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# СОЦІАЛЬНІ КОМУНІКАЦІЇ: ТЕОРІЯ І ПРАКТИКА

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
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# SOCIAL COMMUNICATIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

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*Соціальні комунікації: теорія та практика / Social Communications: Theory and Practice* (2024). Scientific semiannual magazine, 16(2), July – December, Kyiv, 207.

Volume 16(2) of the periodical scientific journal contains research results by social communication specialists, presented by authors from Belgium, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Ukraine.

The research concerns the theory, methodology and history of social communications, the theory and history of journalism, applied social communication technologies, and social communications in management.

The materials will interest social communication specialists, psychologists, political scientists, philologists, sociologists, and philosophers.

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 Національної ради України з питань телебачення й радіомовлення  
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Том 16(2) періодичного наукового журналу містить результати досліджень фахівців із соціальних комунікацій, представлені авторами з Бельгії, Польщі, Словацької Республіки й України.

Дослідження стосуються теорії, методології та історії соціальних комунікацій, теорії та історії журналістики, прикладних соціально-комунікаційних технологій, соціальних комунікацій в управлінні.

Матеріали зацікавлять фахівців із соціальних комунікацій, психологів, політологів, філологів, соціологів та філософів.

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# **THEORY AND HISTORY OF SOCIAL COMMUNICATIONS**


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# **ТЕОРІЯ ТА ІСТОРІЯ СОЦІАЛЬНИХ КОМУНІКАЦІЙ**



## Basic forms and types of social communications seven Andean cultures of Peru

*(the period from 35–40 million years BC to 700 AD)*

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Oleksandr Kholod,</b> Doctor of Science in Philology, Head of the Department of Journalism, E-mail: akholod@ukr.net, <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6851-0176">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6851-0176</a> ResearcherID: AAD-5598-2019 Vasil Stefanik Carpathian National University, Shevchenko st., 57, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine, 76000.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Abstract</b></p> <p><i>The aim of the study was to identify, describe and classify the main forms and types of social communication of seven ancient Peruvian cultures (Paleolithic, lithic, Chavin (8 thousand BC – 3.5 thousand BC) , Karal, Chavin (1.2 thousand BC – 400 BC), Nazca and Vicus), which existed in the period from 35 to 40 million years BC to 700 AD</i></p> <p><i>Four methods were involved in the study. A holistic approach to the analysis of the history of social communications helped us to analyze all phenomena, processes and objects of the world as parts of the Whole. The method of quantum chronos transmitted the analysis of communication processes and texts, archeological finds that were distributed using various communication channels at least 75 years before the moment of their (communication processes and texts) analysis. Thanks to the method of social engineering analysis, we identified a model for studying the forms and types of social communications of the cultures of ancient Peru, created another model for the analysis of the mentioned forms and types, and verified the effectiveness of the created model. The theory of cumulative culture added an opportunity to consider the forms and types of social communications of the peoples of seven ancient Andean cultures in a convergent plan.</i></p> <p><i>The methodology provided for the selection of seven Andean cultures in the history of the development of Peru, which left behind significant artifacts for analysis, from the point of view of archaeologists. Then a detailed description of the forms of social communication that hypothetically functioned in each of the analyzed seven cultures. Codification and classification of forms and identification of types of social communication of the cultures analyzed by us continued our analysis process. We completed the procedure during the discussion of the results, applied the listed methods</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Citation:</b> Kholod, O. (2024). Basic forms and types of social communications seven Andean cultures of Peru. <i>Social Communications: Theory and Practice, 16(2)</i>.  DOI: 10.51423/2524-0471-2024-16-2- 1 © Kholod, O. (2024).</p> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p>Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)</p> </div>	
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of cumulative culture.	<p><i>of analysis and highlighted the specific features of each species.</i></p> <p><i>The results of the research made it possible to state the fact of the convergence of the spiritual-energetic and material-technological components of seven Andean cultures that functioned during the Paleolithic period (35–40 years BC to 700 AD) on the territory that belongs to Peru today.</i></p>
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## Introduction

Studies of the main research areas in the history of social communications in Peru have not been carried out until now. We found several works (Cappellini, 2004; Cruz, 2007; Ruiz, 2022), in which the author reflected the results of studies of the functioning of the Peruvian mass media (press, radio, television, and electronic resources that either duplicated printed publications or offered their original news content). None of the researchers carried out an analysis of the study of the history of social communications in Peru, which determined the relevance of our research. The absence of works in which the authors published the results of the study of the history of social communications in Peru stimulated our interest in finding not only sources whose authors published the results of the study of the problem we analysed. We were driven by interest in identifying the main directions of the mentioned research in Peru.

Taking into account the historical excursion regarding the research issues of the main directions of the study of the history of social communications in Peru (the period from 35-40 million years BC to 700 AD), we formulated the object of our exploration as the study of the history of social communications in Peru, the subject is the main areas of study of the history of social communications in Peru of the mentioned seven historical periods, such as primitive Peruvians of the Paleolithic era, the lithic period, the Chavin (8 thousand BC - 3.5 thousand BC), Karal, Chavin (1.2 thousand BC – 400 BC), Nazca and Wikus.

The purpose of the further analysis was to identify, describe and classify the main forms and types of social communication of seven ancient Peruvian cultures (the Paleolithic era, the lithic period, Chavin (8 thousand BC - 3.5 thousand BC), Karal, Chavin (1.2 thousand BC - 400 BC), Nazca and Vicus.), which existed in the period from 35 to 40 million years BC. to 700 AD At the same time, we include in the concept of "social communications" not only information about various types of mass media (print, television, radio, documentary (from – documentaries), and network), but also all those types of communication that allow information exchange for the regulation of social actions, social interactions and social relations in Peru.

## Research methods and techniques

The main method of our research was a holistic approach (interdisciplinary idea, according to the terminology of M. Sevnick (2004)) to the analysis of the history of social communications (Jackman, 2014; Jackman, 2000; Holism, 2024; Sevnick, 2004; Holizm (holism), 2002; Kholod). , 2023), the quantum chronos method (Krutov, 2021; Kholod, 2020) and SI analysis (Kholod, 2012).

The method of holism, or a holistic approach, or an interdisciplinary idea involves the analysis of all phenomena, processes and objects of the world as parts of the Whole (Greek - ὅλος) (Holism, 2024). According to the proposal of J. Smuts, the author of the term "holism", the concept should be interpreted as "the highest synthetic activity in the universe that orders, organizes, regulates and explains all structural groupings and syntheses in it" (Smuts, 1926). Followers of J.

Smuts interpreted the term "holism" differently in some ways, namely as "an interdisciplinary idea that systems have properties as a whole, apart from the properties of their component parts" (Sevnick, 2004; Jackman, 2014).

It is worth noting that J. Smuts himself interpreted the term "holism" quite vaguely.

*"Smuts criticized authors who emphasized the Darwinian concepts of natural selection and genetic variation to support a chance view of natural processes in the universe. Smuts perceived evolution as a process of creative and intentional correction of nature. Thus, holism is described as the tendency of a whole system to respond creatively to environmental stressors, a process in which the parts naturally work together to bring the whole to more advanced states"* (Holism, 2024).

J. Smuts' interpretation of the term "holism" has at least three aspects: the first aspect related to the idea that "every thing that can be measured scientifically, physically or psychologically, really has a nature as a whole beyond its parts" (Holism, 2024). The second aspect made it possible to interpret holism as the cause of evolution (it should be taken into account that Darwinism at the time of writing the book "Holism and Evolution" (Smuts, 1926) was the dominant concept in Europe and the world). The researcher believed that "evolution is neither accidental nor caused by the actions of some transcendent power such as God" (Holism, 2024). Note that the creative process, according to J. Smuts' proposal, "was an integral element of all physical systems of parts and excluded indirect, transcendent forces" (Brush, 1984). According to the third aspect, J. Smuts used holism to explain the "concrete (non-transcendent) nature of the universe as a whole" because "a holistic view of the universe explains its processes and their evolution more effectively than a reductive view" (Smuts, 1926).

Taking into account the criticism (Brush, 1984; Jörgenfelt, Partington, 2019) and approval (Morgan, 1927) of the ideas of holism in the interpretation of J. Smuts (Smuts, 1926), we are inclined to apply his proposal of holism as an interdisciplinary idea that "every thing that can be measured scientifically, whether physical or psychological, truly has a nature as a whole beyond its parts" (Holism, 2024). We will also add that we stand on the metaphysical positions of monism (Monism, 2024), which is characterized by the concept of "unity". Within monism, we rely on its variety, namely, double-aspect monism (or two-aspect theory), which assumes the proposition that "the mental and the physical are two aspects or views of the same substance" (Double-aspect\_theory, 2024). According to the position of two-aspect monism, we conduct the study of the history of social communications in Peru as a process that involves the unity of physical and mental (in our case, spiritual) aspects. In other words, all mental (spiritual) processes that occur in the history of Peruvian culture (broader – Andean civilization) are stimulated and motivated by the physical conditions of their existence, and vice versa: all physical processes accompanying the existence of Peruvians (broader – Andean civilizations) are explained by mental (spiritual) system of the Peruvian (Andean) peoples.

While studying the main areas of research in the history of social communications in Peru, we applied the method of quantum chronos (Krutov, 2021; Kholod, 2020), the essence of which will be expressed in a few words. According to the proposal of O. Kholod, the quantum chronos method, or the QC method, provides

*"the analysis of communication processes and texts (including journalistic ones), made public (spread with the help of nodal communication, rock icons or drawings, geoglyphs, voice messages of heralds, with the help of publications in the press, on the radio or television, hypertexts on the Internet) less than 75 years to the moment of their (communication processes and texts) analysis, which is due to the average age of a person who lives in*

*peacetime and is familiar with the episteme (knowledge system of a certain historical era)" (Kholod, 2020).*

The application of the QC method is possible if three conditions are taken into account.

Condition 1: when interpreting the principles and concepts of quantum mechanics, we transfer not the details of the wave corpuscular structure of the world, but only the functioning tendencies of the principles of uncertainty, complementarity (complementarity) and the concept of "superposition" into the system of the macro world.

Condition 2: "The analyzed communication processes and texts must be perceived by a modern reader who is only theoretically familiar with the episteme within which the communication processes took place and the text was created" (Kholod, 2020).

Condition 3: "The analysis of the communication process and the perception of texts must be experimental and take into account the principles and concepts of quantum theory - the uncertainty principle of V. Heisenberg and the principle of complementarity of N. Bohr, as well as the concept of superposition" (Kholod, 2020).

We used the QC method to study the main areas of research in the history of social communications in Peru from three positions.

First, as a presumption, or "an assumption that without evidence is considered true until its falsity is indisputably proven" (Presumption, 2024). Studying the texts of different authors who wrote their works in different historical eras, we relied on the age of 75 years or the age of a person's life. If the author in his work considered social communications that functioned less than 75 years before our analysis, we qualified such social communications as "synchronous". In the case when the social communication processes analyzed by the authors were carried out more than 75 years after the moment of our analysis, we classified such social communication as "diachronic".

Secondly, during the analysis of social communications of a certain historical period of the development of society in Peru, we considered the features of such development taking into account the theoretical knowledge. In other words, we took into account the episteme, or knowledge system of a certain historical era.

Thirdly, we considered the analysis of the implementation of the social communication process in Peru to be experimental, which allowed us to take into account the principles and concepts of quantum theory - the principle of uncertainty, the principle of complementarity and the meaning of the concept of "superposition".

The uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics means that

*"in principle, it is impossible to simultaneously measure with arbitrary precision a pair of quantities that describe a quantum object, for example, coordinates and momentum. This statement is true not only for the measurement but also for the theoretical construction of the quantum state of the system...; it is impossible to build such a quantum state in which the system would simultaneously be characterized by exact values of coordinate and momentum" (Принцип невизначеності, 2024).*

In our study of the main areas of research in the history of social communications in Peru, we implemented the uncertainty principle as such, which allowed us to assert the fundamental impossibility of simultaneously accurately measuring two quantities, namely: "social influence on the journalistic product from the episteme" and "subjective influence from publishers, authors of texts and audience".

"Social influence on the journalistic product from the side of the episteme" we consider as something that can be measured thanks to official historical concepts or information officially approved and published in the form of encyclopedias, scientific monographs, reference books, etc.

Let's call this influence "the magnitude of auctoritas societatis (from the Latin "influence of society") and formalize it with the letters AS." "Instead, we will call the quantity "subjective influence on the part of publishers, authors of texts and the audience" (we will conditionally denote it as "quantity B") "influence of the subject", or lat. "auctoritas rei" and formalized with the letters AR. "Auctoritas rei" is interpreted as such a value that expresses not the epistemic position of society, which is officially accepted, but, on the contrary, the position that is inherent to the subject, for example, a member of society - an average person (publisher, author of journalistic material, reader, listener or viewer, web user). Formalizing the quantum uncertainty principle for social communications (especially journalism) in Peru through letter symbols, we can write it as an inequality (see entry 1 below).

$$AS \neq AR \quad (1)$$

Entry 1 will read: "Social influence (AS) is not equal ( $\neq$ ) to subject influence (AR)".

Since both types of influence are recorded simultaneously, we state that they cannot be measured equally precisely. Another symbolic entry could be as follows (see entry 2 below):

$$\neg(AS = AR) \quad (2)$$

We read entry 2 as follows: "Equation ( = ) between social influence (AS) and subject influence (AR) is impossible ( $\neg$ ).

The principle of complementarity in quantum mechanics

*"each physical quantity, together with its canonical conjugate, forms a pair of complementary quantities, while in any state of the quantum system, only one of them can have a certain value, or both of them do not have a certain value"* (Принцип доповнюваності, 2024).

The principle of complementarity in physics states the fact "according to which a complete knowledge of phenomena of atomic dimensions requires a description of the properties of both waves and particles" (Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2024). At one point in the experiment, N. Bohr could record light waves at the atomic level, but could not record the position of an electron. At another point in the experiment, the physicist managed to fix the position of the electron at the atomic level, but the light wave was elusive. So, after repeated experiments, the researcher concluded that it is impossible to accurately record the characteristics of the wave and the electron at the same time since they cannot act in parallel at the same moment. Only the combination of electron and wave behaviour characteristics can be considered a complete characteristic, which is impossible at the subatomic level. From this, the principle of complementarity was formulated, which predicted that adequate fixation of the characteristics of the electron position and wavelength is possible only by supplementing the characteristics of the first with the characteristics of the second, and vice versa. The principle of complementarity (complementarity)

*"means that phenomena at the atomic and subatomic scale are not strictly similar to large-scale particles or waves (such as billiard balls and water waves). Such characteristics of particles and waves in the same large-scale phenomenon are incompatible rather than complementary. Knowledge of a small-scale phenomenon, however, is essentially incomplete until both aspects are known"* (Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2024).

Since the principle of complementarity also applies to "other related (conjugate) pairs of observable quantities, such as energy and time" (Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2024), in the study described below, the principle of complementarity allowed us to record the impossibility of achieving an adequate description the relationship of two phenomena. On the one hand, we described the time (historical era, period) of the development of social communications in Peru, on the other hand, we could only predict the energy contained in the publications of local newspapers and magazines. Conventionally, we call such energy "word energy", units of measurement which do not yet exist. At the same time, if it is hypothetically possible to measure the simultaneous action (influence) of the two mentioned factors (the first-factor "time" as an episteme, or a system of knowledge of a certain historical era, and the second factor "the energy of a word" printed in a newspaper or magazine, recorded in a digital code or broadcast signal), we would solve many problems of researching the history of social communications (and not only in Peru).

In further research, we turned to the concept of "superposition", which is actively used in quantum mechanics.

*"The general superposition principle of quantum mechanics applies to states [that are theoretically possible without mutual interference or contradiction]... of any single dynamical system. This requires us to assume that there are such specific relationships between these states that whenever a system is definitely in one state, we can assume that it is partially in each of two or more other states. The initial state should be considered as the result of a kind of superposition of two or more new states in a way that cannot be imagined based on classical ideas. Any state can be seen as the result of the superposition of two or more other states, and indeed in an infinite number of ways. Conversely, any two or more states can be superimposed to produce a new state..." (Quantum\_superposition, 2024).*

The concept of "superposition" was necessary for our analysis of the main directions of the history of social communications in Peru for the application of the third of the three provisions of the quantum chronos method. We considered the superposition in further research as the functioning of decoding of two states of mass media texts (newspapers, magazines, web platforms and documentaries) of Peru. One state was determined by the quality of generation and perception of texts during their creation and publication in a certain historical period in the system of certain knowledge of the peoples of Peru, the second state is determined by the processes of perception and decoding of texts, for example, at the beginning of the 20th century or the beginning of the 21st century. The processes of generation and perception of texts (for example, created by mass communication specialists, in particular journalists or authors of journalistic texts) will be produced and perceived differently by people who lived one hundred to one hundred and fifty years before today. At the same time, the researcher will not be able to fix two states of functioning of the texts, but the researcher will understand that the texts are in two different states, that is, they are in a superposition about the researcher himself and about the episteme, which is artificially created. Such an episteme is not physical, it is spiritual, that is, one that conveys the energy of the spirit of the people (in our study of the spirit of the people of Peru). To date, there is no unit or method of measuring the processes of manifestation of the spirit of the people, but certain characteristics are singled out by various authors (Ku, 1915; Ford, 2012; ) without taking into account the principles and concepts of quantum mechanics.

During the identification of the main directions of the research on the history of social communications in Peru, we involved the method of CI analysis (social engineering analysis) (Kholod, 2015: 21–25), which is based on the interpretation of social engineering as a triune complex of processes aimed at:

1) "identification of models of social activity (identification of one original phenomenon, the process from a certain number of others that are similar to the original, but different from it)" (Холод, 2015: 21);

2) "on the creation of a new model (of higher quality, in comparison with the identified "old" model) of society's social activity" (Холод, 2015: 21);

3) "pragmatics of effectiveness and efficiency of the created model of social activity of society" (Холод, 2015: 21).

Researcher O. Kholod calls the triune complex of processes (the three listed points) "the triune principle of social engineering" (Холод, 2015: 21). For convenience, we will refer to this principle as the "SI-analysis method" or "SI-analysis".

The method of CI analysis allowed us to analyze the main directions of research on the history of social communications in Peru thanks to the involvement of the three points mentioned earlier. First, we identified an "old" model for studying the history of social communication in Peru. Secondly, we created a "new" model for the study of the history of social communications in Peru. Thirdly, in our study, we verify the effectiveness of the created "new" model for studying the history of social communications in Peru.

The problems of researching the history of the development of social communication processes are not studied to the same extent and not at the same level of intensity in the countries of South America. This is evidenced by the information provided to us by the electronic resource of artificial intelligence "Claude-instant (Poe)" (The main trends in the study of the history of social communications in Peru, 2024). For example, in Peru, the fourth most populous (after Brazil, Colombia and Argentina) South American country, the mentioned studies allow us to record six directions, the content of which we formulate by interpreting the AI reference "Claude-instant (Poe)":

1) the emergence and functioning of mass media in Peru as a means of forming public discourse;

2) exercising control over the mass media to effectively influence public opinion in the country;

3) increasing the role of mass media in crisis political situations that occurred in Peru;

4) peculiarities of functioning of regional mass media, in particular in the language of the Indigenous population;

5) improvement of technical means of information exchange for positive changes in Peruvian society;

6) representation and formation of various types of Peruvian culture by mass media.

Observation (Холод, 2018), as well as the results of searches (Revista Historia y Comunicación Social, 2024; Revista Internacional de Historia de la Comunicación, 2024) indicate that the history of social communications cannot be narrowed down to the analysis of the specifics and features of such types of media and mass media (mass media communications), such as mass gatherings of people (meetings, plebiscites-referendums, elections, congresses, symposia, congresses, forums), mass force majeure events (rebellions, "maidans", terrorist acts), mass clashes of people (wars, revolutions), mass reactions of people to natural force majeure processes and phenomena (refuge from earthquakes, fires, floods, droughts; resettlement of peoples); spectacular shows (concerts, performances, festivals), trade and exhibition mass events (fairs, bazaars, exhibitions, galleries); press, radio, telegraph, cinema, television or the Internet. To the objects of the history of social communications, it is necessary to add "cave art" or "rock painting" (rock graffiti and drawings), geoglyphs (for example, "Nasca lines", or drawings of the Nazca desert in Peru), oral signals (vocalisms) of ancient tribes, clothing of peoples of any historical period, writings and languages in which the writings were written, etc. The list of means of social communication may also include logistical routes (roads, railway tracks, aerial "routes", space



tracks, etc.). It is worth recalling the proposal of H. Innis (Innis, 1991), who believed that money, fish and even wood that floats in rivers can also be considered "means of communication as means of control over the environment" (Innis, 1991), therefore, means of social communication.

We propose to call the listed groups of media and mass media means of social communications aimed at regulating social actions, social interactions and social relations. In this case, we will consider as an axiom the statement that when studying the history of social communications in Peru, it is possible to conditionally rely on the classification of types of social communications, which we present below (see Table 1 in the Appendices). Each of those is listed in the table. 1 directions further we analyze in detail with the help of the presentation of research results reflected in the publications of authors from Peru or those works in which non-Peruvian authors investigated the problems of studying the history of social communications in Peru.

## **Results and discussion**

### Signs of social communication of primitive Peruvians in the Paleolithic period (from 2.5 million years BC to 15-11 thousand years BC)

The primitive people of Peru "worshipped natural phenomena (rains, earthquakes, lightning, thunder, etc.) which it cannot explain and which it fears" (Historia del Perú..., 2024). Historians and archaeologists (Historia del Perú..., 2024) believe that "the first inhabitants of Peru had skills in making dishes and knew special hunting techniques" (Historia del Perú..., 2024). Since the ancient Peruvians were engaged in hunting, gathering and fishing, their social communication was based on a parasitic economy. In other words, the primitive people of Peru, thanks to the primitive exchange of socially important information, did not plan their lives and led a parasitic economy (Historia del Perú..., 2024).

Back in the Lower Paleolithic period (from 35–40 thousand BC to 15–11 thousand years BC), the primitive people of Peru had specific social communications, which were recorded in group associations based on family ties. Such groups were called "family groups" (Historia del Perú..., 2024). From the period of group family organization of life, the division of labour by gender begins: men performed the hard work of obtaining and transporting food to the cave where the tribe lived, where women were engaged in raising and caring for children, and cooking.

Characterizing the features of the social communications of the primitive people of Peru during the Paleolithic period, it is necessary to take into account how people "used the laminar technique, which consisted in the manufacture of elongated tools with parallel and sharp edges, very similar to modern knives. The technology, whose raw material was bone, was oriented towards the production of throwing weapons that had decorations (sometimes as artistic designs)" (Historia del Perú..., 2024).

Later, from the 3rd to 4th millennium BC. (in the Archaic period), the descendants of the original people of Peru had already learned gardening. At this time, they had the first domestic animals - camels, which at that time were distributed in South America. During this period the primitive tribes of Peru began to live in groups, thus forming settlements that today are commonly called villages. At this stage, the social communications of the primitive people of Peru hypothetically have the following features:

- 1) the appearance of beliefs in supernatural forces, which stimulated the specificity of new social communications;
- 2) special places for sacrificing children to animistic gods appear; therefore, sacrifice explicates a new type of social communication, which we will conventionally call "ritual sacrificial social communication";

3) during the selection of a sacrifice to the gods, the ancient Peruvians determined the criteria for such a selection, which we label as operational social communications, thanks to which the development of abstract thinking was recorded based on the analysis of the salutary functions of the members of the tribe;

4) strengthening of parasitic social communications, which allowed the tribe to exist without planning its forces and preserving food and weapons reserves;

5) social communications of the division of labour took place, which made it possible to rationally distribute the tribal functions of strong and weak members of family groups;

6) joint production of "stone elements for hunting animals" (Historia del Perú, 2024);

7) formation of specific hunting social communications, which allowed verbal and non-verbal means to warn of danger, threat to life, preparation for organized fishing of fish, predators, collection of plants useful for existence;

8) the appearance of tribal leaders, which formed a social-communication cult of a strong leader;

9) the emergence of social and communication principles for the selection of shamans (priests), who "predicted" the power of nature, were "conductors" between members of the tribe and natural deities, could "cause" the elements, rains, drought, wind, etc.;

10) the emergence of the first family "precepts", and "statutes" of the tribe (rules of coexistence), in which sanction measures and norms of coexistence in the tribe were "engraved" orally and passed from generation to generation; the functions of the tribe leader and shaman, men and women, children and young men and women were determined.

Taking into account the forms of social communication of primitive Peruvians during the Lower Paleolithic period (from 35–40 thousand years BC to 15–11 thousand years BC), we singled out the types of social communication of the mentioned period and marked them with letter codes (see Table 1 below). We marked each type of social communication with the letter code "A", "B", "C", "D" and so on according to the alphabet of the English language.

Table 1.  
Signs of social communication of primitive Peruvians  
in the Paleolithic period  
(from 35–40 million years BC to 15–11 thousand years BC)

No s/p	Forms of social communications	Types of social communications	Code	Unit of measurement ( number /%)
	The appearance of beliefs in supernatural forces, which stimulated the specificity of new social communications.	Belief.	A	1/10
2.	There are special places where children can be sacrificed to animistic gods. Therefore, sacrifice explicates a new type of social communication, which we will tentatively call "ritual sacrificial social communication."	Sacrifice.	Б	1/10
3.	During the selection of a sacrifice to the gods, the ancient Peruvians determined the criteria for such selection, which we label	Abstraction.	B	1/10

	as operational social communications, thanks to which the development of abstract thinking was recorded based on the analysis of the welcome functions of the members of the tribe.			
4.	Consolidation of parasitic social communications, which allowed the tribe to exist without the use of planning its forces and the preservation of food and weapon reserves.	Parasitism.	C	1/10
5.	Social communications of the division of labor took place, which made it possible to rationally distribute the tribal functions of strong and weak members of family groups.	Division of labor.	D	1/10
6.	Joint production of "stone elements for hunting animals" ( Historia Del Peru , 2024).	Production of stone weapons .	F	1/10
7.	Formation of specific hunting social communications, which allowed verbal and non-verbal means to warn of danger, threat to life, preparation for organized fishing of fish, predators, gathering of plants useful for existence.	Signal systems.	G	1/10
8.	The emergence of tribal leaders, which formed a social-communication cult of a strong leader.	leadership	H	1/10
9.	The emergence of social and communication principles for the selection of shamans (priests), who "predicted" the power of nature, were "guides" between members of the tribe and natural deities, could "cause" the elements, rain, drought, wind, etc.	Priesthood.	Ц	1/10
10.	sanction measures and norms of coexistence in the tribe were "engraved" orally and passed from generation to generation ; the functions of the tribe leader and shaman, men and women, children and young men and women were defined.	Rules of coexistence.	J	1/10
11.	TOTAL:	–	–	10/100
12.	Error:	–	–	0
13.	AMOUNT ( $\Sigma$ ):	–	–	10/100

Social Communications of the Lithic Period of Peru  
(11 thousand BC - 8 thousand BC)

According to researchers (Historia del Perú, 2024), the appearance of primitive people on the territory of modern Peru should be dated from 11 thousand years BC. The historical period in question is known as the Wisconsin Glaciation, or the Stone Age, or the Lithic Period, which lasted until the 8th millennium BC.

People of the Lithic period already have a belief in natural forces, which are controlled by Someone or Something, to whom/what must be obeyed and whom/what must be satisfied with sacrifices. Often such victims were children who did not yet know how to get food for themselves and serve themselves throughout life (Historia del Perú..., 2024). Adult members of the tribe were not sacrificed, because adults were useful to the tribe, and could obtain food in difficult conditions of existence, the food itself, and guard the caves in which ancient people lived.

Conventionally, in the working order within the scope of our study, we will call the first people in the region of the modern state of Peru "primitive people/tribes of Peru". They were hunters (Historia del Perú, 2024).

*«Human groups led a nomadic lifestyle, lived in caves or rock shelters, where they made engravings or petroglyphs. On the walls of these caves, the first inhabitants of the current territory of Peru left their mark in the form of drawings»* (Historia del Perú..., 2024).

The primitive people of Peru could hypothetically have the following forms of social communication:

- 1) exchange of information thanks to gestures and vocalization;
- 2) joint collective production of traps for large animals;
- 3) joint production of stone tips for spears, production of stones specially sharpened on one side for skinning of killed wild animals;
- 4) transmission and reception of information through the exchange of things (for example, clothes made of the fur of killed animals);
- 5) drawing rock paintings for the educational purpose of informing fellow tribesmen about the specifics of hunting or foraging for food, fishing, etc.;
- 6) painting and tattooing the surface of the body as a way of marking the social status of members of the tribe;
- 7) sacrificing children as a sign of establishing social communications with the forces of nature (gods).



*Fig. 1. A deer hunting scene on a panel at the base of a shelter in the Llamachaki Gorge in Macuzana, Peru. Photograph by Rainer Hostnig (Hostnig, 2024).*



*Fig. 2. Rock paintings that were made by ancient Peraunians between 10,000 and 5,000 years ago (Utcubamba province in Peru) (Gereda, 2024).*

We transferred the hypothetically formulated forms of social communications to Table. 2 (see below) and identified types of social communications.

Table 2.  
Forms and types of social communications of the lithic period of Peru  
(11 thousand BC - 8 thousand BC)

No s/p	Forms of social communications	Types of social communications	Code	Unit of measurement ( number /%)
1.	Information exchange through gestures and vocalizations.	Sign vocalization.	K	1 /14.2
2.	Joint collective production of traps for large animals.	Creation of hunting traps.	L	1 /14.2
3.	Joint production of stone tips for spears, production of stones specially sharpened on one side for skinning of killed wild animals.	Production of stone weapons .	F	1 /14.2
4.	Transmission and reception of information through the exchange of things (for example, clothing made from the fur of killed animals).	Natural exchange.	M	1 /14.2
5.	Drawing rock paintings for the educational purpose of informing fellow tribesmen about the specifics of hunting or foraging for food, fishing, etc.	Graphic rock visualization.	N	1 /14.2
6.	Painting and tattooing the surface of the body as a way of marking the social status of members of the tribe.	Bodyart.	O	1 /14.2
7.	Sacrificing children as a sign of establishing social communications with	Human sacrifice.	Б1	1 /14.2

	the forces of nature (gods).			
8.	TOTAL:	–	–	7/99.4
9.	Error	–	–	0/0.6
10.	$\Sigma$ (sum)	–	–	7/100

Social communications of the pre-Peruvian Chavin culture  
(8 thousand BC - 3.5 thousand BC)

According to the declaration of S. Tello (The Life and Writings of Julio C. Tello, 2010) and according to the research of I. Shimada and R. Vega-Centeno (2011), in the early archaic period (from 8 thousand BC to 3.5 thousand years BC) the oldest culture in Peru was the Chavin culture, which arose 3000 years ago in the eastern mountains of the Ancash department.

In the aforementioned Early Archaic period, images of monkeys and felines were used in Chavin art to mark social communications between tribe members and the higher forces of nature. It is in this period that the first phases of Olmec ceramics (Mesoamerican form-building) are recorded (Historia del Perú..., 2024).

The testimony of Max Uhle (Rowe, 1954), who defended the idea of the autochthonous origin of Peruvian man in the archaic period, is interesting and relevant to our research.

*«...the origin of Peruvian man would have been foreign, and the people who arrived in Peru by sea would have been the Maya and the Aztecs, who would have spread and radiated their culture through the central Andes, reaching the Peruvian coast, giving rise to the great Proto Chimu and Proto Nazca cultures, and from there it spread to the Peruvian mountains. This was accomplished thanks to the ease of navigation provided by the Pacific Ocean as a means of communication and as a source of food» (Historia del Perú..., 2024).*

Therefore, our prediction that the logistical aspect of the problem of the migration of people across the Pacific Ocean is fully confirmed and proves the opinion that the ocean was a means of social communication for the people who once inhabited the Peruvian coast. This is also evidenced by the similarity of Maya and Aztec art with some cultural manifestations of Peru, especially in the architecture of Chavin, Chan-chan and Gran Pajaten" (Historia del Perú..., 2024).

Based on the results of the research of our predecessors, we state that there are several features of social communication of the people of the Chavin culture.

1. Chavin culture people depicted animals on ceramics, which was a manifestation of the first forms of social communication in Peru.

2. The Pacific Ocean as a logistical means of spreading culture in the form of architecture and the cultivation of corn.

3. Similarity of Aztec, Mayan and Peruvian art as a convergent form of social communication.

Table 3.

Forms and types of social communication of the pre-Peruvian Chavin culture  
(8 thousand BC - 3.5 thousand BC)

No s/p	Forms of social communications	Types of social communications	Code	Unit of measurement
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				( number /%)
1.	the Chavin culture depicted animals on ceramics, which was a manifestation of the first forms of social communication in Peru.	Artistic visualization on ceramics.	Nk	1/ 33
2.	The Pacific Ocean as a logistical means of spreading culture in the form of architecture and the cultivation of corn.	Logistics.	P	1/ 33
3.	Similarity of Aztec, Mayan and Peruvian art as a convergent form of social communication.	Convergence in the language of art	Q	1/ 33
4.	TOTAL:	–	–	3/99
5.	Error	–	–	0/1
6.	$\Sigma$ (sum)	–	–	3/ 100

Social communications of the pre-Peruvian culture Karal  
(the period between 3 thousand years and 1.8 years BC)

The next period of development and improvement of social communications should be called the late archaic period. During the mentioned period of development of Peru, the Caral civilization became popular.

*«The Caral culture, which arose between 3000 and 1800 BC, is the emergence of the oldest structured society in the Americas, a settlement area. The urban development occupies an area of 400 km in several valleys, the rivers of which flow into the Pacific Ocean. This civilization is contemporary with the culture of Mesopotamia and Egypt and precedes this culture by 1,200 years» (Bergoeing, 2014: 85).*

The idea that the Karal culture is older than Mesopotamia and Egypt is not new (Shady, et al, 2009). However, the fact that the Caral culture should be considered a period of improvement of social communications in the territory of ancient Peru is not necessarily contradicted. Our opinion is proved by the statement that it was during the Karal period

*«the first societies with monumental architecture appeared, which wove an extensive trade network, uniting products from the coast of the Amazon and Ecuador. Since then, the social and cultural complexity of the peoples of the region began to escalate, giving rise to the Andean civilizations» (Bergoeing, 2014: 85).*

Here it must be recognized that the extensive trade system, as well as the complex social relations between the peoples of the Andean region, gave impetus to the development of new and transformed social communications between tribes. In addition, religion played a major social integration role in the formation of new types of social communication among the people of ancient Peru. As researchers note (Civilización caral, 2024), religion at that time was used as a means of cohesion on a level with coercion.

*«Religion at that time was a state policy of control over the population, the production of goods and their circulation. This is represented in the great monuments of a religious nature (the pyramids) with their plazas, atriums and altars of the sacred fire, where the various feasts of the ceremonial calendar were held, symbolizing their cultural identity» (Civilización caral, 2024).*

Therefore, the faith itself is a philosophical and everyday view and attitudes of the members of the tribes, and together with that, the social institution of faith in the forms of squares, atriums and altars of sacred fire marked new social communications. In addition, we note that ritual gatherings and other mass events grouped social communications around architectural religious and commercial buildings, altars and squares.

*«Periodic meetings and joint activities, such as the restoration of the pyramids, allowed the recognition of authority and the strengthening of cultural identity» (Civilización Caral, 2024).*

An important conclusion of the archaeologists is the statement that during the excavations, experts failed to record artefacts of offensive weapons. Instead, all the historical findings indicated the peaceful and successful economic development of the members of the Karal period. Historians call the Peruvian Caral culture the "civilization of peace" because

*«no offensive weapons or defensive structures were seen or found. ...It would seem that art and commerce were used liberally to support economic production active and efficient» (Civilización caral, 2024).*

The last fact testifies to developed social communications, oriented, first of all, to peaceful coexistence with representatives of other tribes. The society of the Karal culture was not isolated, but on the contrary, represented a part of the system of places that existed with the mentioned culture in a certain economic network.

*«This network included coastal settlements and others located in higher areas (mountains). Between all of them, there was an exchange of products (barter trade), and the city of Karal was the centre of this whole network. From this point of view, we see the importance that specialization has reached, that is, the emergence of groups specializing in certain types of economic activity» (Civilización caral, 2024).*

Let us add that the specialization of members of the Karal tribe in the production of certain narrow types of economic activity marked the emergence of certain specific types of social communications. Today, we call such social communications professional or specialized.

Taking into account the results of searches, studies and descriptions of anthropologists and archaeologists, historians, linguists and culturologists (Bergoeing, 2014; Shady, et al, 2009; Civilización caral, 2024), we will consider a certain list as the key types of social communications of the Caral culture (see below).

1. "Emergence of the first complex societies and states in north-central Peru" (Civilización caral, 2024).

2. The functioning of "a system of complex political entities that governed their territories in north-central Peru, with rulers and ruled located in urban centres and cities" (Civilización caral, 2024).



3. Caral civilization "was contemporary to other primitive civilizations of the world, such as Egyptian, Indian, Sumerian or Chinese, but unlike them (which exchanged their achievements), Caral developed in complete isolation from these civilizations" (Civilización caral, 2024). This refers to the isolation of Karal from civilizations whose representatives lived on the territories of other continents. The aborigines of the Caral culture carried out social communications with representatives of the Andean tribes regularly for economic benefit for themselves.

4. Social communications were formed and reinforced by "the existence of social organizations at the level of chiefs" (Civilización caral, 2024). Processes of exchange of socially important information were carried out during mass meetings, which we consider as social communication forms of strengthening the image of the government and strengthening cultural identity.

5. The social communications of the members of the Caral culture tribes were marked in architecture, as at that time the "building of large cities with monumental buildings" (Civilización caral, 2024) was recorded. So. Markers of Karal social communication are the "predominant forms of stepped pyramids, circular or semi-circular plazas sunk into the facades, with steps leading to the top, where rooms and places for rituals and ceremonies are observed" (Shady, et al, 2009). We can consider the construction of the great pyramids of the Karal culture as a declaration of power.

6. The Karal culture had marked social communication in "sophisticated displays of musical art: in the manufacture of flutes with incised figures of mythical animals, suggesting a religious character" (Shady, et al, 2009).

7. "The differences in size between the settlements and their buildings indicate a hierarchy between the population that occupied them and even the existence of a political organization that made their construction possible" (Civilización caral, 2024), which also distinguishes the types of social communication of the Caral culture from previous and of the following Andean cultures.

8. In the social communications of representatives of the Caral culture, religious institutional procedures functioned as a form of "control over the population, the production of goods and their circulation" (Civilización caral, 2024).

Taking into account 8 items from the above list, we created a table. 4 (see below).

Table 4.  
Forms and types of social communications  
of the pre-Peruvian Karal culture  
(the period between 3 thousand years and 1.8 years BC)

No s/p	Forms of social communications	Types of social communications	Code	Unit of measurement ( number /%)
1.	"The appearance of the first complex societies and states in the north-central part of Peru" ( Civilización caral , 2024).	Complex societies.	R	1/12.5
2.	The functioning of "a system of complex political entities that governed their own territories in north-central Peru, with rulers and ruled located in urban centers and cities" ( Civilización caral , 2024).	Political system. leadership	R1 H	1/6.25 6.25

3.	Caral civilization "was contemporary with other primitive civilizations of the world, such as Egyptian, Indian, Sumerian or Chinese, but unlike them (which exchanged their achievements), Caral developed in complete isolation from these civilizations" ( <i>Civilización caral</i> , 2024). This refers to the isolation of Karal from civilizations whose representatives lived on the territories of other continents. The aborigines of the Caral culture carried out social communications with representatives of the Andean tribes regularly with economic benefit for themselves.	Insulation.	S	1/12.5
4.	Social communications were formed and reinforced by "the existence of social organizations at the level of chiefs" ( <i>Civilización caral</i> , 2024). Processes of exchange of socially important information were carried out during mass events-meetings, which we consider as social communication forms of strengthening the image of the government and strengthening cultural identity.	Social organization. leadership	T H	1/6.25 6.25
5.	The social communications of the members of the Caral culture tribes were marked in architecture, since at that time the "building of large cities with monumental buildings" ( <i>Civilización caral</i> , 2024). So. Markers of Karal social communication are "predominant forms of stepped pyramids, circular or semi-circular plazas sunk into the facades, with steps leading to the top, where rooms and places for rituals and ceremonies are observed" ( <i>Shady , et et al ., 2009</i> ). We can consider the construction of the great pyramids of the Karal culture as a declaration of power.	Architecture.	U	1/12.5
6.	Karal culture had marked social communication in "sophisticated displays of musical art: in the manufacture of flutes with incised figures of mythical animals, suggesting a religious character" ( <i>Shady , et et al</i>	Music.	V	1/12.5

	., 2009).			
7.	"The differences in size between the settlements and their buildings indicate a hierarchy between the population that occupied them and even the existence of a political organization that made their construction possible" ( Civilización caral , 2024), which also distinguishes the types of social communication of the Caral culture from previous and subsequent Andean cultures.	Architecture.	U1	1/12.5
8.	In the social communications of representatives of the Caral culture , religious institutional procedures functioned as a form of "control over the population, the production of goods and their circulation" ( Civilización caral , 2024).	Belief. Religion.	A1	1/12.5
9.	TOTAL:	–	–	8/100
10.	Error	–	–	0
11.	Σ (sum)	–	–	8/100

Social communications of the pre-Peruvian Chavin culture  
(1200 BC - 400 BC)

Returning to the Chavín culture of another period during the Early Horizon (1200 BC - 400 BC)" (Cultura chavín, 2024), we record "the intensification of the religious cult, the appearance of ceramics, closely related associated with ceremonial centres, the intensification of the cultivation of corn and potatoes, the improvement of agricultural machinery and the development of metallurgy and textile processing" (Cultura chavín, 2024).

Researchers (Makowski, 1996; Cultura chavín, 2024; Benavides Estrada, Díaz Suárez, & Narrea Delgado, 2005; Cabezas clavos, 2024, etc.) believe that the Chavín culture created Chavín de Huántar, which was considered an important "ceremonial centre..., whose influence spread over most of the coast and highlands of the Andes of Peru" (Cultura chavín, 2024). According to archaeologists, Chavín de Huántar was built "between approximately 1500 and 300 BC" (Chavín de Huántar, 2024). An analysis of finds on the territory of this ancient city indicates that the structure was a complex network of paths, "internal stone galleries, illuminated only by rays of light that penetrate through strategically placed air ducts" (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).

*«Inside you can still see the monolithic Lanson, a carved stone 4.54 m high, representing an anthropomorphic deity, perhaps the most important in the Chavin pantheon. On the walls of the main temple, you could see some nail caps, and sculptural bundles, which acted as mythological guardians of the temple» (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).*

The fact that Chavin de Huantar was the centre of social communication of the Chavin culture is confirmed by artefacts that testify to the sending of religious cults, ceremonies, and oracle performances at this place. Researchers (Chavín de Huántar, 2024) prove the fact of the importance of the functions of the administrative centre that controlled food production. Such control was necessary to observe the periodicity of going out into the ocean by ships serving trade routes for the distribution of produced food. Since swimming at that time was a fixed process, social communication was carried out to regulate the population. Artefacts found by archaeologists and interpretations of anthropologists, which connect agricultural production with pompous rituals and show respect for supernatural forces, attract attention. Among such revered objects, historians name the God of Water, "on whom beneficial rains depended, as well as catastrophic droughts that destroyed crops" (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).

*«The inhabitants of Chavin were a few priests and their assistants in the service, while most of its users were a kind of pilgrims who came to the place in search of 'oracles', carrying various kinds of offerings, with the possibility of staying for a long time» (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).*

So, the social communication of the ancient Peruvian city of Chavín de Huántar was carried out thanks to the "hierarchical pyramidal society" (Chavín de Huántar, 2024), which had all the signs of a class society.

*«At the head were priest-leaders who performed religious functions and at the same time ruled the people. The same specialists were artisans of stone and clay, metallurgy, textiles, and hydraulic engineers who improved irrigation technology to increase the production of potatoes, corn, beans, chilli peppers, etc. These specialists were kept by the state. Finally, the same peasants cultivated the land with the help of machinery developed by engineers» (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).*

It was notable that the class society of the ancient Peruvian Chavin culture had a "socialist" vector of development, since, according to historians (Chavín de Huántar, 2024), specialists who produced nutritious plants were supported by the state authorities.

Large monoliths that were found by archaeologists in the territory of modern Peru also attract attention (Rick, 2012; Tauro del Pino, 2001). Among the finds are a monolithic lanzon, the Raimondi stele (Estela de Raimondi, 2024) and the Tello obelisk (Obelisco Tello, 2024).

*«Each of them is a menhir, which in Andean culture has a spiritual meaning and serves for social and political control over the population, which is threatened by the elements of nature and lack of food. In Quechua, it means stone of power, and they are extremely sacred» (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).*



Fig. 3. Statue of Raimondi, Peru.



Fig. 4 Tello obelisk, Peru.

Sources:

For Fig. 3: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=27141663>

For Fig. 4: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=89593284>

We believe that both monoliths were used during ritual religious social communications and are evidence of the transformation of ancient Peruvian beliefs and ways of their cultivation and dissemination (Estela de Raimondi, 2024). The system of social communications of ancient Chavins included repressive and restrictive norms, or sanctioned limits of social behaviour and socialization in general (Obelisco Tello, 2024).

*«According to one of the interpretations, Chavin's monolith unites three elements of Chavin's cosmogonic trilogy: the eagle, the snake and the cat (air, water and earth), that is, repressive deities who serve as guards and ward off evil. In this way, air, water and earth confirm the constant harmony with the Cosmos, with which the entire heritage of the Chavin culture is woven»* (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).

The description of the monoliths of the Chavin culture allows us to record the reflection of the specifics of the social communications of the ancient Peruvian people. The monoliths depicted the heads of cats, which were dressed in a lower tunic similar to a belt. Strangely such a belt imitated figures that had a common mouth with a single throat. According to researchers (Chavín de Huántar, 2024), images,

*"where two or more images share a common form is called contour rivalry, and in the art of the people of the Chavin culture it is intentional, creating a rivalry or duality between cult followers and non-cult followers"* (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).

Social communication was reflected by the Chavin people in almost all types of art, the signs of which are recorded in the artefacts found during excavations carried out in different years of the 20th and 21st centuries. The specificity of such social communications consisted in the labelling by ancient Peruvian artists of social relationships between people and animals, between simple and privileged members of the tribe family. Chavin art also recorded specific social communications of Chavin residents with the "other world" (Conklin, & Quilter, 2008). In the everyday life of the people of the Chavin culture, painted cloth was used, which was called "itsi". In the pictures, icicles are observed

*"religious characters of the Chavin culture, which, according to some archaeologists, maybe a catechism intended to spread the religious cult of this culture"* (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).

It is worth noting that clothing and music played a leading role in the introduction of religious cults of the people of the Chavin culture. Because Chavin's social communication relied on the authority of the priestly caste, it is assumed that the high priest occupied the highest rung of the social hierarchy (Makowski, 1996). During the excavations, archaeologists found various painted ceramic products. In connection with the above, experts define two types of ceramic products of the Chavin people by purpose, namely: 1) household ceramics "for the general use of townspeople and 2) ritual ceramics: for ritual practices" (Benavides Estrada, Díaz Suárez, & Narrea Delgado, 2005).

Along with the marking of the specifics of social communications in the ceramic products of the people of the Chavin culture, a similar marking was also recorded in the sculptural monoliths, which archaeologists called "hat nails". The latter represented the heads of mythical creatures, a belief which was widespread in the architecture of the peoples of the pre-Columbian Andes. According to anthropologists (Cabezas Clavas, 2024), the heads of mythical creatures were an explanation of the functions of temple guards or creatures that scared away evil spirits from the settlements of the Chavin tribes. There are also experts' assumptions (Conklin, & Quilter, 2008) that the analyzed hat nails in the form of the heads of mythical creatures could represent the emotions of priests of the Chavin cult people, who practised the use of hallucinogens, for example, the San Pedro cactus, in the implementation of religious social communications.

*"The action of this drug was depicted allegorically on the faces of each nailed head, in the form of a sequence. Wide open round eyes represent dilated pupils; and the snakes sculpted on the faces showed hallucinations" (Cabezas clavvas, 2024).*



*Fig. 3. Hat nails of the Chavin culture (formative horizon period)  
(1200 BC - 400 BC).*

*Source: [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c7/Cabezas\\_clavas\\_chavin.jpg/375px-Cabezas\\_clavas\\_chavin.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c7/Cabezas_clavas_chavin.jpg/375px-Cabezas_clavas_chavin.jpg)*

Taking into account the information analyzed regarding the identification of types and specifics of social communications of the people of the Chavin culture, we singled out 14 points and formed a table. 5. We designated each type of social communication with a letter code (see Table 5 below).

1. Intensification of religious worship and ceremonies (in particular, burial ceremonies).

2. Intensification of social communications in agriculture.
  3. Administration and management of production as a manifestation of social communications in Chavin de Huantar.
  4. The transfer of social communications to stone creatures in the form of anthropomorphic deities (for example, the deity Uanka, God of Water, monolithic Lanson).
  5. Ceremonies and mandates carried out by oracles served as means and forms of regulation of social actions and interactions of society members in Chavin de Huantar.
  6. The presence of a hierarchical pyramidal society (priest-leaders, specialists, peasants).
  7. The cosmological underpinning of social communications "is the menhir, which in Andean culture has spiritual significance and serves for social and political control over a population threatened by the elements of nature and food shortages" (Chavín de Huántar, 2024).
  8. Manifestation of social communications in contour rivalry (rivalry between cult followers and non-cult followers).
  9. Identifying oneself with the other world at the level of establishing good social communication.
  10. Implementation of social communications thanks to the spread of religious cults in the form of ichi - a painted fabric depicting religious characters of Chavin culture.
  11. Use of ritual ceramics for religious social communication.
  12. Explanation of mystical and religious social communications through anthropomorphic hats and nails.
  13. Religious social hierarchy explained the specifics of Chavin's social communication.
  14. Music, clothing, and religious symbols are forms of Chavin social communication.
- We transferred the forms and types of social communications described in 14 points to the table. 5 (see below) and gave each species its letter code.

Table 5.  
Forms and types of social communications of the Chavin culture of the Peruvian Davies  
(1200 BC - 400 BC)

No s/p	Forms of social communications	Types of social communications	Code	Unit of measurement ( number /%)
1.	Intensification of religious worship and ceremonies (in particular, burial ceremonies).	Religious cult (during burial).	A2	1/7,1
2.	Intensification of social communications in agriculture.	Agricultural production.	X	1/7,1
3.	Administration and management of production as a manifestation of social communications in Chavin de Huantar .	State management.	R3	1/7,1
4.	The transfer of social communications to stone creatures in the form of anthropomorphic deities (for example, the deity Uanka , God of Water, monolithic Lanson ).	Anthropomorphic stone deities.	A3	1/7,1

5.	Ceremonies and mandates carried out by oracles served as means and forms of regulation of social actions and interactions of society members in Chavin de Huantar .	Ceremonies. Priesthood.	Ц1 Ц	1/3.55 3.55
6.	The presence of a hierarchical pyramidal society ( priests -leaders, specialists, peasants).	Social hierarchy.	R 4	1/7,1
7.	The cosmological underpinning of social communications "is the menhir, which in Andean culture has spiritual significance and serves for social and political control over the population, which is threatened by the elements of nature and lack of food" ( Chavín de Huántar , 2024).	Cosmology as social control.	A4	1/7,1
8.	Manifestation of social communications in contour rivalry (rivalry between cult followers and non-cult followers).	The cult and its opponents.	A8	1/7,1
9.	Identifying oneself with the other world at the level of establishing good social communications.	Hereafter.	A5	1/7,1
10.	Implementation of social communications due to the spread of religious cults in the form of ichi - a painted fabric on which religious characters of the Chavina culture are depicted.	Textiles (colorings of a religious nature).	W	1/7,1
11.	The use of ritual ceramics for the implementation of religious social communications.	Ceramics ( ritual - religious).	Nk	1/7,1
12.	Explication of channels of mystical and religious social communications in the form of anthropomorphic hats and nails.	Religious and mystical decoration (nail caps)	A6	1/7,1
13.	The religious social hierarchy explained the specifics of Chavin social communication.	Religious holidays.	A1 T	1/3.55 3.55
14.	Music, clothes, religious symbols are forms of Chavin social communication.	Music. Clothes. Religious symbols.	V W A7	1/72,33 2.33 2.33
15.	TOTAL:	–	–	14/99.96
16.	Error	–	–	0/0.03
17.	Σ (sum)	–	–	14/100



Social communications of the tribes of the Nazca culture  
(I century - VI century AD)

The Nazca culture existed between the 1st century and VI century not. A specific feature of the mentioned culture is the so-called line drawings (geoglyphs), "about 20 cm thick on the arid soil of the Peruvian pampa, where more than 800 animal figurines are represented" (Bergoeing, 2014: 85).



*Fig. 4–5. The figure of a hummingbird, located on the arid soil of the Nazca pampa, is one of the first types of social communication of the ancient Peruvians of our era.  
(source Fig. 4, left – Archivo:Lignes de Nazca Décembre, 2006;  
source of fig. 5, on the right – <https://kor.ill.in.ua/m/610x385/1797568.jpg>).*

In the future, we will consider the geoglyphs of the Nazca desert as a form of social communication, thanks to which the cultures of the Peruvian tribes who lived near the desert at different times encoded information of an agronomic and meteorological nature (Delfino, & Carlos, 2022). "Geoglyphs are the constellations of the ancient astronomical calendar (El misterio de las líneas de Nazca, resuelto por los arqueólogos, 2024) and were created to observe the course of celestial bodies in the sky" (Eda, Yamasaki, & Sakai, 2019). There is also the point of view of Japanese researchers about the ritual and decorative purpose of Nazca figures (El misterio de las líneas de Nazca, resuelto por los arqueólogos, 2024).

*«According to recent findings and research presented in May 2015 by Yamagata University in Japan, it is argued that the lines served as epicentres of ritual activity for both the Nazca and other surrounding cultures. It turned out that the lines were made by more than one culture and at different historical moments. Thus, they performed an integrating function for all the cultures between the coast and the mountains of Ikenya. It is also concluded that they served to decorate the pilgrim's path to the city of Cauacha, the socio-political centre of the Nazca culture since the lines are made so that they can be seen from a certain height» (El misterio de las líneas de Nazca, resuelto por los arqueólogos, 2024).*

Such information was passed down from generation to generation for six centuries. Information in patterns, fluoromorphic, anthropomorphic and zoomorphic images on ceramic, metal and textile products of members of the Nazca culture tribes can be considered similar to geoglyphs (Cultura Nazca, 2024).

*«Ceramics were one of the most important manifestations of Nazca art. They used different techniques and designs to create objects for everyday, religious and funerary purposes. The Nazca decorated their pottery with figures of people, animals and plants, and used red, orange and yellow to create striking contrasts» (Soler, 2024).*



*Fig. 6. Ceramics of the Nazca Culture (source – <https://ceramologia.com/arte/nueva-mirada-a-la-ceramica-de-el-reino-nazca/>).*

The social hierarchy was proof of specific social communications among the peoples of the Nazca culture. It existed in the Peruvian tribes, whose members were active between the 1st century. and the VII century. on the territory that today is indicated on the world map as the territory of Peru. The society of the Nazca culture was ruled by lords and priests (Cultura nazca, 2024). The Lord's main function is the organization of public works and ritual actions. The place of residence of the lords and priests were pyramidal buildings, which were located in separate special sectors of the settlements of the Nazca tribes. The rooms of high officials "were made of adobe, and the walls were covered with a layer of plaster or lime to cover cracks" (Cultura nazca, 2024).



*Fig. 7. Burial (skull and mummy embalmed in Peru; source – [https://st.depositphotos.com/1751683/3455/i/600/depositphotos\\_34556233-stock-photo-embalmed-mummy-and-skull-in.jpg](https://st.depositphotos.com/1751683/3455/i/600/depositphotos_34556233-stock-photo-embalmed-mummy-and-skull-in.jpg))*

The social hierarchy of the society of the Nazca culture, after the privileged stratum of the population (priests and lords), was continued by artisans (potters and textile workers). Astrologers were separated from the social class next to musicians and soldiers, "who lived in small towns and ceremonial centres, among which the Kauachi complex stands out" (Cultura nazca, 2024). Farmers

and fishermen were considered the foundation of the conditional social pyramid. Their residence was localized in valleys, closer to water sources (Cultura nazca, 2024). Places of residence of the tribes of the Nazca culture can be tentatively called settlements since the centres of political life were not recorded by archaeologists and historians during excavations. Instead of such centres, social communications were implemented in farms, which can be conventionally called so, since they were located near settlements. The unification of such farms began a political grouping around certain economically "strong" farms. Accordingly, such powerful farms became the basis for strong religious communities in the Nazca tribes. In turn, the latter served as the basis for the emergence of typical cultural traditions. Despite the permanence of conventional centres of political and cultural life, military skirmishes and conflicts were constantly raging among the tribes of the Nazca culture, which is evidenced by the military equipment of the graves of both elite and poor burials.

*«The Nazca were very fond of war. They were always looking for trophy heads and painted their faces to imitate the spots of a falcon, as can be seen in their artistic depictions» (Macera, 1985).*

The fact that the members of the Nazca culture tribes carry the severed heads of their enemies daily indicates, in our opinion, the specificity of social communications, thanks to which the warriors of the tribe marked their merits and combat readiness to protect their fellow tribesmen.

*«The Nazca used severed heads, known as trophy heads, in various religious rituals and appear as a motif in ceramic iconography» (Nalewicki, 2024).*

Gradually, war trophies in the form of severed heads of enemies acquired a different marking in the social communications of the Nazca tribes.

*«Visual images of beheading often associate decapitators with weapons and military-like clothing, but such clothing could also be worn in purely ceremonial circumstances» (DeLeonardis, 2000).*

We consider their customs invaluable and indisputable facts that prove the specificity of social communications of the peoples of the Nazca culture. One such custom involved the presence of feasts, with which the adult population accompanied their hard daily work. The fact of feasting is confirmed by the presence in the burials of ordinary members of the tribe of dishes for chicha with various dishes. The people of South America (in particular, Peru) still call chicha "a low-alcohol drink similar to beer" (Chicha morada, 2024).



*Fig. 8. Utensils for eating chicha (Cerámica de estilo arte precolombino, Nazca Perú, 2024).*

During banquets as a form of social communication of the ancient Peruvian tribes of the Nazca culture in the period from the 1st century to the 7th century, members of the tribes also used such types of social communication as consumption of food stored in ceremonial containers; the use of musical accompaniment of the benectes in the form of antarams ("a kind of Pan flute made of reed cane, like a small pipe" (Antara, 2024)) and drums (Cultura nazca, 2024).

The analysis of various forms of domestic, political and cultural activities of the ancient Peruvian Nazca culture allowed us to single out eleven features of their social communication.

1. Social communications of the peoples of the Nazca culture were reflected in specific urban construction (Bergoeing, 2014: 85).

2. We consider the drawings, and lines (geoglyphs) of the Nazca desert to be a fixation of social communications of the Nazca culture.

«Among almost 300 figures there are images of a spider, fish, bird, monkey, llama, lizard, tree, flower, jaguar, iguana, pelican, sperm whale, even a strange human-like creature" the researchers find "a lot of... various geometric figures: triangles, stars, trapezoids, rectangles, wavy lines, spirals, etc.» (Bergoeing, 2014: 85) (see Figs. 4–5 earlier).

The mentioned facts testify to the attempts of members of the tribes of the Nazca culture to establish social communications with fellow tribesmen but also with the forces of nature and space.

3. The Nazca tribes deformed skulls for socio-communicational identification of their statuses (Nasca (culture), 2024).

4. The Nazca's constant conflicts with neighbouring tribes are named social communications as warlike (Nasca (culture), 2024).

5. Severed heads in early Nascan burials testified to the socio-communicative status of warriors.

*«These heads were dried, flattened, painted, after which they were strung into "garlands" or worn tied to the belt, like war trophies» (Nasca (culture), 2024).*

6. It is appropriate to characterize the social communications of the Naskans as those inherent in a centralized theocratic state (Nasca (culture), 2024).

7. In the society of the peoples of the Nazca culture, social communications of law were commonplace.

*«Relations in society were regulated by the norms of customary law, which supported public stability. Violators of such laws were eventually tied up, their mouths stuffed with human excrement, and then killed by force a blow with a stone or mace directly to the forehead" (Nasca (culture), 2024).*

8. Marking of social communications of members of the Nazca culture tribes was recorded in weaving and embroidery, jewellery and colour schemes.

*«The Neskans knew how to make a wide variety of fabrics from llama wool and cotton, adding human hair and bird feathers to them, and made carpets and brocade. They decorated their products with polychrome embroidery or drawings, the colour range of which includes up to 15 colours and shades; ...Gold ornaments were made, mainly for the ears and nose» (Nasca (culture), 2024).*

9. The attitude towards nature and the environment among Naskans had a specific form of expression, which was recorded in household items that circulated as substitutes and objects of information exchange in the system of social communications.

*«They used dyes of 11 colours to decorate their irrigated ceramics, Nascan artists depicted on their products birds and fish, insects and plants, predators and people (images of priests, next to whom the heads of enemies lie on special altars), various fruits and even fantastic mythical creatures, after which they covered their product with glaze for strength and beauty» (Nasca (culture), 2024).*

10 Attempting to establish social communications with the elements through religious rituals, late ancient Peru anthropomorphized the forces of nature; the ancient Peruvians of the Nazca culture gave a special divine function to the predators of the cat family, which was recorded in many archaeological finds during the excavations of Nazca burials.

*«The goddess of fertility was depicted in the form of a woman with magnificent forms, with streams of water and plants that grow out of her mouth," revered "her divine husband in the form of a moustachioed warrior and ... predators of the feline family, primarily the jaguar. Killer whales, snakes, and birds were also worshipped» (Nasca (culture), 2024).*

11. Religious social communications promoted all the ritual actions of the ancient Peruvians of the Nazca culture and were associated with sacrifices in various forms.

*«There was a tradition of human sacrifice among the Naskans. Numerous victims were bricked (perhaps even alive) into the foundations of many buildings of Nascan origin, and on Nascan vessels, there are images of rituals of total "beheading of a person", that is, his quartering. In addition to people, llamas served as material for periodic sacrifices to the gods» (Nasca (culture), 2024).*

The analysis of the features of the social communications of the Nazca culture allowed us to record a leading trend, the essence of which is that the lifestyle and living conditions of the ancient Nazca people (as well as representatives of other Andean cultures who lived in the period between the 1st and 7th centuries in the territory of modern Peru) did not require high level of social and technical skills. Instead, the social communications of the cultural order were already filled with samples of sophisticated jewellery, weaving, pottery, and painting products.

We have shown eleven features of social communication of the Nazca culture tribes in the table. 6 (see below), identified the types of social communications of the mentioned culture and marked them with letters of the English and Ukrainian alphabet.

Table 6.  
Forms and types of social communications  
tribes of the Nazca culture  
(I century - VI century AD)

No s/p	Forms of social communications	Types of social communications	Code	Unit of measurement ( number /%)

1.	Social communications of the peoples of the Nazca culture were reflected in the specific urban development ( Bergoeing , 2014: 85).	Architecture.	U 1	1/9.0
2.	We consider the drawings, lines ( geoglyphs ) of the Nazca desert to be a fixation of social communications of the Nazca culture. The mentioned facts testify to the attempts of members of the tribes of the Nazca culture to establish social communications not only with fellow tribesmen , but also with the forces of nature and space.	Geoglyphs.	III	1/9.0
3.	The Nazca tribes deformed skulls for the purpose of socio-communicational identification of their own statuses (Nasca (culture), 2024).	Deformation of skulls.	Y	1/9.0
4.	The Nazca's constant conflicts with neighboring tribes marked their social communications as warlike (Nasca (culture), 2024).	Military conflicts.	Z	1/9.0
5.	Severed heads in early Nascan burials testified to the social and communicative status of warriors.	Severed heads.	Г	1/9.0
6.	The social communications of the Naska people should be characterized as those inherent in a centralized state of theocratic type (Naska (culture), 2024).	Social system.	T	1/9.0
7.	In the society of the peoples of the Nazca culture, social communications were governed by the norms of customary law with the involvement of cruel sanctions close to the destruction of criminals.	Society of law.	R4	1/9.0
8.	Marking of social communications of the members of the Nazca culture tribes was recorded in weaving and embroidery, jewelry and color scheme.	Weaving, Embroidery, Jewelry.	W	1/9.0
9.	The attitude towards nature and the environment among the Naskans had a specific form of expression, which was recorded in household items (ceramics, dyes, glazes ), which circulated as substitutes and objects of information exchange in the system of social communications.	Reflection of attitude to nature in art, in drawings, embroideries, patterns on household and ritual objects.	Nk	1/9.0

10.	Trying to establish social communication with the elements through the implementation of religious rituals, late ancient Peru anthropomorphized the forces of nature; the ancient Peruvians of the Nazca culture gave a special divine function to the predators of the cat family, which was recorded in many archaeological finds during the excavations of Nazca burials.	The sacralization of feline predators.	Ж	1/9.0
11.	Religious social communications accompanied all the ritual actions of the ancient Peruvian tribes of the Nazca culture and were associated with sacrifices in various forms.	Offering.	Б	1/9.0
12.	TOTAL:	–	–	11/99
13.	Error	–	–	0/1
14.	Σ (sum)	–	–	11/100

Social communications of ancient Peruvian culture Wikus  
(I century AD - IV century AD)

In the period between 100 AD and 400 AD, the Wikus culture lived on the territory of present-day Peru. The mentioned culture should be placed «between the Chavin and Moche or Mochica cultures» (Smith, 2024).

According to the evidence of archaeologists and historians (Cultura vicús, 2024; Smith, 2024), members of the vicús culture tribes carried out active social communications where they lived. Such places were located next to the place of ritual religious events and the burial of fellow tribesmen.

*«...the sites served as ceremonial and administrative centres, we can see the main platform, various environments (ceremonial and residential) and a cemetery. This platform has a height of three meters and a total area of one hectare. The residential complex has three main rooms, each 13 meters long and 6 meters wide. All rooms are usually delimited by rows of stones» (Cultura vicús, 2024).*

It is clear that where the ritual actions were sent, social communications had a religious and ritual character. In permanent residence, members of the Wikus culture tribes carried out everyday social communications, which differed from religious and ritual ones. More often, those social communications were domestic during herding or hunting. As we understand, the social communications that took place during the military clashes with the representatives of the tribes hostile to the Wikus culture had a different character.

*«A strong contingent of noble warriors roamed their domains to ensure the fulfilment of the sovereign's orders. These occupations were supplemented by herding or hunting» (Cultura vicús, 2024).*

In peaceful life, members of the tribes of the Wikus culture were engaged in pottery, making household ceramics. During the explication of social communications in religious and ritual procedures, Vicúsians used decorative ceramics in their production (Cultura vicús, 2024).



*Fig. 5. Statuette-1 of the Wikus culture.*

Source – <https://a.warbletoncouncil.org/science/cultura-vics-descubrimiento-ubicacin-organizacin-cermica.webp>

The forms of metal objects and images on them were markers of social communications for various functional purposes of the Wikus culture. Among such objects found at the excavation sites are necklaces, foil, and headdresses with "sequins and feathers that make sounds when they move, as well as the rattles themselves" (Cultura vicús, 2024).



*Fig. 6. Statuette-2 of the Wikus culture.*

Source – <https://a.warbletoncouncil.org/science/cultura-vics-descubrimiento-ubicacin-organizacin-cermica-8.webp>

It is worth noting that anthropomorphic, zoomorphic and phytomorphic motifs, which were applied to gold, silver and copper products thanks to embossing and shaping, served as forms of



social communication. Experts found pearls and emeralds, mother-of-pearl shells, turquoise, etc. in the burials of the Wikus culture. Among the finds are "gold and silver nose rings, earrings also made of thin metal and vessels of the same material" (Cultura vicús, 2024). An interesting find of archaeologists, which testifies to the specificity of social communications in the process of funeral rituals of the Vicús people, is considered (Cultura vicús, 2024)

*«anthropomorphic gold sculptures in welded sheets (Venus de Frias and El Hombre de Frias), zoomorphic heads with movable tongues, hair removal flaps and tweezers, cord threads and other objects testify to extensive work and quality work»* (Cultura vicús, 2024).

There is evidence (Cultura vicús, 2024) that the masters of the Vicús culture used specific tools and applied several techniques during manual work on precious gold products, which made the exploitation of social communications unique and realized in inclusive jewellery products.

It is worth noting such professional skill during the production of simple household items, clothes, shoes, etc. Especially in the manufacture of clothes used for sending religious procedures. The last fact testifies to the special role of the habitat image in the social communications of the representatives of the Wikus culture tribes.

Analysis of the information available to us about the ancient Peruvian culture Wikas gave us the reason to identify a certain list of features of the development of social communications of the mentioned culture, to code them with letters of the English and Ukrainian alphabets and to display the formalized indicators in the table. 7 (see below).

1. Social communications based on militarism are recorded in Wikus culture.
2. The exhibition of ceremonial social communications of the Wikus culture was carried out thanks to decorative ceramics.
3. Social communications of Wikus were carried out thanks to metal products. It was exchanging information about their social status and social roles.
4. Tweezers for epilation testify to the special hygienic and aesthetic attitude of the women of the Wikus culture to their appearance, which played a certain role in the implementation of social communications.
5. Gold ornaments of sophisticated processing declared the social status of the members of the Wikus culture tribes.
6. Different levels of architecture were performed to preserve the inhabitants and to mark the social status of the city's inhabitants. The large maidans in the settlements testified to the administration of Wikus social communications, as general meetings of the tribe were held on the maidans.
7. Carrying out manual work on the production of textiles testified that such work was taken care of by those who were more often at home, perhaps women who looked after children. This fact demonstrates the distribution of social roles in the tribe, a means of social communication vikus.
8. Exchange with representatives of other tribes, sometimes requisitioning clothes from different ethnic groups manifested the presence of social communications of various types: from cooperation to rivalry.

Table indicators. 1–7 allowed us to form diagrams 1–4, in which we displayed different forms and types of social communication, the signs and markers of which were recorded by us during the analysis of documents related to the description of artefacts of archaeological excavations of the remains of seven cultures: the primitive Peruvians of the era Paleolithic, lithic period, Chavin (8 thousand BC - 3.5 thousand BC), Karal, Chavin (1.2 thousand BC - 400 BC) AD), Nazca and Wikus.

Since there were 65 positions between the highest (10.96%) and the lowest (0.33%) indicators of the frequency of signs and markers of types of social communication (see Table A below), we

conditionally differentiated all signs and markers of forms and types of social communication of Peruvians, who lived from the Paleolithic era to 700 AD, into 4 such groups:

Table 7.  
Forms and types of social communications  
of the ancient Peruvian Vikus culture  
(I century AD - IV century AD)

No s/p	Forms of social communications	Types of social communications	Code	Unit of measurement ( number /%)
1.	In the Vikus culture , social communications based on militarism are recorded .	Militarism	Z	1/12.5
2.	Expilation of ceremonial social communications of the Vikus culture was carried out thanks to decorative ceramics.	Ceremonies. Ceramics.	Nk	1/12.5
3.	Wikus social communication was carried out thanks to metal products, which served as a means of exchanging information about their social status and social roles.	Metal products.	Ч	1/12.5
4.	Tweezers for epilation testify to the special hygienic and aesthetic attitude of the women of the Vikus culture to their appearance, which played a certain role in the implementation of social communications.	Fashion. Hygiene.	И2	1/12.5
5.	Gold ornaments of sophisticated processing declared the social status of the members of the Vikus culture tribes.	Jewelry.	Ю	1/12.5
6.	Different levels of architecture were performed not only as a means of preserving the inhabitants , but also marked the social status of the city's inhabitants. Large maidans in the settlements testified to the administration of Vikus social communications , as general meetings of the tribe were held on the maidans.	Architecture. Social system.	U1	1/12.5
7.	The manual work of producing textiles indicated that such work was taken care of by those who were more often at home, perhaps women who looked after children. This fact demonstrates	Textile works. Social roles.	W R5	1/ 6.75 6.75

	the distribution of social roles in the tribe, which is a means of social communication Vikus .			
8.	Exchange with representatives of other tribes, sometimes requisitioning clothes from other ethnic groups manifested the presence of social communications of various types: from cooperation to rivalry.	Barter. Looting. Cooperation. Rivalry.	Л М Кo Cy	1/ 3.12 3.12 3.12 3.12
9.	TOGETHER:	–	–	8/100
10.	Error	–	–	0
11.	Σ (sum)	–	–	8/100

- group 1 – the range of frequency indicators from 4.21% to 10.96% (see diagram 1 below);
  - group 2 – the range of frequency indicators from 3.12% to 3.52% (see diagram 2 below);
  - group 3 – the range of frequency indicators from 2.0% to 2.9% (see diagram 3 below);
  - group 4 – the range of frequency indicators from 1.0% to 1.9% (see diagram 4 below).
- In the further analysis, we ignored indicators with a value of less than 0,9%.

Table A.

Indicators of the frequency of types of social communication of Peruvian cultures from the Paleolithic to AD 700.

No s/p	The name of forms and types of social communications	Code	Indicator (%) of frequency in a certain culture	Sum (number)	Sum Σ (%)
<b>Belief</b>					
1.	Belief in the forces of nature.	A	10+3.55	13.55	1.9
2.	Belief. Religion. Religious holidays.	A1	12.5	12.5	1.8
3.	Religious cult (during burial).	A2	7.1	7.1	1.0
4.	Anthropomorphic stone deities.	A3	7.1	7.1	1.0
5.	Cosmology as social control.	A4	7.1	7.1	1.0
6.	Hereafter.	A5	7.1	7.1	1.0
7.	Religious and mystical decoration (nail caps)	A6	7.1	7.1	1.0
8.	Religious symbols.	A7	2.33	2.33	0.33
9.	The cult and its opponents.	A8	7.1	7.1	1.0


10.	TOTAL (A–A8):				<b>10.03</b>
11.	<b>Abstraction.</b>	B	10	10	1.45
12.	Parasitism.	C	10	10	1.45
13.	Division of labor.	D	10	10	1.45
14.	Production of stone weapons .	F	10+14.2	24.2	3.52
15.	Signal systems.	G	10	10	1.45
16.	Leadership	H	10+6.25 +6.25	22.5	3.27
17.	Rules of coexistence.	J	10	10	1.45
18.	Sign vocalization.	K	14.2	14.2	2.0
19.	Creation of hunting traps.	L	14.2	14.2	2.0
20.	Natural exchange.	M	14.2	14.2	2.0
21.	<b>Visualization</b>				
22.	Graphic rock visualization.	N	14.2	14.2	2.0
23.	Artistic visualization on ceramics (in particular ritual and religious).	Nk	33+7.1 +9.0+12.5	61.6	8.96
24.	TOTAL ( N+Nk ):				<b>10.96</b>
25.	Bodyart.	O	14.2	14.2	2.0
26.	<b>Logistics and convergence</b>				
27.	Logistics.	P	33	33	4.8
28.	Convergence in the language of art.	Q	33	33	4.8
29.	TOTAL ( P+Q ):				9.6
30.	<b>Society</b>				
31.	Complex societies.	R	12.5	12.5	1.8
32.	Political system.	R1	6.25	6.25	0.9
33.	State management.	R3	7.1	7.1	1.0
34.	Social hierarchy.	R4	7.1+9.0	16.1	2.34
35.	Social roles.	R5	6.75	6.75	0.98
36.	TOTAL (R–R5) :				<b>7.02</b>
37.	Insulation.	S	12.5	12.5	1.8

38.	Social organization.	T	6.25+3.55 +9.0	18.8	2.73
39.	<b>Architecture</b>				
40.	Architecture (size and area of public buildings).	U	12.5	12.5	1.8
41.	Architecture (size and area of residential buildings).	U1	12.5+9.0	21.5	3.12
42.	TOTAL ( U–U1 ):				<b>4.92</b>
43.	Music.	V	12.5+2.33	17.83	2.59
44.	Textiles (colorings of a religious nature). Textile works.	W	7.1+2.33 +9.0+6.75	24,18	3.51
45.	Agricultural production.	X	7.1	7.1	1.0
46.	Deformation of skulls.	Y	9.0	9.0	1.3
47.	Military conflicts. Militarism.	Z	9.0+12.5	21.5	3.12
48.	<b>Harvesting</b>				
49.	Sacrifice (sacrifice).	Б	10+9.0	19.0	2.76
50.	Human sacrifice.	Б1	14.2	14.2	2.0
51.	TOTAL ( B–B1 ):				<b>4.76</b>
52.	Severed heads.	Г	9.0	9.0	1.3
53.	The sacralization of feline predators.	Ж	9.0	9.0	1.3
54.	Cooperation.	Ko	3.12	3.12	0.45
55.	Barter.	Л	3.12	3.12	0.45
56.	Looting.	М	3.12	3.12	0.45
57.	Rivalry.	Сy	3.12	3.12	0.45
58.	<b>Ceremonies</b>				
59.	Priesthood.	Ц	10+3.55	13.55	1.9
60.	Ceremonies.	Ц1	3.55	3.55	0.51
61.	Fashion. Hygiene.	Ц2	12.5	12.5	1.8
62.	TOTAL (C–C2):				<b>4.21</b>
63.	Metal products.	Ч	12.5	12.5	1.8
64.	Geoglyphs.	Щ	9.0	9.0	1.3
65.	Jewelry.	Ю	12.5	12.5	1.8

66.	TOTAL (quantity without error):	–	–	<b>683.07</b>	<b>99.4</b>
67.	Error (%):	–	–	<b>4.1</b>	<b>0.58</b>
68.	TOTAL (%):	–	–	<b>687.17</b>	<b>100</b>

We assigned the following subgroups of frequency indicators to group 1: "Ceremonies", "Sacrifice", "Architecture", "Society", "Logistics and convergence", "Visualization" and "Belief". We have shown the correlation of indicators of group 1 in diagram 1 (see below).

Chart 1. Quantity indicators (%)  
types of social communications  
in the period from the Paleolithic to 700 AD.  
(in the frequency range from 4.21% to 10.96%)



*An explanation of the names of the types of social communication is presented in Diagram 1.*

The name "Ceremonies" is related to the fact that during religious (domestic or funeral) procedures, ancient Peruvians exchanged information aimed at regulating social actions, social interactions and social relationships. The very act of any ceremony provided both demonstrative, image, reputational, and propaedeutic, didactic influence for the current members of society. It served as a channel of social communication for future generations. We add the same meaning to the name "Sacrifice", which we interpret as the implementation of social communications with the deities of the upper (positive) and lower (negative) statuses.


In the name of the species "Architecture" we reflected on the marking of the social hierarchy during the construction of the residences of the tribe members, highlighting the higher social status (for example, a leader or a priest) by the height of the building. Also, in the architecture, the ancient Peruvians reflected the places of departure for religious procedures (prayer, sacrifice, consecration into members of the tribe and other types of socialization). The ancient Peruvians marked different types of social communication thanks to such architectural differences. The name "Society" means the implementation of social communications in the social system of life and festive procedures of Peruvians of different historical periods.

The name of the type of social communication "Logistics and Convergence" has two elements that are closely related to each other. The word "logistics" in our study refers to the presence of

social information exchange due to the implementation of the movement of ancient Peruvians in space for trade and the search for better living conditions. The word "convergence" in the working order of our research means the merging and mixing of signs of different historical cultures and the reflection of such marker signs in speech, drawings on fabrics, ceramics, the body, the surface of the earth, tools of work and hunting, etc. By the name "Visualization" we meant graphic images made by ancient Peruvians on rock walls and ceramics. The name "Belief" reflects the different types of faith of ancient Peruvians in the forces of nature.

According to our analysis, group 2 contains the following indicators of the frequency of types of social communication: "Militarism", "Textiles", "Leadership", "Stone weapons" (see diagram 2 below).

Diagram 2. Indicators of the number (%) of types of social communications in the period from the Paleolithic to 700 AD.  
(in the frequency range from 3.12% to 3.52%)



The name "Militarism" we called social communications that functioned among ancient Peruvians as a form of violent seizure of territories, settlements, tools of labour, domestic animals, household items and the sending of religious cults, etc.

The type of social communication "Textile" means the exchange of social information from generation to generation thanks to textiles, their form, decoration and artistic design. By the name "Leadership" we meant the implementation of information exchange with the help of physical strength, wisdom, and the ability to make decisions useful to the tribe, which provided acceptable conditions for coexistence. "Stone weapons" means, in our research, the implementation of manufacturing operations for manufacturing weapons from stone by the ancient Peruvians. During such production procedures, groups of Peruvians exchanged information, and performed two to three to eighteen manipulations with the stone, thereby passing on important salutary information to subsequent generations (Paige, & Perreault, 2024).

Group 3 consists of six indicators: Music, Social Organization, Body Art, Natural Exchange, Hunting Traps, and Sign Vocalization (see Chart 3 below).

As is known (Makowski, 1996; Shady, et al, 2009;), the ancient Peruvians of the Caral and Chavin cultures made musical instruments (for example, flutes), the fact of their presence gave us the right to assert that social communication in certain historical periods could be carried out through music. The name "Social organization" corresponds to the type of social communication implemented in the ancient Peruvians in the early days of a clear social hierarchy, the direct subordination of tribe members to the leader and priests. Tattooing, also called body art, was and still is traditional for certain Peruvian tribes (Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Body art, 2024). We believe

that thanks to the images on the body, Peruvians exchanged and exchanged information of a social nature, which we attribute to one of the forms of social communication.

The name "Natural exchange" (a type of social communication) was proposed by us to explain the exchange of information due to the transfer from one tribe of ancient Peruvians to another of various food products and household goods, products, booty, etc. An exchange of information was carried out (to our definition of "social communications"). "Hunting traps" (the name of a type of social communication) were used by us to interpret the process of preparing hunting traps by the male part of Peruvian tribes. During such joint works, members of the tribes exchanged socially and salutarily important information.

The most important driver of forming social communications among ancient Peruvians was the exchange of gestures and vocalisms (exclamations, chants, howls, cries, etc.). We called such a process in the working order "Gestovocalization" (see diagram 3 below).

Diagram 3. Indicators of the number (%) of forms and types of social communications in the period from the Paleolithic to 700 AD.  
(in the frequency range from 2.0 to 2.90)



In the composition of diagram 4 (see earlier), we included only those forms of social communication of ancient Peruvians (frequency indicators in the range from 1.0% to 1.9%). Among them were noted "Jewellery", "Geoglyphs", "Metal products", "Sacralization of felines", "Deformation of skulls", "Agriculture", "Isolation", "Rules of coexistence", "Signal systems", "Division of labour", "Parasitism" and "Abstraction".

By the name "Jewellery" as a form of social communication, we meant gold products left behind by ancient Peruvians. Thanks to the images of gold products, Peruvian masters transmitted information that was later used for further social coexistence by their descendants. In addition, it is worth considering that gold jewellery could be worn only by persons of high social status, which was reflected in the quantity and quality of gold jewellery worn by, for example, tribal leaders, priests, or strong, knowledgeable warriors. The name "Geoglyphs" encompasses the meanings that the ancient Peruvians of the Nazca culture placed in the gigantic figures of birds and animals on the ground, the scale of which can only be understood from a bird's eye view. The different ideas of Nazca geoglyph researchers about their purpose can be united by the leading, in our opinion, trend of information exchange about cosmic phenomena, agricultural processes and meteorological features that influenced the life of the Nazca people. We consider geoglyphs a vivid example of the form of social communication of ancient Peruvians.



"Metal products" - this is what we called the next low-frequency form of social communication, which was distributed in certain regions of Ancient Peru. The essence of this form of social communication was that the mental products of various economic, religious and household functions of the members of the tribe served as a means of exchanging socially and vitally important information. Perhaps another function was in this form of social communication, which we called "Feline sacralization". The fact is that on the territory of both Ancient Peru and modern Peru, the cult of feline predators is widespread. In a sacred sense, predators of the cat family were considered a symbol of power, which must be protected by force. The symbol of such power was wild and strong animals with fangs - tiger, tigrillo, puma (mountain lion), jaguar (otorongo), Andean wild cat, lynx; chokenchinchai, or golden jaguar, etc. (Porrás, 2009).

*«Big cats in the Andean region, especially the jaguar and puma, were mythologized by pre-Hispanic cultures as the ultimate expression of power over earth, sky, and the nonhuman world. Similarly, feline deities were associated with the rainy world in the Andes and on the ocean coast, and in the case of the jaguar or otorongo, with the wet jungle. They received the gift of generating water, which they had dreamed of for so long. Water was necessary for the fertility and productivity of the land. Such qualities make cats a direct symbol of the union of forces necessary for the continuity and origin of life» (Porrás, 2009).*

In our opinion, from the point of view of the social communication system, representatives of the feline family in ancient pre-Columbian Peru were identified with the exchange of information about strength, power and superhuman abilities, moisture and sunlight, necessary for strengthening strength and power. The image of sacralized felines marked the socially important personalities of the tribe and distinguished them from ordinary tribesmen.

A unique form of social communication of the ancient Peruvians should be considered the process of changing the shape of the skull, which we called in the working mode "Deformation of the skull".

*«Artificial deformations of the human head have a remote origin and are common on all continents. In Peru, the most diverse and incredible forms were presented. Of course, it is not known why our ancestors made these deformations, and they can be many, from aesthetic, ethical, social differentiation, economic, moral, magical, religious, as a national currency, etc.» (Borja, & Calla, 2014).*

The artificial deformation of the skull of the ancient Peruvians, in our opinion, marked social communication as a means of information exchange, which signalled to the environment either the low social status of the person or that the deformed skull means work. There is also an opinion that the deformation of the skull was carried out only as a sign of elite individuals who had certain social preferences in the tribe. In any case, we consider the deformation of the skull, which is found among the archaeological finds in the burial of ancient Peruvians, a form of social communication.

We introduced the name «Agriculture» in diagram 4 (see below) to a form of social communication that included the social work of ancient Peruvians during agricultural operations (cultivating fields, planting and processing sprouts, harvesting, etc.). The agricultural work of tribal members allowed for the exchange of social and greeting information that regulated social actions and interactions.

The term "Isolation" is proposed by us to denote a form of social communication that was focused on a separate tribe of a separate culture of the ancient Peruvians. We are talking about the people of the Caral culture, which did not spread information to the ancient cultures of Europe and


Asia, but had close social and cultural relations with representatives of other Andean cultures. So, the specific form of social communication of the Karal culture was their relative social isolation.

The processes of socialization of members of the tribes of different cultures of pre-Columbian Peru have been conventionally called "Rules of Coexistence", thanks to which the social statuses and roles of the members of the tribes were differentiated. The exchange of information took place at tribal levels in determined situations, which we regard as a form of social communication.

By «signalling systems» we called the form of social communication by which the ancient Peruvians notified each other of danger, prey, tribal gatherings, etc. By the term «Division of labour» we meant a form of social communication that allowed women to remain in places protected from predators and weather, take care of children, prepare food and wait for the male part of the tribe who was out hunting or making traps for the upcoming hunt.

Diagram 4. Indicators of the number (%) of forms of social communication in the period from the Paleolithic to 700 AD .

*(in the frequency range from 1.0% to 1.9%)*



One of the rare forms of social communication found in diagram 4 (see below) is called parasitism. This form meant the absence of agricultural labour in the tribe and the presence of gathering, fishing and consumption of what «nature gives». In the course of the parasitic way of existence, the exchange of social information took place through various channels and thus allowed to regulation of social actions and interactions between members of the tribe.

Finally, we identified a form of social communication called «Abstraction», referring to the ability of the ancient Peruvians to believe in the invisible forces of nature. The formation of faith made it possible to carry out elementary social communications using "communication" with idols, deities, etc.

### Discussion of results

We analyzed not only the indicators of high frequency but also paid attention to the specificity of the quality of the types and forms of social communications inherent in the seven analyzed

cultures of primitive Peruvians of the Paleolithic, Lithic, Chavin (8 thousand BC – 3.5 thousand BC), Karal, Chavin (1.2 thousand BC - 400 BC), Nazca and Vikus.

Based on the results of the analysis, we singled out several specific features of social communications of the mentioned seven cultures of pre-Columbian Peru, which have different interpretations in different theoretical concepts and different scientific schools.

Next, we offer our interpretation, based on the postulates of holism (Smuts, 1926), double-aspect monism, or double-aspect\_theory (Double-aspect\_theory, 2024), the method of quantum chronos, which we described at the beginning of the study (Холод, 2020: 32–67) and the SI-analysis method (socio-engineering analysis) (Холод, 2015: 21–25). Our interpretation of the obtained results concerns only trends in the development of social communication processes, taking into account the concept of a technological boom (Paige, & Perreault, 2024).

From the standpoint of holism, we propose to perceive the various forms and types of social communications of the seven cultures of pre-Columbian Peru that we have considered earlier as seven elements of a creative system called the «Whole». All forms and types of the seven cultures of Peru analyzed by us (in the period from 35–40 million years BC to 700 AD) are elements of the Whole, which should be understood as a local matrix of Andean cultures that are «woven» into another global matrix of world cultures. At the same time, we see the holistic aspect of the manifestation of the forms and types of social communication of the ancient Peruvians in the ability to respond creatively «to environmental stressors, a process in which parts naturally work together to bring the whole to more advanced states» (Holism, 2024). Our interpretation means that the influence of stress factors in the development of the seven cultures of the Peruvians of the mentioned period was explained in a non-standard, or linear order of the unfolding of history, but in a holographic order. We equate such a holographic order with the way nerve fibres from the human skin send disparate impulses from different receptors to the human brain, and the brain, perceiving such impulses in a systematic order, accumulates such impulses and reacts, creating a holographic image of a stressful situation. The result of such a process is a holographic-complex reaction of the brain to stimuli coming from different parts of the human skin (Eagleman, 2020).

Thus, we identify the tendency of the human brain's reaction to irritating (especially stressful) factors with those tendencies and processes that occurred in seven cultures of pre-Columbian Peru during the period from 35-40 million years BC. to 700 AD For each stressful social or natural cultural factor, the Peruvians accumulated and synthesized the received information in a holographic manner and created new forms and types of social communications.

Based on a kind of monistic view of social communications from the side of the double-aspect theory (Double-aspect\_theory, 2024), we consider various forms and types of social communications of seven cultures of ancient Peruvians of the mentioned period as a unity of mental and physical aspects of one substance. Such holistic unity is due to the conditions of existence of Peruvians of seven different cultures and the convergent processes of combination with the spiritual beginning of the peoples of each Andean culture analyzed by us.

Considering the main positions of the quantum chronos method (Холод, 2020: 32–67), we are thinking that the evaluation of social communications must be carried out based on the basic provisions of quantum mechanics, transferred from the atomic microcosm to the physical dimension of the macrocosm. The method of quantum chronos made it possible to attribute all the analyzed forms and types of social communications of the ancient Peruvians who lived from 35 to 40 million BC to 700 AD to the diachronic. This status (diachronicity) of social communications allowed us to apply concepts and principles of quantum mechanics of the microcosm. First, we analyzed the artefacts and their functions in the process of social communication of ancient Peruvians taking into account the episteme (the knowledge system of the historical era that was analyzed). Secondly, during the analysis of the forms and types of social communications of seven cultures of ancient Peruvians, we conducted a thought experiment, which allowed us to address the basic concepts of

the quantum mechanics of the microcosm (the principle of uncertainty, the principle of complementarity, and the meaning of the concept of "superposition").

Taking into account the two mentioned positions (epistemic science and quantum mechanics), we interpret the forms and types of social communications of representatives of seven ancient Andean Peruvian cultures as such that:

1) have an undefined meaning in the sense of the impossibility of combining, on the one hand, social influence on the development of forms and types of social communications, on the other hand, subjective influence on the forms and types of social communications; in other words, we cannot unambiguously measure and evaluate (even taking into account the modern episteme of ancient Peruvians) the functionality of social communications of the seven analyzed cultures of ancient Peru;

2) must be supplemented by two factors, namely: the first factor is the energy that was "charged" or given by the ancient Peruvian artist – the manufacturer of a specific vessel, for example, ceramic or gold, stone or metal, weaving or geoglyphic, etc., not passed down through the millennia; the second factor is the materialistic concept of "time", which is not explained either by the drawings, the shape of the product, or the effort spent on making the product; a separate analysis of each factor without taking into account the duality of their synthesis cannot provide us with an objective Holistic (in the holistic sense) picture;

3) do not simultaneously record two states of functioning of the products of activity within the limits of a certain culture; in other words, the researcher needs to understand that the product of activity has two different states: on the one hand, it (the product of activity) is in superposition to the researcher, on the other hand, to the episteme as an artefact (artificial fact); the mentioned duality indicates that the episteme is expressed not only in a material form but also in a spiritual-energy form (it transmits the spirit of the people, culture, their energy; since there are only a few publications in science about the unit of non-quantum measurement of the mentioned energy (Ku, 1915; Ford, 2012), we leave discussion on this topic to future research.

Applying the method of SI analysis (social engineering analysis) (Холод, 2015: 21–25), we established that today's model of scientific research of forms and types of social communication of seven Andean cultures of ancient Peruvian tribes that existed from 35-40 million BC to 700 AD, is not valid and objectively verifiable. Firstly, the existing research model of the mentioned tribes of the mentioned period was based on a materialistic vision of historical processes, which did not holistic nature of the research subject (social communications). Secondly, the holistic approach involves a different study model for the dual (material-spiritual-energetic) nature of social communications. Thirdly, the verification of the holistic approach to the study of the history of development and transformations of forms and types of social communications allows us to state other (different) conclusions regarding the functionality, quality and pragmatics of such forms and types.

An important factor influencing the material and spiritual-energetic transformation of the forms and types of social communication of the ancient Peruvians of the period from 35-40 million years BC. to 700 AD, in our opinion, was what in the scientific circulation of recent years is called "cumulative culture" (Paige, & Perreault, 2024; Гайдамашко, 2024), or the theory of cumulative culture. The latter involves the thesis that the accumulation of human knowledge and technologies for processing stone, wood, and metal accumulated and caused a technological boom.

*«Scientists now say that the jump in the complexity of the stone tools we find in ancient cultural layers suggests that hominid knowledge experienced a sudden increase around 600,000 years ago» (Paige, & Perreault, 2024).*

The given opinion of the researchers can explain the transformation of the forms and types of social communication of the ancient Peruvians of the analyzed seven Andean cultures. We combine the mentioned interpretation from the perspective of the theory of cumulative culture with the theory of holism. From this, we can conclude that the new approach (synthesis of spiritual-energetic and materialistic postulates) to the analysis of social communication processes has the potential of objectivity, which is close to establishing the truth in comparison with the traditional (materialistic) approach. It should be taken into account that the theory of cumulative culture involves the generation of the following two elements: the results of random mutations and natural selection. Let's add the third element of such generation, namely the spiritual-energetic element, and we will be able to get an objective integral Whole.

*People will «use and develop technologies without the need to fully understand every aspect of their development, opening the way to an ever-growing and adaptive pool of knowledge. As this collective knowledge and associated behaviour grew, so did the genes that influence learning» (Гайдамашко, 2024).*

The use of various forms and types of social communication by the representatives of the seven Andean cultures analyzed by us was motivated by the processes of co-evolution of genes and culture, which the authors of the studies did not take into account before. We add that "early hominins may also have relied on cumulative culture to develop complex social, dietary, and technological behaviours that we may not see archaeologically" (Paige, & Perreault, 2024). Proceeding from the last thesis prediction, we understand that social-communication manifestations of cumulative culture today do not have a clear evidential explanation in archaeological artefacts. At the same time, they have a clear conceptual basis in the holistic analysis, which assumes the existence of the Whole, a material-spiritual-energetic synthesis. He is "responsible" for the formation of specific historical forms and types of social communications of the Andean tribes of ancient Peru, and any tribes of any region of the Earth.

## Conclusions

1. At the beginning of the research, we formulated the goal of identifying, describing and classifying the main forms and types of social communication of seven ancient Peruvian cultures (the Paleolithic era, the lithic period, the Chavin (8 thousand years BC – 3.5 thousand years BC), Karal, Chavin (1.2 thousand BC – 400 BC), Nazca and Vicus.), which existed in the period from 35 to 40 million years before not. to 700 AD the set goal was fully achieved.

2. We have identified and described 49 forms and 7 main types of social communication during the analyzed period in the life of seven Peruvian cultures.

2.1. The peculiarities of the seven types of social communications specified in point 2 were their actual «ability2 to differentiate into a spiritual-energetic component (belief, sacrifice, ceremonies, visualization) and a material-practical component (society, architecture, logistics, convergence). The mentioned differentiation proves our opinion about the holistic principle of explanation of trends in the macro world of quantum principles and concepts of the micro world.

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### Conflict of interest

There is no conflict of interest.

### Ethics

The material presented in this article meets all the points and requirements put forward by the Ethics Commission of the Editorial and Publishing Department of the public organization "Scientific and Educational Center "SUCCESSFUL".

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**Основні форми та види соціальних комунікацій  
семи андських культур Перу  
(період від 35–40 млн років до н. е. до 700 р. н. е.)**

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**Анотація**

*Мета дослідження полягала у виявленні, описі та класифікації основних форм і типів соціальних комунікацій семи стародавніх перуанських культур (палеоліту, літичного періоду, Чавін (8 тис. до н. е. – 3,5 тис. до н. е.), Карал, Чавін (1,2 тис. до н. е. – 400 р. до н. е.), Наска і Вікус), які існували з 35–40 мільйонів років до нашої ери по 700 рік нашої ери.*

*У дослідженні було задіяно чотири методи. Холістичний підхід до аналізу історії соціальних комунікацій допоміг нам проаналізувати всі явища, процеси та об'єкти світу як частини Цілого. Метод квантового хроноса передав аналіз комунікаційних процесів і текстів, археологічних знахідок, які були поширені за допомогою різних комунікаційних каналів щонайменше за 75 років до моменту їх (комунікаційних процесів і текстів) аналізу. Завдяки методу соціально-інженерного аналізу ми визначили модель для дослідження форм і типів соціальних комунікацій культур Стародавньої Перу, створили ще одну модель для аналізу форм і типів соціальних комунікацій, перевірили ефективність створеної моделі. Теорія кумулятивної культури додала можливість розглядати форми й типи соціальних комунікацій народів семи стародавніх андських культур у конвергентному плані.*

*Методика передбачала виділення семи андських культур в історії розвитку Перу, які залишили значні для аналізу, на думку археологів, артефакти. Потім запропонований детальний опис форм соціальної комунікації, які гіпотетично функціонували в кожній із семи проаналізованих культур. Кодифікація та класифікація форм та ідентифікація типів соціальної комунікації проаналізованих нами культур продовжили наш процес аналізу. Під час обговорення результатів ми завершили процедуру, застосували вищезгадані методи аналізу й виділили особливості кожного виду.*

*Результати досліджень дали змогу констатувати факт зближення духовно-енергетичної та матеріально-технічної складових семи андських культур, що функціонували в період палеоліту (35–40 рр. до н. е. – 700 р. н. е.) на території, що належить до території сучасної Перу.*

**Ключові слова:** соціальні комунікації, андські культури Перу, холістичний підхід, метод квантового хроноса, метод соціально-інженерного аналізу, теорія кумулятивної культури.

# **THEORY AND HISTORY OF JOURNALISM**

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## **ТЕОРІЯ ТА ІСТОРІЯ ЖУРНАЛІСТИКИ**





## The Position of Slovak Tabloids on the Print and Online Media Market

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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Citation:</b> Cillingová, V. (2024). The Position of Slovak Tabloids on the Print and Online Media Market. <i>Social</i> <i>Communications: Theory and Practice,</i> <i>16(2).</i></p> <p>DOI: 10.51423/2524-0471-2024-16-2-7 © Cillingová, V. (2024).</p> <p style="text-align: center;"></p> <p>Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)</p>	
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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Key words:</b></p> <p>Dailies, Slovak Online Media Market, Slovak Print Media Market, Tabloids, Web Portal.</p>	

## Úvod

Slovenské bulvárne denníky sú z hľadiska počtu predaných výtlačkov od roku 2013 lídrom na trhu slovenských printových médií s dennou periodicitou. Najpredávanejším periodikom je denník Nový čas a druhým najpredávanejším je denník Plus JEDEN deň. Tretiu a štvrtú pozíciu na tomto trhu obsadzujú od roku 2013 noviny Pravda a SME, pričom rozdiel v ich predajnosti nie je výrazný a pozíciu si medzi sebou menia. Piatym najpredávanejším denníkom s celoslovenským zameraním sú Hospodárske noviny<sup>1</sup>. (Cillingová, 2024, online) Všetky uvedené denníky s nástupom digitalizácie spoločnosti prešli aj do online prostredia. Ako prvý (v roku 1994) transformoval svoje vydania na web denník SME. V ďalších rokoch vytvorili svoje internetové stránky periodiká Pravda (ako Pravda.sk) a Hospodárske noviny (najskôr ako HNX.sk, v súčasnosti pôsobiace na doméne HNonline.sk). (Olejárová, 2019) Bulvárne denníky Nový čas a Plus JEDEN deň vytvorili svoje online podoby až po roku 2000. (Augustín, 2008)

Prechodom do online prostredia sa novinárske obsahy slovenskej tlače s dennou periodicitou dostali na trh s rozmanitejšou konkurenciou. Na jednej strane totiž zakladali vlastné webové stránky so žurnalistickým obsahom tzv. tradičné médiá, a to nielen tlač, ako sme to prezentovali aj v prípade slovenských denníkov v predchádzajúcom texte, ale svoju webovú podobu vytvárali aj rozhlas či televízia. Na druhej strane začali s rozvíjajúcou sa digitalizáciou v slovenskom online priestore vznikať médiá, ktoré uverejňovali novinársky obsah výlučne na internete. Tento typ médií označuje J. Višňovský ako e-ziny. (Višňovský, 2017)

Podľa údajov združenia Interactive Advertising Bureau Slovakia (IAB Slovakia) bol v októbri 2024 najnavštevovanejším slovenským webom spravodajský portál Aktuality.sk s 2 220 000 reálnymi používateľmi. Ide o web, ktorý nemá svoju printovú podobu. Z médií analyzovaných v tejto štúdií má najvyššie postavenie Pluska.sk, ktorá s počtom 2 031 360 reálnych používateľov obsadila tretie miesto. Na štvrtom mieste je web SME.sk (2 014 646 reálnych používateľov), piatu pozíciu na trhu online médií mal v októbri 2024 web Pravda.sk (1 837 216 reálnych používateľov) a šiestu Čas.sk (1 506 112 reálnych používateľov). Spravodajský portál HNonline sa nachádzal až na 18. mieste s počtom 1 022 688 reálnych používateľov. (Iab.slovakia, 2024, online)

Cieľom predkladanej štúdie je zistiť, či majú webové portály slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na slovenskom trhu online médií rovnakú pozíciu, akú majú aj slovenské bulvárne denníky na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače, a to v porovnaní so slovenskými nebulvárnymi novinami s dennou periodicitou a ich webovými portálmi. Hoci už uvedené aktuálne výsledky naznačujú odlišnosť v tomto postavení, zámerom predkladaného príspevku bolo identifikovať pozíciu uvedených médií z perspektívy sledovania jednoročného vývoja analyzovaného javu.

Štúdia vychádza z verejne dostupných údajov Kancelárie pre overovanie nákladov tlače (Audit Bureau of Circulations, skratka ABC SR), ktorá monitoruje predaný a tlačený náklad slovenských periodík, a z verejne dostupných údajov združenia Interactive Advertising Bureau Slovakia (IAB Slovakia), ktoré meria návštevnosť slovenských online médií. Naším zámerom bolo najskôr identifikovať trend vývoja postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov a ich webových portálov v období jedného roka a následne porovnať postavenie predmetných médií na uvedených trhoch. Keďže v čase napísania tohto príspevku<sup>2</sup> pochádzali najaktuálnejšie dáta o predanom a tlačenom náklade slovenských printových médií z júna 2024, zamerali sme sa na analýzu predaného nákladu za obdobie jedného roka, a to od júla 2023 do júna 2024. V prípade návštevnosti slovenských internetových stránok sú najstaršie údaje verejne dostupné zo septembra 2023

<sup>1</sup> Z hľadiska všetkých denníkov, ktoré sú do auditu predného nákladu slovenskej tlače zapojené, je však jeho pozícia nižšia, keďže vyššiu predajnosť dosahuje, ako ukazujú dáta z roku 2023, aj regionálny denník vydávaný v maďarskom jazyku Új Szó. (Cillingová, 2024, online)

<sup>2</sup> Príspevok bol písaný v októbri – novembri 2024.

a najnovšie z októbra 2024. V snahe o umožnenie relevantnej komparácie postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače s postavením webových portálov týchto denníkov na trhu online médií sme si pre analýzu online portálov slovenskej dennej tlače zvolili jednoročné obdobie od septembra 2023 do augusta 2024. Následne sa ako relevantný prienik pre časové vymedzenie komparácie postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na trhu tlačенých médií a s pozíciou ich webových portálov na trhu online médií ukázalo obdobie od septembra 2023 do júna 2024, v ktorom sú dostupné aktuálne informácie o postavení predmetných médií na oboch uvedených trhoch.

### Slovenská denná tlač a jej online podoby v 21. storočí

Na rozdiel od vývoja slovenskej bulvárnej tlače, ktorá v porovnaní s vývojom bulvárnych novín v liberálnodemokratických krajinách zaostávala o viac než storočie, k publikovaniu novinárskych obsahov slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na webe dochádza v podobnom období, ako tomu bolo v iných liberálnodemokratických krajinách. Primárne však na Slovensku do online prostredia preklápali svoje komunikáty nebulvárne periodiká. *„Začiatky onlinovej žurnalistiky sa datujú do prvej polovice 90. rokov 20. storočia, pričom súvisia so sprístupnením využívania internetu na komerčné využitie. K takému kroku pristúpila Národná nadácia pre vedu (NSFNET) v roku 1991. Následne americký Kongres prijal zákon, ktorý deklaroval slobodné celosvetové využívanie tejto siete.“* (Višňovský, 2015, s. 53) Na Slovensku ako prvý z novín uverejnil svoj obsah na internete ešte v prvej polovici 90. rokov 20. storočia, a to v roku 1994, nebulvárny denník SME. Ako uvádza J. Višňovský, najskôr sa obsah tohto periodika uverejňoval na webe Slovenskej akadémie vied, a to vďaka projektu Logos. (Višňovský, 2015) Od roku 1996 publikoval denník SME svoj obsah na vlastnej doméne [www.sme.sk](http://www.sme.sk), čím tieto noviny: *„(...) vstúpili na internet ako jedny z prvých v regióne strednej Európy.“* (Višňovský, 2015, s. 53) O dva roky neskôr (v roku 1998) začali preklápať svoje obsahy do online prostredia aj ďalšie dva nebulvárne denníky, ktoré sú predmetom tejto štúdie, a to Pravda a Hospodárske noviny. (Olejárová, 2019) V podobnom období prechádzali tradičné médiá, a teda aj noviny, do online prostredia aj v USA či západnej Európe. Ako uvádzajú J. D. Greer a D. Mensing, niektoré médiá boli v elektronickej podobe vydávané už v 70. rokoch 20. storočia, no na web začali prechádzať v polovici 90. rokov 20. storočia. V USA už v apríli 1994 boli na báze webu publikované noviny z mesta Casper v štáte Wyoming, Star-Tribune. Vo Veľkej Británii koncom roka 1994 začal denník Daily Telegraph vydávať svoje noviny na webe pod názvom The Electronic Telegraph. V máji 1995 už bolo zaznamenaných okolo 150 tzv. Web-based news, a to nielen v USA a Veľkej Británii, ale napríklad aj v austrálskom Sydney či v španielskej Barcelone a pod. Začiatkom roka 1996 začali vydávať online svoje noviny aj The New York Times v USA, The Times vo Veľkej Británii či Le Monde vo Francúzsku. (Greer & Mensing, 2005) Webové stránky novín spočiatku obsahovali totožný obsah ako ich printové vydania, na základe čoho sa označovali aj ako tzv. zrkadlá. (Višňovský, 2015). Postupom času však nastala v tejto oblasti zmena: *„Kým pri vstupne novín na web na prelome tisícročí redakcie ‚preklápali‘ svojho obsah na internet, dnes sú webové portály (často fungujúce pod rovnakým názvom ako tradičné médiá) relatívne samostatnými spravodajskými médiami, častokrát s vlastným obsahom a v rámci organizačnej štruktúry médiá fungujú relatívne samostatne.“* (Višňovský, 2017, online)

Hoci, ako sme už v tomto texte uviedli, ako prvé preklápali svoje obsahy na web slovenské nebulvárne periodiká, po dvanástich rokoch od prvého uverejnenia obsahu slovenského nebulvárneho denníka (konkrétne denníka SME) už mali svoju online podobu aj oba slovenské bulvárne denníky, Nový čas a Plus JEDEN deň. Slovenský bulvárny denník Nový čas, ktorý bol jedinými bulvárnymi novinami s dennou periodicitou na slovenskom trhu printových médií do roku 2006, preniesol svoj obsah na web až po roku 2000. Práve začiatok tretieho tisícročia sa ukazuje

ako významný v rámci formátov online podôb tradičnej tlače. Ako uvádza J. Višňovský: „Napriek tomu, že noviny vstúpili na internet už v prvej polovici 90. rokov 20. storočia, plnohodnotnou súčasťou tohto mediálneho segmentu sa stali až na prahu tretieho tisícročia.“ (Višňovský, 2015, s. 125) Tento jav podľa neho podmienilo niekoľko zmien po roku 2000. Prvou bola transformácia webu 1.0 na web 2.0, ktorý priniesol lepšie technické možnosti pre mediálnu komunikáciu. Druhou zmenou bol fakt, že po roku 2000 sa internet stal: „(...) bežnou súčasťou súkromných a pracovných aktivít ľudí. Redakcie postupne rozpoznali potenciál internetu ako nového komunikačného, distribučného a marketingového média a pristúpili k profilácii onlinových vydaní titulov ako samostatných produktov, a to aj napriek tomu, že ich názov zostal zhodný s tlačovým titulom.“ (Višňovský, 2015, s. 126) Web nazvaný Čas.sk, ktorý je dodnes webovým portálom denníka Nový čas, bol založený v máji v roku 2001. V tom čase išlo o web, na ktorom sa nachádzali informácie spoločenského týždenníka Čas. (Cas.sk, 2016, online) Koncom januára 2002 denník Nový čas spolu s internetovým portálom Zoznam.sk založili portál Bleskovky.sk, ktorý mal podľa V. Borovského nahradiť: „(...) doterajšiu webovú stránku Nového Času.“ (Borovský, 2002, online) V lete 2008 sa však po spore medzi spoločnosťou Zoznam a vtedajším vydavateľstvom Nového času – Ringier, presunul obsah denníka Nový čas na inovovaný portál Čas.sk.<sup>3</sup> (Vozárová, 2008, online) Druhý bulvárny denník na trhu slovenských printových médií, ktorý je vydávaný až do súčasnosti, noviny Plus JEDEN deň, začal vychádzať 4. 9. 2006. (Lincényi & Kohuťár, 2009) Ako uvádza A. Tušer, tento denník: „(...) sa v priebehu piatich rokov dostal medzi najúspešnejšie denníky.“ (Tušer, 2011, s. 101) Spolu s printovou verziou vstúpil v rovnaký deň aj na trh slovenských online médií. Podľa R. Augustína: „Plus jeden deň je na webe od prvého dňa na stánkoch.“ (Augustín, 2008, online) Pôvodný web týchto bulvárnych novín mal názov Plusjedenden.sk a „(...) zväčša len mechanicky preklápal obsah z novín podľa ich štruktúry.“ (Augustín, 2008, online) Svoju doménu do aktuálnej podoby Pluska.sk zmenil v roku 2008. Podľa R. Augustína sa tak stalo v období, keď sa oslabovalo postavenie portálu Čas.sk na slovenskom trhu online médií. (Augustín, 2008, online)

Ako sme už uviedli, podľa aktuálnych dát z októbra 2024 mal portál Pluska.sk tretí najvyšší počet užívateľov zo všetkých webov, ktoré monitoruje Interactive Advertising Bureau Slovakia (najviac reálnych používateľov mal web Aktuality.sk a druhý najvyšší počet reálnych používateľov mal portál Zoznam.sk). Z hľadiska portálov analyzovaných v tomto príspevku (Čas.sk, HNonline.sk, Pluska.sk, Pravda.sk a SME.sk) mal teda v októbri 2024 na trhu slovenských online médií najlepšie postavenie. Druhú najlepšiu pozíciu mal (spoplatnený) nebulvárny spravodajský portál SME.sk (celkovo štvrtú) a bulvárny Čas.sk, ktorého printový denník Nový čas je lídrom na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače, bol z hľadiska webov, na ktoré sa predkladaná štúdia zameriava, až tretí (celkovo šiesty) (Iab.slovakia, 2024a, online).

## Metodika výskumu

Cieľom príspevku je zistiť, či webové portály slovenských bulvárnych denníkov Čas.sk a Pluska.sk majú vo vzťahu k portálom slovenských nebulvárnych denníkov HNonline.sk, Pravda.sk a SME.sk rovnakú pozíciu na trhu slovenských online médií, ako majú ich printové verzie Nový čas a Plus JEDEN deň v porovnaní so slovenskými nebulvárnymi denníkmi Hospodárske noviny, Pravda a SME na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače. Čiastkovými cieľmi výskumu bolo zistiť aktuálny trend vývoja postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov Nový čas a Plus JEDEN deň na trhu slovenských printových médií, ako aj aktuálny trend vývoja postavenia online portálov Čas.sk a Pluska.sk na trhu slovenských online médií. V kontexte týchto cieľov sme si definovali aj všeobecnú výskumnú otázku:

<sup>3</sup> Spoločnosť Zoznam založila portál Topky.sk, ktorý mal byť pokračovateľom webu Bleskovky.sk. „Oproti pôvodnej podobe bulvárneho webu nemení okrem názvu takmer nič.“ (Vozárová, 2008, online)



*Majú portály Čas.sk a Pluska.sk v porovnaní s portálmi HNonline.sk, Pravda.sk a SME.sk rovnaké postavenie na trhu slovenských online médií, aké majú bulvárne denníky Nový čas a Plus JEDEN deň v porovnaní s periodikami Hospodárske noviny, Pravda a SME na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače?*

Na identifikáciu postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov a ich online portálov na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače a na trhu slovenských online médií sme zvolili ako hlavné ukazovatele mesačný predaný náklad slovenských denníkov a mesačný počet reálnych používateľov webových portálov slovenských denníkov. Uvedené ukazovatele sme reflektovali aj v špecifických výskumných otázkach:

1. *Ako sa počas sledovaného obdobia vyvíjal predaný náklad slovenských bulvárnych denníkov v porovnaní so slovenskými nebulvárnymi denníkmi?*

2. *Ako sa počas sledovaného obdobia vyvíjal počet reálnych používateľov online portálov slovenských bulvárnych denníkov v porovnaní s portálmi slovenskej nebulvárnej dennej tlače?*

3. *Aký je rozdiel v postavení slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače s postavením portálov slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na trhu slovenských online médií?*

Ako už bolo uvedené v tejto kapitole, trend postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače sme hodnotili z hľadiska počtu predaných výtlačkov skúmaných novín. Dáta o predanom náklade slovenských denníkov boli získané z verejne dostupných informácií, ktoré publikuje na svojej webovej stránke Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC SR). Ide o jedinú inštitúciu na Slovensku, ktorá uskutočňuje celoslovenský audit predaného a tlačeného nákladu slovenských periodík. Do tohto auditu nie sú zapojené všetky periodiká, ktoré vychádzajú na Slovensku. Účasť na audite nie je pre vydavateľov tlače povinná. Na Slovensku v súčasnosti vychádza 9 denníkov, a to: Denník N, Hospodárske noviny, Korzár, Plus JEDEN deň, Nový čas, Pravda, SME, Šport a Új Szó. (Ministerstvo kultúry Slovenskej republiky, ©2008-2010b) Do overovania predaného a tlačeného nákladu Audit Bureau of Circulations nie sú zapojené noviny Denník N ani Denník Šport. (Kancelária pre overovanie nákladu tlače, 2015, online) Z tohto dôvodu neboli ani predmetom našej analýzy. Rovnako boli z analýzy vylúčené aj periodiká Új Szó a Korzár, pretože ide o regionálne médiá, pričom Nový čas a Plus JEDEN deň, rovnako ako Hospodárske noviny, Pravda a SME, majú celoslovenské územné zameranie.


V prípade analýzy trendu postavenia webových portálov slovenských denníkov na trhu online médií sme vychádzali z údajov o počte reálnych používateľov slovenských webových portálov. Dáta sme čerpali z portálu združenia Interactive Advertising Bureau Slovakia. Ide o jediné združenie, ktoré uskutočňuje celoslovenský monitoring návštevnosti webových portálov. (Iab.slovakia, 2024b, online) V októbri 2024 publikovalo združenie Interactive Advertising Bureau monitoring 83 webových portálov. V prípade webových portálov slovenských denníkov je na rozdiel od auditu predaného a tlačeného nákladu slovenskej tlače s dennou periodicitou súčasťou tohto monitoringu aj web Denníka N (DennikN.sk). Naopak, webový portál periodika Denník Šport sme, na rozdiel od jeho printovej verzie v audite predaného a tlačeného nákladu slovenských periodík, v monitoringu online médií nezaznamenali. (Iab.slovakia, 2024a, online) Z dôvodu relevantnosti komparácie postavenia webových portálov slovenskej dennej tlače nebol ani webový portál DennikN.sk predmetom predkladanej analýzy, keďže printový Denník N nie je zapojený do auditu predaného a tlačeného nákladu slovenských periodík, ktorý uskutočňuje Audit Bureau of Circulation.

Dáta použité v tejto štúdií boli čerpané z obdobia od júla 2023 do augusta 2024. Ako už bolo v úvode tohto príspevku napísané, dôvodom voľby tohto obdobia bola verejná dostupnosť čo najaktuálnejších údajov. Kým v prípade tlačených médií boli najnovšie verejne dostupné údaje o predanom náklade publikované k mesiacu jún 2024, najaktuálnejšie dáta o počte reálnych používateľov slovenských webových portálov boli uverejnené k októbru 2024. Naopak, najstaršie verejne dostupné informácie o počte reálnych používateľov slovenských webových portálov

pochádzali v čase napísania tejto štúdie zo septembra 2023, kým údaje o predanom náklade slovenských periodík siahali až do roku 2000. Keďže zámerom tejto štúdie bolo reflektovať vývoj postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na trhu slovenských printových médií a ich webov na slovenskom online trhu za obdobie jedného roka, v prípade bulvárnych novín bola analýza uskutočnená na dátach od júla 2023 do júna 2024 a informácie o vývoji počtu reálnych používateľov webov slovenských denníkov boli analyzované za obdobie od septembra 2023 do augusta 2024. Pre samotnú komparáciu postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na trhu printových médií s postavením ich webových portálov na trhu online médií sme zvolili obdobie, počas ktorého boli verejne dostupné dáta z oboch slovenských mediálnych trhov, a to od septembra 2023 do júna 2024.

### Výsledky analýzy a diskusia


Najvyšší predaný náklad počas sledovaného ročného obdobia, t. j. od júla 2023 do júna 2024, mal slovenský bulvárny denník Nový čas s priemernou hodnotou 33 386 mesačne predaných výtlačkov. Druhý najvyšší predaný náklad zaznamenávali počas jednoročného analyzovaného obdobia bulvárne noviny s dennou periodicitou Plus JEDEN deň, a to s priemerným mesačným predajom predstavujúcim 23 494 novín. Tretí najvyšší priemerný mesačný náklad za obdobie od júla 2023 do júna 2024 zaznamenal nebulvárny denník SME. Na štvrtom mieste sa nachádzal nebulvárny denník Pravda s priemerným predajom 13 587 novín za mesiac. Najnižší priemerný mesačný náklad počas sledovaného jednoročného obdobia zaznamenala tlač s dennou periodicitou Hospodárske noviny, a to s priemernou mesačnou hodnotou na úrovni 7 245 predaných kusov. (Kancelária pre overovanie nákladov tlače, 2015, online).



Graf č. 1: Vývoj predaného nákladu slovenských denníkov za obdobie jedného roka (Zdroj: vlastné spracovanie podľa Kancelária pre overovanie nákladov tlače, ©2015, online).

V porovnaní s júlom 2023 v júni 2024 bol zaznamenaný (s výnimkou denníka SME) pokles mesačného predaného nákladu slovenských denníkov (graf č. 1). Denník SME zaznamenal nárast počtu predaných novín v mesiacoch august 2023 a september 2023. Následne v rámci trendu tohto vývoja možno identifikovať menšie výkyvy, rovnako ako v prípade denníkov Nový čas, Plus JEDEN deň a Pravda. Len v prípade Hospodárskych novín vidieť po septembri 2023 pokračujúci trend poklesu predaného nákladu až do konca analyzovaného obdobia, t. j. do júna 2024. Napriek


uvedeným výkyvom sa pozícia väčšiny periodík na trhu slovenských printových médií nezmenila. Výnimku tvoril len nebulvárný denník SME, ktorého mesačný počet predaných výtlačkov bol od septembra 2023 vyšší ako predaný náklad nebulvárneho denníka Pravda.



Graf č. 2: Vývoj počtu reálnych používateľov webových portálov slovenských denníkov za obdobie jedného roka (Zdroj: vlastné spracovanie podľa Iab.slovakia, 2024a, online)


V prípade porovnania počtu reálnych používateľov webových portálov slovenských denníkov s mesačným predným nákladom analyzovaných periodík v období od septembra 2023 do augusta 2024 bol zaznamenaný značný rozdiel. Pozíciu s najvyšším počtom reálnych používateľov striedavo počas jednotlivých mesiacov nadobúdali portály SME.sk (web nebulvárných novín SME) a Pluska.sk (online podoba bulvárneho denníka Plus JEDEN deň). Na treťom mieste sa stabilne udržiaval webový portál nebulvárných novín Pravda – Pravda.sk. S výnimkou septembra 2023 mal štvrtý najvyšší počet reálnych používateľov bulvárný portál Čas.sk (web denníka Nový čas) a najmenej reálnych používateľov z analyzovaných online médií zaznamenala webová podoba nebulvárných Hospodárskych novín – HNonline.sk (graf č. 2).

Uvedené údaje sa prejavili aj v pozícii analyzovaných médií na ich trhoch. Ako vidieť z grafu č. 3, nárast predaného nákladu denníka SME sa prejavil aj v zmene jeho pozície na trhu slovenských printových médií. Od septembra 2023 do júna 2024 si udržal tretiu pozíciu na tomto trhu a denník Pravda klesol na štvrtú pozíciu.



Graf č. 3: Vývoj postavenia slovenských denníkov na trhu printových médií za obdobie jedného roka (Zdroj: vlastné spracovanie podľa Kancelária pre overovanie nákladov tlače, ©2015, online)


Nemenná v priebehu sledovaného roka zostala pozícia bulvárnych denníkov Nový čas (1. miesto) a Plus JEDEN deň (2. miesto), ako aj Hospodárskych novín (6. miesto).<sup>4</sup> V prípade trhu slovenských printových médií s dennou periodicitou teda možno skonštatovať, že si vedúce postavenie dlhodobo udržiavajú slovenské bulvárne denníky (graf č. 3).



Graf č. 4: Vývoj postavenia webových portálov slovenských denníkov na trhu online médií za obdobie jedného roka (Zdroj: vlastné spracovanie podľa lab.slovakia, 2024a, online)

<sup>4</sup> V predanom náklade počas každého zo sledovaných mesiacov mal vyššie hodnoty denník Új Szó, ktorý však nie je pre jeho regionálne zameranie predmetom predkladanej štúdie.

Ako už bolo v tejto štúdií uvedené, vstupom slovenskej dennej tlače na trh online médií sa v porovnaní s ich pôsobením na trhu printových médií výrazne rozšírila ich konkurencia. Uvedený faktor sa prejavil aj na celkových pozíciách webových portálov slovenských denníkov na trhu online médií. Ako je vidieť v grafe č. 4, ani jedno z analyzovaných online médií nebolo počas sledovaného roka lídrom tohto trhu.<sup>5</sup> Na druhej pozícii sa najčastejšie (6 mesiacov) nachádzal webový portál slovenského bulvárneho denníka Plus JEDEN deň – Pluska.sk (november 2023, december 2023, február 2024, marec 2024, júl 2024, august 2024). V štyroch mesiacoch dosahoval druhú pozíciu na trhu online médií web SME.sk (september 2023, október 2023, apríl 2024, máj 2024). Webový portál nebulvárneho denníka SME zaznamenal v mesiacoch november 2023, február 2024, marec 2024 a jún 2024 tretiu pozíciu a v mesiacoch december 2023, január 2024, júl 2024 a august 2024 štvrté miesto na trhu online médií. Webový portál bulvárneho denníka Plus JEDEN deň sa počas mesiacov október 2023, november 2023, apríl 2024 a máj 2024 nachádzal na treťom mieste na trhu slovenských online médií. Najhoršia, štvrtá pozícia na trhu, bola v prípade tohto online média zaznamenaná na začiatku sledovaného obdobia, t. j. v septembri 2023. Stále postavenie na uvedenom trhu si počas 12 mesiacov udržiaval webový portál nebulvárneho denníka Pravda, a to piate. S výnimkou mesiacov september 2023 a október 2023 si stálu pozíciu (6. miesto) na trhu slovenských online médií udržal aj bulvárny portál Čas.sk. Okrem septembra 2023 malo najhoršie umiestnenie na sledovanom trhu online médium nebulvárnych Hospodárskych novín, ktoré bolo v júli 2024 a auguste 2024 na 16. mieste a v júni 2024 na 18. pozícii na trhu online médií.




Graf č. 5: Vývoj postavenia slovenských denníkov na trhu printových médií za obdobie september 2023 – jún 2024 (Zdroj: vlastné spracovanie podľa Kancelária pre overovanie nákladov tlače, ©2015, online)

V prípade obdobia od septembra 2023 do júna 2024, ktoré bolo predmetom komparácie postavenia slovenských bulvárnych denníkov na trhu slovenských printových médií s pozíciou ich webových portálov na trhu online médií, sa pozícia slovenských denníkov (bulvárnych aj nebulvárnych) na trhu printových médií javí ako ustálená. Ako je zrejme z grafu č. 5, vedúce

<sup>5</sup> Keďže je trh slovenských online médií oveľa rozsiahlejší, ako je tomu v prípade trhu slovenskej dennej tlače, z dôvodu zamerania tejto štúdie len na webové portály slovenských denníkov nie sú uvedené ostatné webové portály, ktoré sa na tomto trhu umiestnili počas sledovaného obdobia na lepších či horších pozíciách.

postavanie patrí bulvárnemu denníku Nový čas a za ním nasledujú bulvárne noviny s dennou periodicitou Plus JEDEN deň. Nasledujúce pozície obsadila slovenská nebulvárna denná tlač.



Graf č. 6: Vývoj postavenia webových portálov slovenských denníkov na trhu online médií za obdobie september 2023 – jún 2024 (Zdroj: vlastné spracovanie podľa Iab.slovakia, 2024a, online)

Na trhu slovenských online médií je v komparovanom období evidentný rozdiel v postavení webových portálov bulvárnych denníkov. Z grafu č. 6 vyplýva, že v rámci bulvárnych webových portálov sa na popredných miestach vyskytuje bulvárne online médium Pluska.sk, kým webový portál najpredávanejšieho slovenského bulvárneho denníka Čas.sk sa ustálil na šiestom mieste. Vedúce postavenie spomedzi slovenských nebulvárnych denníkov si aj v online priestore udržiava denník SME so svojim portálom SME.sk. Na rozdiel od trhu printových médií je na webe konkurenciou pre bulvárny webový portál Pluska.sk denník Plus JEDEN deň. Stálu pozíciu, no na poslednom mieste v rámci analyzovaných médií, si od októbra 2023 do júna 2024 udržiava webový portál HNonline. Podobne, na poslednom mieste v rámci sledovaných médií, sa umiestňuje počas celého komparovaného obdobia (t. j. od septembra 2023 do júna 2024) aj denník Hospodárske noviny.

V kontexte uvedených výsledkov je potrebné ešte poukázať na jeden faktor pôsobenia webových portálov na trhu slovenských online médií, a tým je spoplatnenie prístupu k ich obsahom. Za významný medzník v tejto oblasti možno považovať rok 2011. Do tohto roka všetky webové portály, ktoré sú predmetom predkladanej štúdie, ponúkali svoj obsah bezplatne. V máji 2011 vznikol systém národného paywallu Piano, v rámci ktorého mohli recipienti po zaplatení jedného poplatku čítať texty viacerých online médií. Do tohto systému vstúpili s výnimkou bulvárneho Nového Času webové portály všetkých ostatných slovenských celoštátnych denníkov, t. j. Hospodárske noviny, Plus JEDEN DEŇ, Pravda a SME: „Piano odštartovalo v máji 2011. Jeho zámerom bolo vytvoriť jednotný platobný systém pre prístup k článkom slovenských médií a naučiť čitateľov platiť za obsah na internete.“ (TASR, 2016, online) Zo spoločného spoplatňovania obsahu webových portálov však viaceré periodiká začali postupne odstupovať. Ako prvý z Piana vystúpil v marci 2014 webový portál Hospodárskych novín. Po niekoľkých mesiacoch od odstúpenia z Piana

zaviedol vlastnú platobnú bránu, cez ktorú spoplatňoval vybraný obsah. (TASR, 2016, online) V máji 2014 z národného systému paywallu vystúpil aj web denníka Pravda, ktorý sa rozhodol sprístupniť celý svoj obsah čitateľom bezplatne. (Czwitkovics, 2014, online) Na jar roku 2016 vystúpil zo systému Piano aj portál Pluska.sk, ktorý rovnako ponúka svoj obsah bezplatne. Denník SME vytrval v uvedenom systéme najdlhšie a po zániku Piana v roku 2016 pokračoval v ponuke spoplatneného obsahu, no už cez vlastnú platobnú bránu, ktorú však stále technicky zabezpečovalo Piano Media. (TASR, 2016, online) V roku 2024 spoplatňujú svoj obsah už len dva nebulvárne webové portály, ktoré sú predmetom tejto štúdie, a to SME.sk a HNonline.sk. Webové portály Čas.sk, Pluska.sk a Pravda.sk poskytujú svoj obsah bezplatne. Výnimku tvorí nákup elektronickej formy denníka Pravda cez portál e.pravda.sk a zároveň spoplatnený elektronický archív jednotlivých vydaní tohto periodika.

Z výsledkov monitoringu reálnych používateľov bulvárnych portálov Čas.sk a Pluska.sk v porovnaní s nebulvárnymi portálmi HNonline.sk, Pravda.sk a SME.sk však nie je tento faktor evidentne potvrdený ako determinant, ktorý by mohol potenciálne obmedzovať postavenie tohto webového portálu na trhu slovenských online médií. Dokazuje to predovšetkým postavenie webového portálu SME.sk, ktorý sa v sledovanom období spomedzi komparovaných online médií nachádzal na prvom resp. druhom mieste na trhu. Pre konkrétne určenie miery vplyvu spoplatnenia obsahu webových portálov na ich postavenie na trhu online médií by však bolo potrebné vypracovať samostatnú štúdiu, ktorá by sa zaoberala napríklad aj otázkou vplyvu tohto faktora na postavenie online média Hospodárskych novín na posledných pozíciách v porovnaní s ostatnými webovými portálmi slovenských denníkov, ktorých printové verzie sú predmetom monitoringu predaného a tlačeného nákladu prostredníctvom Audit Bureau of Circulations.

## Záver

Pozícia webových portálov Čas.sk a Pluska.sk na trhu slovenských online médií nie je taká dominantná ako v prípade slovenských bulvárnych denníkov Nový čas a Plus JEDEN deň na trhu slovenských printových médií. Kým bulvárny denník Nový čas je stálym lídrom tohto trhu (Cillingová, 2024, online), webový portál tohto periodika Čas.sk má šiesty najvyšší počet reálnych používateľov. Z hľadiska online médií, ktoré sú predmetom tejto štúdie, sa nachádza až na štvrtom mieste. Vyšší počet reálnych používateľov každý mesiac v priebehu sledovaného ročného obdobia zaznamenávali webové portály Pravda.sk, SME.sk a Pluska.sk. Lepšiu pozíciu na trhu online médií, ako má webový portál bulvárneho denníka Nový čas, tak mali internetové podoby dvoch nebulvárnych denníkov (Pravda a SME) a druhého, popri Novom čase aj posledného, bulvárneho denníka (Plus JEDEN deň). Líderskú pozíciu spomedzi analyzovaných webových portálov (a druhé miesto z hľadiska všetkých online médií, ktoré sú predmetom monitoringu IAB Slovakia) si v sledovanom období jedného roka vymieňali SME.sk a Pluska.sk, pričom Pluska.sk zaznamenala od septembra 2023 do augusta 2024 najvyšší počet reálnych používateľov až v šiestich mesiacoch, kým web SME.sk len v štyroch.

Uvedené trendy teda naznačujú, že z hľadiska webových portálov slovenských denníkov je na online trhu úspešnejší web tých bulvárnych novín s dennou periodicitou, ktorým na trhu printových denníkov patrí druhá pozícia. Lepšie postavenie na trhu slovenských online médií oproti webu bulvárneho denníka Nový čas (ktorý vedie trh slovenských printových denníkov) majú aj webové portály dvoch slovenských nebulvárnych novín s dennou periodicitou. A ani vedúca pozícia online média Pluska.sk na trhu v porovnaní s ostatnými webovými portálmi slovenských denníkov, ktoré boli predmetom tejto analýzy, nie je jednoznačná, keďže sa na nej web bulvárneho denníka striedal s webom nebulvárnych novín s dennou periodicitou (SME).

## Statement

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### Conflict of interest

There is no conflict of interest.

### Ethics

The material presented in this article meets all the points and requirements put forward by the Ethics Commission of the Editorial and Publishing Department of the public organization "Scientific and Educational Center "SUCCESSFUL".

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### **Postavenie slovenského bulváru na trhu printových a online médií**

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*(Nitra, Slovak Republic)*

#### ***Anotácia***

*Predkladaný príspevok sa venuje otázke, či webové portály slovenských bulvárných denníkov majú rovnakú pozíciu na trhu slovenských online médií, ako majú ich printové verzie na trhu slovenskej dennej tlače. Štúdia porovnáva postavenie slovenských bulvárných denníkov a ich online podôb na trhu slovenských printových a online médií v období od septembra 2023 do júna 2024. Predmetom výskumu sú jediné dva tlačené bulvárne denníky, ktoré vychádzajú na Slovensku, a to Nový čas a Plus JEDEN deň, a ich webové portály, konkrétne Čas.sk a Pluska.sk. Pozíciu skúmaných médií na trhu sleduje vo vzťahu k celoslovenským nebulvárnym denníkom Hospodárske noviny, Pravda a SME a k ich webovým portálom (HNonline.sk, Pravda.sk a SME.sk). Na základe*

identifikovania postavenia denníkov *Nový čas* a *Plus JEDEN deň* v porovnaní s nebulvárnymi denníkmi *Hospodárske noviny*, *Pravda* a *SME* na trhu slovenských printových médií v období od septembra 2023 do júna 2024 a postavenia portálov *Čas.sk* a *Pluska.sk* v porovnaní s pozíciami webových portálov slovenských nebulvárných denníkov, a to *HNonline.sk*, *Pravda.sk* a *SME.sk*, od septembra 2023 do júna 2024 identifikuje, či je postavenie slovenských bulvárných denníkov na trhu online médií rovnaké, ako je tomu v prípade ich postavenia na trhu slovenských printových médií. Štúdia vychádza z verejne dostupných údajov Kancelárie pre overovanie nákladov tlače (Audit Bureau of Circulations, skratka ABC SR), ktorá ako jediná na Slovensku monitoruje predaný a tlačенý náklad slovenských periodík, a z verejne dostupných údajov združenia slovenských vydavateľov, mediálnych a digitálnych agentúr, technologických platforiem a zadávateľov reklamy Interactive Advertising Bureau Slovakia (skratka IAB Slovakia), ktoré taktiež ako jediné v Slovenskej republike meria návštevnosť slovenských online médií.

**Keywords:** bulvár, denníky, trh slovenských online médií, trh slovenských printových médií, webový portál

### Позиція медіа «Словацький бульвар» на ринку друкованих медіа та онлайн-медіа

**Вероніка Цілінгова,**  
доктор філософії, доцент,  
кафедра журналістики та нових медіа,  
факультет мистецтв,  
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(м. Німра, Словацька Республіка).

#### Анотація

Стаття присвячена висвітленню питання про те, чи вебпортали словацьких таблоїдів займають таку ж позицію на словацькому онлайн-ринку медіа, як і їхні друковані версії на словацькому друкованому ринку. У дослідженні авторка порівняла позиції словацьких таблоїдів і їхніх вебпорталів на ринку друкованих медіа та онлайн-медіа Словаччини за період із вересня 2023 року по червень 2024 року. Предметом дослідження є два словацькі друковані таблоїди «*Nový čas*» і «*Plus JEDEN deň*» та їхні вебпортали «*Čas.sk*» і «*Pluska.sk*». Авторка відстежує позицію цих медіа на ринку щодо загальнонаціональних нетаблоїдних щоденних газет «*Hospodárske noviny*», «*Pravda*» і *SME* та їхніх вебпорталів («*HNonline.sk*», «*Pravda.sk*» і *SME.sk*). На основі моніторингу розвитку позиції щоденних газет «*Nový čas*» і «*Plus JEDEN deň*» і нетаблоїдних щоденних газет «*Hospodárske noviny*», «*Pravda*» і *SME* на ринку друкованих медіа Словаччини за період із липня 2023 року по червень 2024 року, а також позиції порталів «*Čas.sk*» і «*Pluska.sk*» і порталів небульварних газет, зокрема «*HNonline.sk*», «*Pravda.sk*» і «*SME.sk*», за період із вересня 2023 року по серпень 2024 року авторка визначає тенденцію розвитку позиції моніторингових медіа на обох ринках. За період із вересня 2023 року по червень 2024 року авторка з'ясує, чи є позиція словацьких щоденних таблоїдів на онлайн-ринку такою ж, як і на ринку друкованих медіа. Дослідження ґрунтується на загальнодоступних даних Аудиторського бюро тиражів (аббревіатура – ABC SR), яке в Словаччині здійснює моніторинг проданих і друкованих тиражів словацьких періодичних видань, а також на загальнодоступних даних асоціації словацьких видавців, медіа та цифрових агентств, технологічних платформ та рекламодавців «*Interactive*

*Advertising Bureau Slovakia» (IAB Slovakia), яка є єдиною асоціацією в Словацькій Республіці для вимірювання кількості відвідувачів словацьких онлайн-медіа.*

**Ключові слова:** щоденні газети, ринок онлайн-медіа Словаччини, таблоїди, вебпортал.





## Analysis of the Visual and Textual Processing of Political News in Slovak Tabloid Newspapers

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Mgr. Aneta Černáková</b> <i>PhD. Student</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Department of Journalism and New Media</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>E-mail: aneta.cernakova@ukf.sk</i> <i>https://orcid.org/0009-0007-5857- 0005 Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra, B. Slančíkovej 1, Nitra, Slovak Republic, 94901</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Abstract</b></p> <p><i>Compared to other liberal-democratic countries, tabloid journalism is a relatively recent phenomenon in Slovakia, having begun to take shape in the early 1990s. Despite the fact that the tabloid press has been developing in our region for only a few years, it has already acquired distinctive characteristics that set it apart from non-tabloid media. A unique aspect of Slovak tabloids is their coverage of political issues, which differs from political coverage in Slovak non-tabloid media. The specific approach of the editorial teams in tabloids makes the political news coverage different not only in terms of topics but also in terms of other typical features, including visual and textual treatment. In this study, we focused on identifying typical features of political topics, especially in terms of thematic, textual and visual presentation, which we consider characteristic of the political content of Slovak tabloids. Since there are only two tabloid dailies in Slovakia, the research will focus on political topics in the Nový Čas and Plus JEDEN DEŇ magazines. In order to identify the specifics of political topics in tabloid newspapers, the analysis includes two non-tabloid dailies, SME and Pravda, which published in Slovakia. We chose these two non-tabloid dailies for their subject versatility. The specificity of political topics in the Slovak tabloid press is determined through an analysis of media content focused on political issues, followed by a comparison with the treatment of political topics in selected non-tabloid dailies. The analysis based primarily on a quantitative research methodology aimed at identifying the characteristics of political news coverage. The subsequent comparative analysis of tabloid and non-tabloid dailies will answer the questions of how and to what extent political reporting differs in the Slovak tabloids Nový Čas and Plus JEDEN DEŇ, and what specific characteristics distinguish them.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Citation:</b> Černáková, A. (2024). Analysis of the Visual and Textual Processing of Political News in Slovak Tabloid Newspapers. <i>Social Communications: Theory and Practice, 16(2)</i>.</p> <p>DOI: 10.51423/2524-0471-2024-16-2- 8</p> <p style="text-align: center;">© Černáková, A. (2024).</p> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> <p style="text-align: center;">Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)</p>	
<p>Submitted to the editor – 21.11.2024 Review 1 – 22.12.2024 Review 2 – 22.12.2024 Accepted for printing – 30.12.2024</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Key words:</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;">tabloid, non-tabloid media, newspaper, political news, specifics</p>	

## Úvod

I keď v súčasnosti klesá záujem publika o tradičné médiá, bulvárne periodiká si neustále držia nezastupiteľnú úlohu vo verejnej sfére, pretože ponúkajú informácie, ktoré si recipienti vyžadujú. Zrod bulváru na našom území spájame území s rokom 1991, kedy vznikol prvý slovenský bulvárny denník Nový Čas. Titul slovenských bulvárných denníkov dopĺňa a zároveň uzatvára Plus JEDEN DEŇ, ktorý sa vydáva od 4. septembra 2006. I keď aj v iných slovenských nebulvárných denníkoch sa vyskytujú bulvárne prvky, nemožno ich v celku považovať za bulvárne (Lincényi & Kohutár, 2009).

Hoci bulvár vznikol na území Slovenskej republiky len pred tridsiatimi rokmi, pričom jeho vznik spájame so začiatkom vydávania denníka Nový Čas, možno povedať, že v rámci dennej tlače ide už o pomerne ustálený jav. To dokazuje fakt, že na Slovensku už viac než sedemnášť rokov nevznikol žiadny nový bulvárny denník. Napriek tomu, že sa bulvárna tlač formuje na našom území len desiatky rokov, i za toto obdobie nadobudla typické vlastnosti. Osobitou záležitosťou slovenského bulváru je komunikovanie politických tém, ktoré sa takisto diferencuje s politickým spravodajstvom v nebulvárných médiách.

Zámerom výskumu je vyhľadať kľúčové znaky spracovania politických tém v slovenských bulvárných denníkoch Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ. Zároveň je naším cieľom odhaliť kľúčové znaky textového a vizuálneho spracovania, ktoré sa používajú na prezentáciu politických tém v bulvárných denníkoch, a zároveň ich odlíšiť od prístupu spracovania politickej problematiky, ktorý využívajú nebulvárne denníky Sme a Pravda. Komparácia politických tém v bulvárných a nebulvárných denníkoch nám umožní lepšie pochopiť rozdiely v spracovávaní politickej problematiky vo vybraných denníkoch a určiť špecifické spôsoby, ktoré využívajú bulvárne denníky na prezentáciu politickej problematiky.

## Metodika výskumu

Bulvárna tlač sa vyznačuje mnohými typickými vlastnosťami, preto je naším zámerom nadobudnúť poznatky, či sú tieto znaky identické aj v prípade komunikovania politických tém. Takisto sledujeme, či má politické spravodajstvo v slovenských bulvárných denníkoch iné prvky, ktoré sú pre ne charakteristické.

### *Výskumné otázky*

Keďže je primárnym cieľom výskumu identifikácia špecifik spracovania politických tém v bulvárných denníkoch, všeobecná výskumná otázka znie: Aké sú špecifiká spracovania politických tém v bulvárných denníkoch Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ? Na dosiahnutie hlavného cieľa sme si určili špecifické výskumné otázky:

**Špecifická výskumná otázka č. 1:** Dáva bulvár politickému spravodajstvu menší priestor než seriózna tlač?

**Špecifická výskumná otázka č. 2:** Disponujú politické témy v denníkoch Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ typickými bulvárnymi prvkami?

**Špecifická výskumná otázka č. 3:** Prevažuje v politickom spravodajstve v bulvárných denníkoch zábava nad zameriavaním sa na napĺňanie základných spravodajských hodnôt?

### *Hypotézy*

Na základe teoretických poznatkov sme si určili hypotézy, ktoré slúžia ako predpokladané závery našich výskumných otázok:

**Hypotéza č. 1:** Bulvár sa väčšmi zameriava na zábavu, senzácie a život celebrit. (Psárová,

2018) Z toho dôvodu predpokladáme, že bulvárne denníky sa budú venovať politickým témam menej, než nebulvárna tlač.

**Hypotéza č. 2:** Princíp bulvárnej mediálnej komunikácie sa zameriava predovšetkým na zábavu či senzácie a uprednostňuje ich pred presnosťou a novinárskou integritou. (Gossel, online)

Preto predpokladáme, že v politických témach Nového Času a Plus JEDEN DEŇ bude prevažovať zábava nad spravodajskými hodnotami.

## Výsledky výskumu

### Kvantitatívna analýza špecifik spracovania politických tém v slovenských denníkoch

Na identifikáciu zistenia, ktoré periodiká venujú väčší priestor politickému spravodajstvu, sme zaznamenávali celkový počet žurnalistických výstupov a politických správ v analyzovaných denníkoch. Spriemerované dáta uvádzame v Tab. 1.:

Názov periodika	Nový Čas	Plus JEDEN DEŇ	Pravda	SME
Priemerný počet politických správ v jednom vydaní	3	15	6	11
Priemerný počet žurnalistických výstupov v jednom denníku	34	63	30	43
Podiel politického spravodajstva (%)	8 %	23 %	23 %	27 %
Podiel politických správ prebraných z tlačových agentúr (%)	0 %	67 %	28 %	47 %
Podiel politických správ prebraných z tlačových agentúr, ktoré sú upravené (%)	6 %	6 %	4 %	1 %
Podiel autorských politických správ (%)	94 %	27 %	68 %	52 %

Tab. 1.: Kvantitatívna analýza politického spravodajstva

Najväčší podiel politického spravodajstva sa nachádzal v denníku SME (27 %). Nasledovali Pravda a Plus JEDEN DEŇ s rovnakým podielom politického spravodajstva (23 %). Najmenej politických tém bolo v Novom Čase (8 %).

Denník SME dával najväčší priestor politickým témam, no až 47 % výstupov v redakcii preberali z tlačových agentúr. V uverejňovaní agentúrnych správ s témou politiky dominoval denník Plus JEDEN DEŇ s podielom 67 %. V Pravde sa nachádzalo 28 % agentúrneho spravodajstva a v Novom Čase sme nezaznamenali žiadnu agentúrnu správu v pôvodnom znení.


V Novom Čase sme však počas skúmaného obdobia našli 6 % agentúrneho spravodajstva, ktoré podliehalo redakčnej úprave. Rovnaký podiel upravených agentúrnych správ sa nachádzal v denníku Plus JEDEN DEŇ. V Pravde tento podiel tvoril 4 % a v SME 1 %. Keďže sme v Novom Čase zaznamenali celkovo najmenší podiel agentúrnych správ a aj to len tých s redakčnou úpravou (6 %), až 94 % politického spravodajstva v tomto periodiku tvorili autorské správy. V uverejňovaní autorských správ nasledovali Pravda (68 %), SME (52 %) a Plus JEDEN DEŇ (27 %).

Nebulvárne periodiká sa zaoberali politickým spravodajstvom viac (minimálny podiel 23 %), než bulvár (maximálny podiel 23 %). Pre Nový Čas bolo špecifické, že sa v periodiku nachádzali len upravené tlačové správy. Plus JEDEN DEŇ sa vyznačoval veľkým podielom tlačových správ v pôvodnom znení (aspoň 67 %), čo preyšovalo podiel tlačových správ v nebulvárných denníkoch. Pre Nový Čas bol charakteristický veľký podiel autorského politického spravodajstva, v

Plus JEDEN DEŇ bol tento podiel najnižší.


### Umiestnenie politického spravodajstva v rubrikách tematicky univerzálnych denníkov

Bulvárne periodiká venujú rovnakú pozornosť celebritám, škandalom, športu a politickým témam. (Psárová, 2018) Aj to možno považovať za dôvod, prečo sa v oboch bulvárnych denníkoch vyčleňujú politické témy v rubrike nazvanej doslovne: Politika. V Novom Čase sme v tejto rubrike zaznamenali 86 % politického spravodajstva. Nasledoval Plus JEDEN DEŇ s podielom 50 %. Nebulvárne denníky rubriku Politika nemajú.




Graf 1: Politické spravodajstvo v denníku Nový Čas

V Novom Čase sa v časti Politika vyskytovala väčšina politických tém (86 %). Politické spravodajstvo sa nachádzalo aj v rubrike Šport (6 %), Prominenti (4 %) a Téma dňa (4 %).




Graf 2: Politické spravodajstvo v denníku Plus JEDEN DEŇ

V Plus JEDEN DEŇ sme identifikovali najviac politického spravodajstva v časti Politika (50 %). Nasledovali rubriky Aktuálne (31 %), Slovensko (12 %), Zahraničie (6 %) a Zaujalo nás (1 %).



Graf 3: Politické spravodajstvo v denníku Pravda

Keďže Pravda nemá túto rubriku, najviac politického spravodajstva bolo v rubrike Slovensko (48 %), nasledovali tematické časti nazvané Svet (29 %), Ekonomika (20 %) a Rozhovor (3 %).



Graf 4: Podiel politického spravodajstva v rubrikách denníka SME

V denníku SME sa väčšina politických správ nachádzala v rubrike Spravodajstvo (99 %). 1 % politického spravodajstva sme zaznamenali v časti Kultúra.

Špecifikom slovenských bulvárnych denníkov je samostatná rubrika Politika, do ktorej vyčleňujú politické spravodajstvo. V Novom Čase sa v tejto rubrike nachádzala väčšina politických tém (podiel 86 %). V Plus JEDEN DEŇ sa v Politike nachádzalo 50 % politického spravodajstva. V analyzovaných nebulvárnych denníkoch sa rubrika Politika nenachádzala.

### Tematické zameranie politického spravodajstva

Bulvár sa väčšmi než na fakty a overené informácie zameriava na osobný život mediálne známych osobností. (Gossel, online) Takisto prezentuje a odhaľuje životných štýl, bohatstvo a úspechy známych ľudí, čo sme potvrdili v analýze. (Buček, 2011) Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ venovali v porovnaní s Pravdou a SME viac pozornosti témam, ktoré



sa zameriavali na konkrétnych politických aktérov a ich súkromie. Treba však doplniť aj inú stránku, že napriek tomu väčší podiel v bulvárnej tlači majú v politických správach spoločenské témy oproti tým zo súkromia politikov.

Denník Nový Čas priniesol v sledovanom období 39 % tém, ktoré sa orientovali na konkrétnych politických aktérov a ich súkromie. Plus JEDEN DEŇ venoval tejto tematike 20 % podielu politického spravodajstva. Menšie čiastky sme zaznamenali v nebulvárnej tlači, konkrétne v denníku Pravda 9 % a v SME 2 %.

Názov periodika	Nový Čas	Plus JEDEN DEŇ	Pravda	SME
Spoločenské témy	61 %	80 %	91 %	98 %
Osobnosti	39 %	20 %	9 %	2 %


Tab. 2.: Politické spravodajstvo v analyzovaných periodikách

### Spravodajské hodnoty

Pri určovaní spravodajských tém, resp. toho, čo sa môže dostať do spravodajstva, je dôležité poznať spravodajské hodnoty. Na základe teoretických poznatkov môžeme hovoriť o piatich spravodajských hodnotách, ktoré definujú spravodajstvo. Sú to nasledovné funkcie: dôležitosť, blízkosť, dramatickosť, prístup a ideológia. (Vizváryová, 2021)

V Grafe 5 znázorňujeme, že seriózne periodiká venujú omnoho väčšiu pozornosť spoločensky dôležitým témam. V denníku Pravda sme spomedzi skúmaných komunikátov zaznamenali 90 % dôležitých tém, v SME malo túto spravodajskú hodnotu 80 % analyzovaných správ. V prípade bulvárnych denníkov bol podiel omnoho menší, keďže sa väčšmi zaoberali súkromným životom politikov alebo škandálmi. V oboch bulvárnych periodikách sme zaznamenali 30 % politických tém, ktoré mali túto spravodajskú hodnotu.

Bulvár venoval omnoho väčšiu pozornosť dramatickosti v spracovaní tém. V Novom Čase vykazovalo politické spravodajstvo prvky dramatickosti v podiele 80 % analyzovaných výstupov, v Plus JEDEN DEŇ bol tento podiel ešte vyšší, konkrétne 90 %. V serióznom SME sme zaznamenali 40 % politického spravodajstva s funkciou dramatickosti, Pravda obsahovala 30 % takýchto správ.



Graf 5: Spravodajské hodnoty

Väčšie rozdiely sme zaznamenali v spôsobe získavania informácií, t.j., či redaktori využívali primárne alebo sekundárne zdroje. Zistili sme, že politické spravodajstvo serióznych médií obsahovalo viac informácií z primárnych zdrojov. Najvyšší podiel spomedzi analyzovaných

periodík vykazoval denník Pravda (100 %), nasledoval denník SME (90 %), Plus JEDEN DEŇ a Nový Čas s rovnakým podielom (60 %). V prípade ďalšej spravodajskej hodnoty, blízkosti, sme zaznamenali výskyt v podobnom podiele vo všetkých analyzovaných periodikách.

I keď bol podiel tejto funkcie najvyšší v Pravde (50 %), v bulvárnom Plus JEDEN DEŇ a nebulvárnom SME bol podiel rovnaký (40 %). Najmenší percentuálny podiel tejto funkcie sa nachádzal v Novom Čase (30 %). Najvyšší výskyt poslednej z analyzovaných funkcií, t.j. ideológie, bol v denníku SME v podiele 90 %. V ostatných analyzovaných denníkoch sa táto funkcia vyskytovala v prípade 70 % politického spravodajstva.

Výskumom spravodajských hodnôt sme zistili, že kým percentuálny výskyt funkcie ideológie a blízkosti je v analyzovaných bulvárnych a nebulvárnych periodikách rovnaký alebo veľmi podobný, funkciu dramatickosti väčšmi využívali v politických témach bulvárne periodiká. Pre nebulvárne denníky bolo typické, že sa viac zaoberali témami, ktoré sú dôležité, a taktiež získavali informácie predovšetkým z primárnych zdrojov. Bulvár využíval viac aj sekundárne zdroje.

### Vizuálne a textové spracovanie politického spravodajstva v bulvárnych denníkoch

V porovnaní s inými liberálnodemokratickými krajinami je bulvár na Slovensku pomerne novou záležitosťou, keďže sa na našom území začal formovať až začiatkom 90-tych rokov minulého storočia. (Veverková, 2014) Osobitou záležitosťou slovenského bulváru je politické spravodajstvo, ktoré sa odlišuje istými špecifikami, v komparácii s komunikovaním politických tém v nebulvárnych médiách. Za základný znak bulvárnych periodík je možné považovať tabloidný formát, ktorý je zvyčajne o polovicu menší, než majú nebulvárne noviny. (Gossel, online) K ďalším charakteristickým vlastnostiam patria výrazné grafické spracovanie, veľké farebné fotografie a tučné písmo. Bulvár sa vyznačuje jednoduchým jazykom, ktorému porozumie široké publikum. (Veverková, 2014) Bulvárne texty majú krátky rozsah a sú povrchno spracované. Bulvárne správy oboznamujú ľudí, ktorí sa nezaujímajú o politiku, s dôležitými politickými problémami, ktoré sú písané v zjednodušenej forme. (Hvížďala et al., 2016) Keďže sú tieto charakteristiky všeobecne platné pre bulvárnu tlač, sú aj predmetom štúdie.

V denníkoch Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ sa vyskytovali určité znaky bulvárnych periodík v podobných čiastkach, i keď pri istých vlastnostiach boli výraznejšie špecifiká. Najväčší rozdiel bol v tabloidnom formáte, ktorým disponoval spomedzi analyzovanej tlače len Nový Čas.

Špecifikum	Nový Čas	Plus JEDEN DEŇ
Tabloidný formát	100 %	0 %
Výrazne sfarbený titulok	100 %	100 %
Výrazne sfarbený nadtitulok	73 %	100 %
Veľké fotografie	86 %	68 %
Zvýrazňovanie tučným písmom	86 %	61 %
Texty vo farebnom ráme	50 %	75 %
Grafy	5 %	0 %
Tabuľky	5 %	4 %
Hovorový jazyk	68 %	46 %
Povrchnosť spracovania textu	91 %	68 %

<b>Krátky rozsah</b>	77 %	75 %
<b>Oboznamuje čitateľov, ktorí sa o politiku nezaujímajú, s informáciou v zjednodušenej forme</b>	61 %	80 %

Tab. 3.: *Bulvárne prvky v politickom spravodajstve denníka Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ*

Oba denníky využívali v podiele 100 % titulky s výrazným sfarbením. Nápadité nadtitulky dominovali v Plus JEDEN DEŇ (100 %) a v Novom Čase sa vyskytovali v 73 % politického spravodajstva. Veľké fotografie, ktoré zobrazovali politických aktérov, sa nachádzali v oboch denníkoch, i keď v Novom Čase bol výskyt častejší (86 %), ako v denníku Plus JEDEN DEŇ (68 %).

V periodikách boli dôležité časti textu zvýraznené tučným písmom. V Plus JEDEN DEŇ sa tento jav nachádzal v 61 % politického spravodajstva, v Novom Čase častejšie (86 %). Tvorcovia denníka Plus JEDEN DEŇ väčšmi zvýrazňovali a oddeľovali politické spravodajstvo farebnými rámkami (75 %) v porovnaní s Novým Časom, kde sa tento úkaz vyskytoval v 50 % politického spravodajstva.


Grafy a tabuľky sa vyskytovali v oboch denníkoch minimálne. Nový Čas používal grafy v 5 % v politického spravodajstva, v Plus JEDEN DEŇ sa grafy nevyskytovali. Tabuľky sa nachádzali v Novom Čase v 5 % analyzovaných žurnalistických komunikátov. Denník Plus JEDEN DEŇ ich používal menej často, konkrétne v podiele 4 %. Oba denníky komunikovali politické spravodajstvo najmä hovorovým jazykom. Nový Čas používal hovorové slová v podiele 68 %, teda viac ako Plus JEDEN DEŇ (46 %).

Pri komunikovaní problematiky obsahovalo bulvárne spravodajstvo väčšmi politické výpovede, než fakty, a zameriavalo sa na povrchné informácie, ako napríklad vzhľad politických aktérov, súkromie, životný štýl atď., a teda išlo prevažne o povrchné spracované spravodajstvo. Takto komunikované správy sa nachádzali v 91 % výstupov Nového Času. Plus JEDEN DEŇ prinášal povrchné témy v 68 % prípadoch analyzovaných textov.

Obe bulvárne médiá interpretovali spoločensky závažné témy v kratšom rozsahu, čo sme zistili komparáciou rovnakých alebo podobných tém s nebulvárnou tlačou. Bulvárne spravodajstvo často obsahovalo len povrchné informácie bez faktov, súvislostí a dostatočných informácií. Takto spracované správy sa nachádzali v oboch bulvárných periodikách v podobnom podiele (Nový čas 77 %, Plus JEDEN DEŇ 75 %).


Keďže sa v spravodajstve Nového Času aj Plus JEDEN DEŇ vyskytovali najmä hovorový jazyk a povrchné spracované témy, možno povedať, že obe médiá sú sprostredkovateľom informácií o politickom dianí v zjednodušenej forme. Konkrétne komunikáty plniace túto funkciu sme zaznamenali v Novom Čase v 61 % výstupov z dôvodu, že nie všetky analyzované texty sa zaoberali politickým spravodajstvom, ale orientovali sa aj na konkrétne osobnosti. V Plus JEDEN DEŇ plnilo túto funkciu 80 % analyzovaných výstupov.

Pre bulvárne periodiká je typické využívanie výrazných farieb. Preto sme sa v štúdiu orientovali na najčastejšie vyskytujúce sa farby v politickom spravodajstve. Nový Čas používal pri komunikovaní politického spravodajstva najviac červenú a žltú farbu v rovnakom podiele (27 %). Nasledovali modrá a oranžová (22 %), fialová (18 %), zelená (14 %) a hnedá (9 %).



Graf 6: Farby v politickom spravodajstve denníka Nový Čas

Plus JEDEN DEŇ využíval najčastejšie červenú farbu, a to až v 46 % politického spravodajstva. Rovnako používaná bola modrá farba, nasledovala žltá (43 %), zelená (21 %), hnedá (18 %), oranžová a fialová v rovnakom podiele (7 %). V tomto denníku sme zaznamenali aj výskyt ružovej farby (4 %).



Graf 7: Farby v politickom spravodajstve denníka Plus JEDEN DEŇ

Oba bulvárne denníky disponovali typickými znakmi bulváru, a to v prípade vizuálnej stránky (veľké fotografie, výrazné titulky, zvýrazňovanie dôležitých častí textu, oddeľovanie textov vo farebných rámkoch) ale i textovej (hovorový jazyk, krátky rozsah správ, povrchno spracované spravodajstvo, informovanie v zjednodušenej forme). Všetky znaky vykazovali obe periodiká vo veľmi podobných percentuálnych podieloch. Rovnakou vlastnosťou periodík bolo minimálne používanie tabuliek a grafov (maximálny podiel 5 %). Významný rozdiel bol v tabloidnom formáte, ktorým zo spomínaných denníkov disponoval len Nový Čas.

V politickom spravodajstve oboch denníkov prevažovala červená, žltá a tmavomodrá farba. V Novom Čase boli najčastejšie využívanými farbami červená a žltá, v Plus JEDEN DEŇ červená a tmavomodrá. Ďalšími typickými farbami bulvárneho politického spravodajstva boli hnedá, zelená, fialová, oranžová a v prípade denníka Plus JEDEN DEŇ aj ružová.

### Vizuálne a textové spracovanie politického spravodajstva v nebulvárnych denníkoch

Cieľom nebulvárnych médií je prinášať rozsiahle a analytické informácie o politike, ktoré poskytnú čitateľom priestor k diskusii a politickému rozhodnutiu. Mediálne výstupy nebulvárnej tlače by mali byť založené na faktoch, hodnotných informáciách, odbornom pohľade. (Midulová,

2013) Zároveň by mali nebulvárne médiá plniť funkciu predĺženej ruky občana pri kontrole moci a verejných prostriedkov. (Mistriková & Žitný, 2001)

Denník SME možno všeobecne považovať za liberálnejší, pričom sa orientuje viac na mladších a vzdelanejších čitateľov v porovnaní s denníkom Pravda, ktorý sa historicky spája aj s obdobím komunizmu. Pravda sa i v súčasnosti orientuje ľavicovo, pričom čitatelia sú z väčšej časti vzdelaní ľudia s vyšším vekovým priemerom. (Midulová, 2013)

Špecifikum	Pravda	SME
<b>Jednoduché grafické spracovanie</b>	100 %	<b>100 %</b>
<b>Použitie jednej, maximálne dvoch fotografií</b>	92 %	<b>83 %</b>
<b>Jednoduchý titulok</b>	92 %	<b>100 %</b>
<b>Nocionálny jazyk</b>	83 %	<b>92 %</b>
<b>Grafy</b>	17 %	<b>8 %</b>
<b>Tabuľky</b>	50 %	<b>17 %</b>
<b>Odborný pohľad na problematiku</b>	83 %	<b>83 %</b>
<b>Investigatíva</b>	<b>25 %</b>	<b>50 %</b>

Tab. 4: Špecifiká politického spravodajstva denníkov Pravda a SME

Politické témy v oboch periodikách mali nevýrazné grafické spracovanie, ktoré zahŕňalo jednoduchý titulok čiernej farby a jednu až dve fotografie zobrazujúce politických aktérov. Pravda využívala častejšie grafy (17 %) ako SME (8 %). Podiel výskytu tabuliek bol takisto väčší v Pravde (50 %) ako v SME (17 %). Periodiká komunikovali politickú problematiku nocionálnym jazykom, pričom spravodajstvo bolo založené na faktoch, analýzach a názoroch odborníkov. Presne 50 % komunikátov denníka SME sa zameriaval na investigatívu a odhaľovanie súvislostí, v Pravde sa vyskytovali investigatívne témy v 25 % analyzovaných žurnalistických komunikátov.

### Titulky v bulvárnem a nebulvárnem politickom spravodajstve

K najvýznamnejším znakom bulváru patria výrazné titulky (Hvízd'ala, online). Titulky sú vydavateľmi podávané tak, aby prilákali čo najviac čitateľov ku kúpe periodika. (Psárová, 2018) Bulvárne titulky ovplyvňujú i celkové pôsobenie komunikátu. Rovnako dôležitá je slovná podoba titulkov, ako aj ich vizuálne spracovanie. (Cillingová, 2023)


V Novom Čase sa vyskytovalo 43 % a v Plus JEDEN DEŇ 30 % titulkov, ktoré poukazovali na nejaký škandál. V Pravde bol výskyt 5 % takýchto titulkov, v SME 3 %.

Názov periodika	Nový Čas	Plus JEDEN DEŇ	Pravda	SME
<b>Politický problém</b>	57 %	70 %	95 %	<b>97 %</b>
<b>Škandál</b>	<b>43 %</b>	<b>30 %</b>	<b>5 %</b>	<b>3 %</b>

Tab. 5.: Zameranie titulkov v bulvárných a nebulvárných denníkoch

Dôležitou zložkou, ktorú aplikujú najmä bulvárne periodiká na získavanie pozornosti čitateľov, je interpunkcia. Interpunkcia je dôležitým prvkom na docielenie emocionálnosti a vyvoláva u čitateľa zvedavosť. (Cillingová, 2023)

V Novom Čase sme zaznamenali interpunkčné znamienka v 73 % skúmaných žurnalistických komunikátov. V Plus JEDEN DEŇ sa interpunkcia vyskytovala v 53 % titulkoch politického spravodajstva. V nebulvárnej tlači bolo využívanie interpunkčných znamienok minimálne.



Graf 8: Interpunkcia v titulkoch bulvárných denníkov

Kým v Novom Čase dopĺňali nadtitulky 93 % politického spravodajstva a v Plus JEDEN DEŇ sa vyskytovalo 30 % nadtitulkov, SME a Pravda ich nevyužívali. Zaujímavým zistením je, že denník SME využíval podtitulky v 38 % analyzovaného spravodajstva a Pravda nevyužívala podtitulky ani nadtitulky.

Periodiká používali rozdielne aj medzitulky. Kým v Novom Čase sa medzitulky vyskytovali v 54 % analyzovaných komunikátov, v Plus JEDEN DEŇ sa nenachádzali. Pravda používala medzitulky v 39 % a SME v 29 % politického spravodajstva.

Názov periodika	Nový Čas	Plus JEDEN DEŇ	Pravda	SME
<b>Nadtitulky</b>	93 %	30 %	0 %	0 %
<b>Podtitulky</b>	0 %	0 %	0 %	38 %
<b>Medzitulky</b>	54 %	0 %	39 %	29 %

Tab. 6.: Výskyt nadtitulkov, podtitulkov a medzituliek

Typickým prvkom politického spravodajstva v bulvárných denníkoch boli nadtitulky, ktoré sa vyskytovali vo väčšine komunikátov Nového Času a v 30 % politického spravodajstva denníka Plus JEDEN DEŇ. Ďalšou vlastnosťou politického spravodajstva slovenských bulvárných denníkov boli škandalózne orientované titulky v porovnaní s nebulvárnymi periodikami. V prípade oboch bulvárných periodík boli titulky dopĺňané interpunkciou, pričom Nový Čas ju využíval väčšmi, než Plus JEDEN DEŇ. Medzitulky využívali všetky analyzované denníky v podiele aspoň 29 %, okrem Plus JEDEN DEŇ.

## Diskusia

Bulvárna tlač je všeobecne charakteristická určitými znakmi, ktorými sa odlišuje od nebulvárných periodík. Zámerom bulváru je uprednostniť zábavu pred novinárskou integritou, a teda jej hlavným cieľom je predovšetkým upútať pozornosť čitateľov. Bulvárne periodiká sa nezameriavajú na kvalitu informácií, ktoré podávajú čitateľom, ale väčšiu pozornosť venujú výraznému vizuálnemu spracovaniu, veľkým fotografiám či iným grafickým prvkom, ktorými sa snažia upútať recipientov ku kúpe periodika. Na komunikovanie tém používajú jednoduchý jazyk, ktorému porozumie široká vrstva obyvateľstva.

Výskumom sme potvrdili, že Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ mali typické bulvárne znaky – veľké fotografie, výrazné titulky, dôležité časti textu boli zvýraznené, text bol oddelený vo farebných rámkoch, využívali väčšmi hovorový jazyk, správy mali krátky rozsah a boli povrchne spracované, teda plnili funkciu informovania v zjednodušenej forme. Pri komparácii oboch periodík bol významný rozdiel v tabloidnom formáte, ktorým zo spomínaných denníkov disponoval len Nový Čas. Nebulvár sa vyznačoval jednoduchým grafickým spracovaním, pričom text dopĺňali jedna až dve fotografie, titulky boli jednoduché a mali nociónálny charakter. Spravodajstvo bolo v porovnaní s bulvárom analytickejšie a obsahovalo viac faktov.

Farby typické pre politické spravodajstvo denníkov Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ boli červená, žltá a tmavomodrá farba. V Novom Čase boli najčastejšie využívanými farbami červená a žltá, v Plus JEDEN DEŇ červená a tmavomodrá. Ďalšími charakteristickými farbami bulvárneho politického spravodajstva boli hnedá, zelená, fialová, oranžová, špecifikom periodika Plus JEDEN DEŇ bola ružová farba.

Ďalším zistením bolo, že nebulvárne periodiká venovali politickému spravodajstvu väčší priestor, než bulvár. Špecifikom politického spravodajstva v slovenských bulvárných denníkoch bola samostatná rubrika Politika, kde zaradovali oba denníky aspoň 50 % politického spravodajstva. SME a Pravda túto rubriku nemali.

K vlastnostiam politického spravodajstva slovenských bulvárných denníkov sme zaradili škandalózne orientované titulky, pričom ich v oboch bulvárných periodikách dopĺňala interpunkcia. Nebulvár titulky väčšmi zameriaval na politické problémy.

Za typický znak slovenského bulvárneho spravodajstva možno považovať nadtitulky, ktoré sa nenachádzali v žiadnom z analyzovaných nebulvárných periodík. Denník SME využíval na doplnenie informácií podtitulky, Pravda nevyužívala nadtitulky ani podtitulky.

V závere diskusie môžeme zhodnotiť, že sa nám podarilo zodpovedať výskumné otázky, a taktiež sme potvrdili hypotézy, ktoré sme predpokladali. Výskumom sme identifikovali špecifiká spracovania politických tém v slovenských bulvárných denníkoch. Potvrdilo sa nám, že bulvárne médiá uprednostňujú zábavu pred novinárskou integritou a ich cieľom je predovšetkým upútať pozornosť, a tým dosahovať čo najväčší zisk.

## Záver

V štúdiu sme sa zaoberali komparáciou slovenských bulvárných a nebulvárných denníkov, pričom sme sa orientovali na politické témy s cieľom identifikácie špecifik spracovania politickej problematiky v bulvári. Výskumom sme potvrdili naše predpoklady, keďže i slovenské bulvárne periodiká komunikujú problematiku zjednodušenou formou a väčšmi sa orientujú na zábavu a senzácie, ktoré uprednostňujú pred kvalitne spracovaným spravodajstvom.

Výskum identifikoval špecifické vlastnosti vizuálneho a textového spracovania, ktorými sa vyznačujú politické témy v slovenských bulvárných denníkoch. Bulvárne médiá komunikujú problematiku jednoduchým jazykom, ktorému porozumie široká vrstva obyvateľstva, pričom

prevažuje výrazné vizuálne spracovanie nad kvalitným spravodajstvom, ktorého cieľom je upútať pozornosť širokej verejnosti. Tento cieľ sa dosahuje používaním hrubých titulkov, veľkých fotografií, farebných rámkov či iných grafických prvkov. Jazyk bulvárneho textu je jednoduchý, spravodajstvo je spracované povrchné a obsahuje emocionálne nabitú prvky so zámerom čo získať čo najväčšiu pozornosť recipientov.

Zároveň sme určili znaky spracovania politického spravodajstva v nebulvárnych denníkoch SME a Pravda, ktoré sa snažili väčšmi zaujať kvalitne spracovaným spravodajstvom a uprednostňovali novinársku integritu pred zábavou. Nebulvárne periodiká preferovali analytický prístup pri tvorbe spravodajstva a kládli väčší dôraz na uvádzanie faktov a presné informácie. V tejto súvislosti môžeme dodať, že nebulvárne denníky komunikovali politické spravodajstvo v širšom kontexte a poskytovali čitateľovi objektívnejší pohľad na politické dianie.

Štúdiá tiež identifikovali významné rozdiely v komunikovaní politických tém v slovenskom bulvári a nebulvári, pričom bulvár sa vyznačoval výraznejšími grafickými prvkami a témami, ktoré sa orientovali na zábavný obsah, senzácie a škandály. Naopak, nebulvár sa zameriaval na hĺbkovo spracované spravodajstvo s cieľom o politických problémoch nielen informovať, ale ich aj analyzovať.

V závere štúdie môžeme konštatovať, že slovenské bulvárne denníky uprednostňujú zábavu a senzácie pred novinárskou integritou a objektivitou. Výskum potvrdil naše predpoklady o komerčných zámeroch bulvárnych médií a o ich vplyve na komunikovanie politickej problematiky.

Výskum priniesol dôležité zistenia o špecifikách spracovania politických tém v slovenských bulvárnych, ale aj nebulvárnych periodikách. V budúcnosti by bolo zaujímavé štúdiu rozšíriť o analýzu bulvárnych periodík v medzinárodnom kontexte – napríklad komparáciou slovenských bulvárnych denníkov so zahraničnými periodikami. Tento výskum by umožnil identifikovať regionálne špecifiká spracovania politických tém v bulvári, ale aj odhaliť vlastnosti, ktoré sú v rámci komunikovania politických tém spoločné.

## Statement

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### Conflict of interest

There is no conflict of interest.

### Ethics

The material presented in this article meets all the points and requirements put forward by the Ethics Commission of the Editorial and Publishing Department of the public organization "Scientific and Educational Center "SUCCESSFUL".

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### **Analýza obrazového a textového spracovania politického spravodajstva v slovenských bulvárnych novinách**

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### **Abstraktné**

*V porovnaní s inými liberálnodemokratickými krajinami je bulvár na Slovensku pomerne novou záležitosťou, keďže sa na našom území začal formovať až začiatkom 90-tych rokov minulého storočia. Napriek tomu, že bulvárna tlač sa v našom regióne rozvíja len niekoľko rokov, i za toto obdobie získala charakteristické znaky, ktorými sa odlišuje od nebulvárnych médií. Osobitným aspektom slovenského bulváru je komunikovanie politických tém, ktoré sa taktiež líši od politického*

*spravodajstva v slovenských nebulvárnych médiách. Špecifický prístup redakcií bulvárnych periodík zapríčiňuje, že politické spravodajstvo je v bulvári rozdielne nielen tematicky, ale vyznačuje sa i ďalšími typickými prvkami, ktoré sa týkajú vizuálneho a textového spracovania. Táto štúdia sa zameriava na identifikáciu typických vlastností, a to najmä z hľadiska tematického, textového a vizuálneho spracovania, ktoré možno považovať za charakteristické pre politické témy v slovenských bulvárnych novinách. Keďže v Slovenskej republike vychádzajú len dva bulvárne denníky, predmetom výskumu sú politické témy v periodikách Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ. Na identifikáciu špecifických vlastností politických tém v bulvárnych periodikách sú súčasťou analýzy dva nebulvárne denníky SME a Pravda, ktoré takisto vychádzajú na území Slovenskej republiky. Oba nebulvárne denníky sme vybrali z dôvodu ich tematickej univerzálnosti. Špecifiká politických tém v slovenskej bulvárnej tlači určíme na základe analýzy komunikátov zameraných na politickú problematiku a následnou komparáciou so spracovaním politických tém vo vybraných nebulvárnych denníkoch. Analýza sa primárne opiera o metodiku kvantitatívnej analýzy, ktorá sa zameriava na identifikáciu vlastností spracovania politického spravodajstva. Následná komparatívna analýza bulvárnych a nebulvárnych denníkov prináša odpovede na otázky, do akej miery a akými špecifickými znakmi sa odlišuje politické spravodajstvo v slovenských bulvárnych periodikách Nový Čas a Plus JEDEN DEŇ.*

**Кľúčové slová:** bulvár, nebulvárne médiá, noviny, politické spravodajstvo, špecifiká

#### **Аналіз візуальної й текстової обробки політичних новин у словацьких бульварних газетах**

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#### **Анотація**

*На відміну від інших ліберально-демократичних країн, бульварна преса є відносно новим явищем у Словаччині, оскільки вона почала формуватися на території Словаччини лише на початку 90-х років ХХ століття. Незважаючи на те що бульварна преса розвивається в нашому регіоні лише кілька років, за цей період вона набула характерних рис, які відрізняють її від небульварних медіа. Особливим аспектом словацьких таблоїдів є комунікація політичних тем, яка також відрізняється від політичних репортажів у словацьких нетаблоїдних медіа. Специфічний підхід редакції таблоїдів означає, що політичні репортажі в таблоїдах відрізняються не лише тематично, але й характеризуються іншими типовими елементами, пов'язаними з візуальною й текстовою обробкою. Це дослідження зосереджено на виявленні типових характеристик із точки зору тематичної, текстової та візуальної обробки, які можна вважати характерними для політичних тем у словацьких таблоїдних газетах. Оскільки в Словацькій Республіці виходять лише дві таблоїдні газети, предметом дослідження є політичні теми в періодичних виданнях «Nový Čas» і «Plus JEDEN DEŇ». Для виявлення особливостей політичних тем у бульварних виданнях аналіз включає дві нетаблоїдні щоденні газети, тобто SME та «Pravda», які також виходять у Словацькій Республіці. Ми обрали ці щоденні газети через їхню тематичну універсальність. Ми визначили специфіку політичних тем у словацькій таблоїдній пресі на основі аналізу пресрелізів, присвячених політичним питанням, і подальшого порівняння з трактуванням політичних тем у вибраних небульварних газетах. Передусім аналіз ґрунтується на методології кількісного аналізу, яка*

зосереджується на визначенні характеристик обробки політичних новин. Подальший порівняльний аналіз бульварних і небульварних газет дає змогу висвітлити, наскільки та якими особливостями відрізняється політичний репортаж у словацьких бульварних виданнях «Nový Čas» і «Plus JEDEN DEN».

**Ключові слова:** *таблоїд, небульварні медіа, газета, політичні новини, специфіка.*



# **APPLIED SOCIAL AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES**

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## **ПРИКЛАДНІ СОЦІАЛЬНО-КОМУНІКАЦІЙНІ ТЕХНОЛОГІЇ**





## Electronic Media Tools in Image-Building

(Using a Comparison of Publications about Ukraine in the Antwerp Newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» and the Ivano-Frankivsk Newspaper «Kurs»)

<p><b>Snizhana Hontariuk,</b> Freelance researcher, E-mail: snizhana.hontariuk@gmail.com, <a href="https://orcid.org/0009-0007-1201-1101">https://orcid.org/0009-0007-1201-1101</a> (Antwerpen, Belgium)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Abstract</b></p> <p><i>The purpose of this study was to identify, describe, classify, and compare the tools (means) of the electronic resources of the Antwerp newspaper “Gazet van Antwerpen» and the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper “Kurs» in the process of Ukraine's image-building.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Citation:</p> <p>Hontariuk, S. (2024). Electronic Media Tools in Image-Building (Using a Comparison of Publications about Ukraine in the Antwerp Newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» and the Ivano-Frankivsk Newspaper «Kurs»). <i>Social Communications: Theory and Practice, 16(2)</i>. DOI: 10.51423/2524-0471-2024-16-2-3 © Hontariuk, S. (2024).</p> <p style="text-align: center;"> Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)</p>	<p><i>Research Methodology: The research was conducted in three stages: the initial stage, content analysis, and the final stage. Each stage had specific tasks and objectives. The initial stage involved defining the main tasks and goals of the research, and selecting and conducting a preliminary analysis of domestic and foreign regional electronic media. The second stage – content analysis – involved conducting quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the Ivano-Frankivsk and Antwerp media by the unit of topics during the period from April 1, 2024, to April 10, 2024. The final stage of the research aimed to identify the main tools of electronic media in the process of Ukraine's image-building (both internal and external). The total number of analyzed publications of the Ivano-Frankivsk online newspaper “Kurs» was 209. The total number of analyzed publications of the Antwerp online newspaper “Gazet van Antwerpen» was 2313.</i></p>
<p><i>Submitted to the editor – 03.11.2024</i> <i>Review 1 – 29.11.2024</i> <i>Review 2 – 03.12.2024</i> <i>Accepted for printing – 10.12.2024</i></p> <p><i>Подано до редакції – 03.11.2024</i> <i>Рецензія 1 – 29.11.2024</i> <i>Рецензія 2 – 03.12.2024</i> <i>Прийнято до друку – 10.12.2024</i></p>	<p><i>As a result of processing the obtained data, it was established that the tools of domestic media (Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper “Kurs») indirectly influence the creation of Ukraine's image in foreign media (the Antwerp newspaper “Gazet van Antwerpen»).</i></p>
<p><b>Keywords:</b> <i>image-building, electronic media tools, electronic media, image-building process.</i></p>	<p><i>Conclusions: Both “Kurs» and “Gazet van Antwerpen» remind Ukrainians and the world daily about the Russo-Ukrainian war, the losses, and the heroism of the Ukrainian people on the frontline and in the rear. They also comprehensively and objectively highlight the crimes of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, which helps optimize humanitarian and military aid to the country. As a result, the world takes Ukraine, a post-Soviet country demonstrating competitiveness on the global stage, more seriously. Additionally, journalists from “Gazet van Antwerpen» dismantle the propaganda narratives of the aggressor country.</i></p>

## Introduction

*The study is devoted to the problem of determining the tools of electronic media in the process of image building (using the example of a comparison of publications about Ukraine in the Antwerp newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» and the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper «Kurs»). Until now, the topic chosen by us has not been studied by scientists.*

*The object of further analysis was the image-building process of wartime Ukraine by means of electronic media («Gazet van Antwerpen» and «Kurs»). The subject is a comparison of the tools of electronic resources of the Antwerp newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» and the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper «Kurs» in the process of image building of Ukraine.*

*Research hypothesis: the tools of the domestic media (the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper «Kurs») indirectly influence the creation of the image of Ukraine by the foreign media (the Antwerp newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen»).*

*The aim of the study was to identify, describe, classify and compare the tools (tools) of the electronic resources of the Antwerp newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» and the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper «Kurs» in the process of image building of Ukraine.*

### *History of problem research*

The choice of the specified research topic is due to the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine. We consider it necessary to point out the fact that this topic in a specific sense has not been investigated by scientists before. However, studies of image-building processes make up a significant part of scientific works in Ukraine and abroad. Let us single out the works of Barna N. (2008); I. Bondarenko (2014); Dyachuk V. (2017); Korolka (2001); Parkhomenko T. (2000); Pocheptsova G. (1997) and Kholoda O. (2011). The importance of the study and research of our chosen topic lies in the timely detection, identification and optimization of the processes of the formation of Ukraine as a competitive state at the geopolitical level. The country's image is an integral element of the country's infopolitical status in modern conditions; when information (propaganda, rumours, stereotypes and myths) precedes the activities of states.

Ukrainian scientist, professor and doctor of philosophy Valentin Hryhorovych Korolko believes that:

*«Image is a mental representation of a person, product or institution, which is purposefully formed in the mass consciousness with the help of publicity, advertising or propaganda» (Korolko, 2001).*

An image, or an exhaustive list of associations of this or that phenomenon/object/subject/institution, exists on the basis of rumors, myths, propaganda of facts. Often, facts take the last place in the hierarchy of the image-building process. The basis for this is the influence of the rest of the countries on the mass consciousness of foreign recipients. «Information competitions» are not innovative. Ukraine «convinced» on its own experience that refuting certain myths and misinformation takes a lot of time and resources. In addition, it requires the involvement of professionals in the work, as well as cooperation with foreign colleagues.

Georgy Pocheptsov notes that:

*«The image is a symbolic substitute that reflects the main features of a person's portrait. The image is informative, it informs about a certain set of features inherent in the object. Moreover, these signs can exist objectively or be arbitrarily attributed to the object by the creators of the image» (Pocheptsov, 1997).*

That is why it is necessary to study the concepts of image, image building and related elements in detail. It is important to constantly monitor the network - to monitor the state of our country's image. We consider network monitoring in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war of the third period to be the primary task of specialists in the field of PR and others. The Russian Federation produces new and new fakes every day, and the enemy's propaganda spreads to foreign audiences faster than we have time to notice.

Ukrainian image researcher Nataliya Vitaliyvna Barna claims that:

*«The image can also serve as a basis for trust, a factor that facilitates influence, but this, firstly, is not the only function of the image, and secondly, the use of the image as a means of social influence is possible not always, but under certain conditions, which must meet image» (Barna, 2008).*

The country's image determines its place in the international political and, in particular, information arena. Studying the role and functions of the country's image building is an important element in creating a positive image of Ukraine abroad: reliable, steadfast, and one that inspires trust.

Because of the growing informational presence of Ukraine in the media space of the world, we consider it an important task to study the image-building processes of Ukraine by domestic and foreign media.

### **Research methods and techniques**

The methods that helped us during the research can be conditionally divided into *theoretical and practical*.

Among *the theoretical methods*, we used the following: we applied *the inductive method* to derive general propositions from the observation of a series of facts. Thanks to *the generalization*, markers of the influence of domestic and foreign media on the image-building process of Ukraine in the international info-political space were established. *The hypothetical-deductive method* helped us put forward the hypothesis that the tools of the domestic media (the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper «Kurs») indirectly influence the creation of the image of Ukraine by the foreign media (the Antwerp newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen»). Systematization of the obtained data helped us formulate conclusions.

Regarding *practical methods*, we conducted a *content analysis* (Content analysis, 2024) of the Ivano-Frankivsk online news resource «Course» and the Antwerp online newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen», which helped us determine the main events, topics and views on the situation in Ukraine. In addition, a *comparative analysis* of publications related to the war in Ukraine was conducted based on the materials of such electronic media as «Kurs» and «Gazet van Antwerpen». This allowed us to find the focus of attention and the main approaches to covering events in Ukraine. Monitoring of the foreign press helped determine Ukraine's place in the international information arena.

#### *Research methodology*

The research is based on three stages. Each of the stages has a specific task and goal.

1. *Initial stage*. At this stage, we identified the main ones task and purpose of further

research, selection and preliminary analysis of domestic and foreign regional electronic media. The goal was to identify, define and compare the tools of electronic media in the process of image

building of Ukraine at the international level. Among the tasks, we will highlight the content analysis of the Ivano-Frankivsk online news resource «Kurs» and the Antwerp online newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» by the unit «topic»; identification of certain regularities regarding the distribution of news by foreign media from Ukrainian primary sources; definition and comparison of the tools of the specified electronic media through the analysis of news publications devoted to the topics «Ukraine», «Ukrainians», «war in Ukraine»; search for effective methods for building a positive external image of the country.

## 2. *Content analysis.* The implementation of this stage was carried out quantitative and

qualitative content analysis of Ivano-Frankivsk and Antwerp media by topic unit. We focused on publications during the period from April 01, 2024 to April 10, 2024. We managed to identify four main categories of affiliation of the «Course» publications: «Culture», «War in Ukraine», «Society» and «Ukraine». The category «Culture» covers such headings as *literature, art, sports, music, cinema and theater, history, fashion, festivals, contests, competitions, traditions and customs. Military aid, news from the front and rear, losses and gains, Russian crimes in Ukraine, awards to military personnel/military families, awarding of ranks, actions in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, volunteer movement - form the category «War in Ukraine».* In the «Society» category, we have combined the rubrics devoted to *the health and medicine of Frankivians, crime, road accidents, church and religion, social life of the population, sowing, ODA, etc.* «Ukraine» contains publications covering the *political, economic, legislative and executive system of Ukrainians.* (Summary data of the conducted analysis are provided in Table 1 «Content analysis of the online newspaper «Kurs»: quantitative aspect» (see the section «Results of the study»).

We conditionally divided the analyzed publications of the Antwerp online newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» into two categories: «*Total number of publications*» (per day) and «*Ukraine*». Since our area of interest is the image of Ukraine in foreign media, we focused on the publications of «Gazet van Antwerpen» devoted to the topic of Ukraine, Ukrainians and the Russian-Ukrainian war (category «Ukraine»). (The results of the conducted content analysis are given in Table 2 «Content analysis of the online newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen»: quantitative aspect» (see the section «Research results»).

3. The performed analysis helped us to define the main toolkit electronic media in the process of image building of Ukraine (external and internal). *The final stage of the study* is dedicated to this.

## **Research results**

The research was carried out by conducting a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of 10 issues of the Antwerp online newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» and the Ivano-Frankivsk online newspaper «Kurs» in the period from 04/1/2024 to 04/10/2024. Next, we offer a more detailed look at the results of the conducted content analysis of the Ivano-Frankivsk online news resource «Course». We present the data obtained during the quantitative content analysis of the «Course» in the form of a table (see below).



Table 1 Content analysis of the Kurs online newspaper: quantitative aspect  
(by the «topic» unit)

Date	Total number of publications; (%)	Culture; (%)	War in Ukraine; (%)	Society; (%)	Ukraine; (%)
1.04.2024	21; (100%)	1; (4,76%)	3; (14,29%)	16; (76,19%)	1; (4,76%)
2.04.2024	23; (100%)	5; (21,74%)	6; (26,09%)	10; (43,48%)	2; (8,7%)
3.04.2024	25; (100%)	4; (16%)	5; (20%)	14; (56%)	2; (8%)
4.04.2024	24; (100%)	7; (29,17%)	5; (20,83%)	12; (50%)	-; -
5.04.2024	23; (100%)	2; (8,7%)	9; (39,13%)	11; (47,83%)	1; (4,35%)
6.04.2024	14; (100%)	5; (35,71%)	5; (35,71%)	4; (28,57%)	-; -
7.04.2024	12; (100%)	2; (16,67%)	4; (33,33%)	5; (41,67%)	1; (8,33%)
8.04.2024	21; (100%)	5; (23,81%)	6; (28,57%)	10; (47,62%)	-; -
9.04.2024	25; (100%)	5; (20%)	5; (20%)	15; (60%)	-; -
10.04.2024	21; (100%)	4; (19,05%)	5; (23,81%)	11; (52,38%)	1; (4,76%)
AMR	20,9; (100%)	4; (19,56%)	5,3; (26,18%)	10,8; (50,37%)	0,8; (3,89%)

\*AMR – the arithmetic mean value of the results.

Quantitative content analysis of publications of the Ivano-Frankivsk online newspaper «Course» was carried out from 04/01/2024 to 04/10/2024. During this time, we analyzed 209 news publications. Among which:

- 40 publications from the «Culture» section: the average number of publications per day – 4, which in percentage ratio is 19.56%;
- The heading «War in Ukraine» has a total of 53 publications – 5 (5.3) publications/day on average, or 26.18%;
- «Society» includes 108 publications. An average of 10 (10.8) publications per day, which is a percentage of 50.37%;
- The last section - «Ukraine» - contains 8 publications. The average number of publications per day is 0.8 publications, or 3.89%.

Based on the data obtained during the quantitative content analysis, we will single out four features.

1. The «Society» category occupies the main niche of «Course» news publications (50.37% of all publications during the specified time period). That is, 10.8 publications of the specified category appear on the site every day.

2. News from the «War in Ukraine» category covers more than a quarter of the site's information load and ranks second in terms of the number of publications during the analyzed period – 26.18%. We consider this amount of news of the Russian-Ukrainian war of the third period insufficient, because not all reports about war crimes of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine have a place in the information field of «Course».

3. The total number of publications in the «Ukraine» category occupies the smallest share of the information load of the news site (3.89%), but it corresponds to the specified topic of the online newspaper «Kurs» – news of Prykarpattia and the city (Ivano-Frankivsk).

4. On average, «Kurs» publishes 21 (20.9) news messages per day, providing basic information to the audience without reloading it.

Thanks to a qualitative content analysis of the Ivano-Frankivsk online newspaper «Kurs» during the specified time period (04/1/2024 – 04/10/2024), it was possible to determine the tools of the Ukrainian online media in the process of image-building of Ukraine during the third period of the Russian-Ukrainian war. We came to the following conclusions:

1. Ivano-Frankivsk online media publishes news from various spheres of the socio-cultural life of Ukrainians, which directly or indirectly shape the internal image of the country, which is a component of the external image.

2. News of culture, war, the front, education, science and society appear in the publication feed every day, ensuring a balance of information. No less important, in our opinion, is the fact of daily reminding the society about the war and losses, gains of Ukrainians/the country in military and socio-cultural terms. In this way, the «Course» forms the image of Ukraine for Ukrainians themselves, and in the future for foreign recipients. It is worth adding that a stable internal image of the country is a catalyst for the formation of a positive image of the country in the international arena.

3. The Russian-Ukrainian war became the basis for reforming Ukraine's image abroad. Therefore, we consider the coverage of the events of the third period of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the achievements of Ukrainians on the battlefield and the losses caused by the aggressor country to be key in the image-building process of Ukraine. Honoring the memory of War Heroes, awarding soldiers and volunteers, awarding honorary titles - mentions of this in the national media form an important aspect of the country's external image as one that honors the memory of everyone's contribution during the confrontation with the enemy. We consider it necessary to point out that the Ukrainian media is the source of reliable news of the war, terrorist acts of the Russian Federation against Ukrainian civilians and, in particular, prisoners and/or Ukrainians in the temporarily occupied territories. Russia produces a large amount of propaganda and disinformation in the international information space, falsifying and distorting the facts. The main task of the Ukrainian media is the objective and constant coverage of the events of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation and commemoration of the Ukrainians who died in this war in the information space. In particular, «Course» adheres to the mentioned technology. «Carpathian Ivan Hudyak was posthumously awarded the Order of Courage» (Kurs (2024, April 1). «26-year-old Carpathian Serhiy Varyk died in Donetsk region» (Kurs (2024, April 2). «The death of Ivan Zembitsky from Kalush, who was considered missing, was confirmed missing» (Kurs (2024, April 2). «The president presented the order «Gold Star» to the native of Kosovan Ivan Krymskyi» (Kurs (2024, April 2). «39-year-old Andriy Geryn from the Dzvinyak community died in the war» (Kurs (2024, April 3). «Students-geologists of IFNTUNG are invited to a charity fair on support of the Armed Forces» (Kurs (2024, April 3). «As a result of the attack on Kharkiv, four people were killed, three of them are rescuers» (Kurs (2024, April 4). «Relatives of the fallen from Kosiv region and Verkhovyna region were awarded awards» (Kurs (2024, April 4). Ihor Kozmenko, a defender from Pechenezhyn, was awarded the «Golden Cross» (Kurs (2024, April 4). Parkulabu» (Kurs (2024, April 5). «It became known about the death of Ivan Kuchirka, a resident of Kolomyia, who was considered missing»

(Kurs (2024, April 5). «At a meeting at PNU, the Order of «Achievements» was presented to military pilot Dmytro Shkarevsky» (Kurs (2024, April 5). «Geological students of the IFNTUNG collected almost 56 thousand hryvnias for the Armed Forces» (Kurs (2024, April 5). «Russian troops started a new wave of offensives in the Bakhmut direction, ISW» (Kurs (2024, April 6). «In Amber was allowed autonomous heating after the Russian missile attack on the TPP» (Kurs (2024, April 6). «More than 800,000 soldiers' wives were collected at an auction for the Armed Forces in Frankivsk» (Kurs (2024, April 6). «Saminer of the 102nd brigade of the TRO Nazar Ugorskyi awarded the «Golden Cross» (Kurs (2024, April 6). «The defender died in the war from Kolomyia Ihor Hanushchak» (Kurs (2024, April 7). «Kolomia utility workers build fortifications for the Armed Forces» (Kurs (2024, April 7). «Fighter from Prykarpattia Mykhailo Baranovsky died» (Kurs (2024, April 7). «Kaluski utility workers joined the construction of fortifications for the Armed Forces» (Kurs (2024, 8 «Fighter Mykhailo Kushmelyuk from Prykarpattia was awarded the Golden Cross» (Kurs (2024, April 8). «Frankivsk Lyceum purchased 10 kamikaze drones for the Armed Forces» (Kurs (2024, April 8). «34-year-old Frankivsk resident Andrii Popyk died in the war» (Kurs (2024, April 8). «War opens people up»: Edelweiss psychologist about combat reality, fears and character» (Kurs (2024, April 8). «He died in the war Carpathian Nazar Danilets» (Kurs (2024, April 9). «Defender from Kosiv Oblast Yury Kulka died in Donetsk region» (Kurs (2024, April 9). «27-year-old Andriy Stefyuk from Kolomiy Oblast died in the war» (Kurs (2024, April 9). missing» (Kurs (2024, April 9). «Fighter Petro Beysyuk from Kosiv region died in the war» (Kurs (2024, April 10). «A man from Kolomyia with the call sign «Legend» shot down a «shahed» with a machine gun» (Kurs (2024, April 10).

Thus, what and how the Ukrainian media, in particular the Ivano-Frankivsk online newspaper Kurs, determines what the international audience learns about Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian war. The creation of a positive, stable external image of Ukraine at the international infopolitical level is based on the creation of an equally effective internal image.

In order to determine the toolkit of the online resource of the Antwerp newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» in the process of image-building of Ukraine against the background of the third period of the Russian-Ukrainian war, we resorted to a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the publications of «Gazet van Antwerpen» – a daily newspaper of Flanders, founded in 1891 in Belgium.

The results of the conducted content analysis are presented in Table 2 «Content analysis of the online newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen»: quantitative aspect» (See below).

Table 2 Content analysis of the online newspaper “Gazet Van Antwerpen»: quantitative aspect (by the unit «theme»)

Date	Total number of publications; (%)	Ukraine; (%)
1.04.2024	136; (100%)	–; –
2.04.2024	225; (100%)	1; (0,44%)
3.04.2024	240; (100%)	2; (0,83%)
4.04.2024	240; (100%)	2; (0,83%)
5.04.2024	256; (100%)	2; (0,78%)
6.04.2024	175; (100%)	1; (0,57%)
7.04.2024	197; (100%)	2; (1,02%)
8.04.2024	321; (100%)	3; (0,93%)
9.04.2024	265; (100%)	5; (1,89%)

<b>10.04.2024</b>	258; (100%)	4; (1,55%)
<b>AMR:</b>	231,3; (100%)	2,2; (0,88%)

\*AMR – the arithmetic mean of the results.

We analyzed 2313 publications of the online resource «Gazet van Antwerpen» during the same time period (04/01/2024 – 04/10/2024) for quantitative coverage of the topic «Ukraine», «Ukrainians» and «Russian-Ukrainian war».

In this way, it was established that the frequency of the appearance of Ukraine in the Antwerp newspaper is on average 2 (2.2) publications/day, in the percentage ratio – 0.88%. At the same time, the online newspaper publishes 231 news items daily on average.

We consider such a number of mentions of Ukraine in foreign (in particular Antwerp) infospace insufficient in the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war. It should be noted that news about our country is published every day. For this, a special column «Oorlog in Oekraïne» («War in Ukraine») was created.

During the time span covered by the analysis, only on April 1, 2024, the topic of Ukraine is absent in the publications of «Gazet van Antwerpen».

The process of building a stable and positive image of Ukraine abroad requires defining and optimizing the toolkit of domestic and foreign media. Qualitative content analysis of publications allowed us to more accurately determine the place of Ukraine at the geopolitical level, as well as outline the limits of our country's information presence on the international arena.

Next, we present the results of a qualitative content analysis of the publications of the Antwerp online newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» with their detailed list.

02.04.2024: «Van graanschuur tot wapenfabriek: Oekraïne wil de oorlogsmachine van het Westen worden» | «From a warehouse to a weapons factory: Ukraine wants to become a military machine of the West» (Tanghe (02.04.2024, April 2); the article is devoted to an important topic for our country - the defense industry. What is important is how the online newspaper emphasizes the fact that the Russian Federation treacherously destroyed the well-known Antonov and Motor Sich defense plants. In addition, we focus on a quote that is important in our opinion: «Unfortunately, Russian President Putin knew exactly where these weapons factories were located, so most of them were bombed at the beginning of the Russian invasion. But Ukraine would not be Ukraine if it did not show stability and determination. Under the influence of Ukrainian President Zelensky last year, Kyiv developed an ambitious plan to quickly transform Ukraine into an «international military center.» The same country as it was then for the Soviet Union, although this time for a different camp: Western» (Translated from the following language: Dutch) (Tanghe, (04.02.2024, April 2). Quite relevant is the statement that Ukraine restores its own «name» in the historical context.

03.04.2024: «Russische soldaten gebruiken seksueel geweld als oorlogsmiddel: «Vaak moesten familieleden in de kamer ernaast het aanhoren» | «The Russian military uses sexual violence as a means of war: «Before this, it was often necessary to listen to the household members in the next room» (Hancké (2024, April 3); «Hilariteit over mislukte Russische afleiding: helikopter landt op geschilderde afbeelding van gevechtsvliegtuig» | «Hilarious over botched Russian sabotage: Helicopter lands on painted image of fighter jet» (Sodb (2024, April 3);

*“Russische soldaten gebruiken seksueel geweld als oorlogsmiddel: “Vaak moesten familieleden in de kamer ernaast het aanhoren» | «Russian military uses sexual violence as a means of war: 'Before this, it was often necessary to listen to household members in the next room'» (Hancké, 2024).*

«Frank, true and terrifying». These are the words that describe the headline used by Gazet van Antwerpen journalists. Journalists conducted a study commissioned by the UN Commission on Human Rights. This article uses the stories of the local population of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Kyiv, Sumy, Kherson, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk regions during the occupation. Scenes of sexual violence and moral humiliation have been compared to those committed by Soviet soldiers on German women at the end of World War II. History repeats itself, but this time the journalists of the Antwerp newspaper speak frankly, and also have evidence that they are going to use at the trial against Russia. «In anticipation of such a process, we consider it important that everyone knows what is happening in Ukraine», – Lemkin-centrum.

*Hilariteit over mislukte Russische afleiding: helikopter landt op geschilderde afbeelding van gevechtsvliegtuig* | «*Hilarious over botched Russian sabotage: Helicopter lands on painted image of fighter jet*» (Sodb, 2024).

This is exactly what disproves the claim of «The Second World Army (Russian)». During the two years of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the whole world sees an inversely proportional statement to this fact. On the other hand, there is an increase in the prestige of the Ukrainian army, which shows courage, skill and success in the fight against the enemy.

4.04.2024: «Schokkende beelden van Russische aanval op Charkov tonen hoe drone inslaat op reddingswerkers» | «Shocking footage of Russian attack on Kharkiv shows drone shooting down rescuers» (Adb (2024, April 4); «Antwerpse ondernemer in Oekraïne ziet nu ook huis van boekhoudster gebombardeerd worden: "Russen gebruiken experimentele raketten" | «Antwerp businessman in Ukraine now also sees bombing of accountant's house: 'Russians use experimental missiles'» (Van Roosbroeck, 2024).

*Schokkende beelden van Russische aanval op Charkov tonen hoe drone inslaat op reddingswerkers* | «*Shocking footage of Russian attack on Kharkiv shows drone shooting down rescuers*» (Adb (2024, April 4).

A video taken from a Ukrainian channel, with a real picture of Russian brutality, sirens and a burning rescue car next to a high-rise building hitting a residential apartment, truthfully demonstrates the Ukrainian reality. Thanks to materials such as this article, Russian fakes about «NATO bases» and non-involvement in shelling of the civilian population lose their force.

*Antwerpse ondernemer in Oekraïne ziet nu ook huis van boekhoudster gebombardeerd worden: "Russen gebruiken experimentele raketten" | «Antwerp businessman in Ukraine now also sees bombing of accountant's house: 'Russians use experimental missiles'» (Van Roosbroeck, 2024).*

Russia uses all possible weapons on the territory of Ukraine, destroying industry, economy, infrastructure, and most importantly, killing the civilian population. Although the Ukrainian media publishes the consequences of Russian «arrivals» every day, in this case the testimony of a European – an Antwerp businessperson – affects the world largely.

5.04.2024: «Zelenski bezoekt nieuwe verdedigingslijnen, maar krijgt heel wat kritiek: «Ze hebben te laat een mentale switch gemaakt» | «Zelensky Visits New Frontiers of Defense, but Receives Much Criticism: 'Switching Late'» (Verhaert, W. (2024, April 5); «Oekraïense aanvoerder en stervoetballer Oleksandr Zinchenko doet belofte: «Als ik word opgeroepen, ga ik vechten» | «Ukrainian captain and star football player Oleksandr Zinchenko promised: 'If I am called, I will fight'» (Van Genechten, 2024).

*«Zelenski bezoekt nieuwe verdedigingslijnes, maar krijgt heel wat kritiek: “Ze hebben te laat een mentale switch gemaakt» | «Zelensky Visits New Frontiers of Defense, but Receives Much Criticism: 'Switching Late'» (Verhaert, 2024).*

Different from the Russian side, the image of an ideal state with an ideal president takes place in the mass media space of our country. Accordingly, the world picks up and carries to the masses the socio-political system of Ukraine, where there is both criticism of the government and freedom of speech.

*«Oekraïense aanvoerder en stervoetballer Oleksandr Zinchenko doet belofte: «Als ik word opgeroepen, ga ik vechten» | «Ukrainian captain and star football player Oleksandr Zinchenko promised: 'If I am called, I will fight'» (Van Genechten, 2024).*

The famous Ukrainian football player is ready to defend the country, this time, if necessary. This testifies to the sense of duty of Ukrainians: stars, public and non-public people.

6.04.2024: *«Aan het front in Oekraïne worden zelfs vijftig jaar oude tanks nog opgelapt: “We kunnen ons niet veroorloven die te verliezen» | «At the front in Ukraine, even fifty-year-old tanks are still being repaired: «We cannot afford to lose them» (De Decker, 2024).*

This publication once again becomes a call for Ukraine to receive equipment and weapons from Western partners. Our country urgently needs armed assistance in order to continue to defend the state, people and European values. However, the news shows how well the Ukrainians have adapted to the conditions of the war and even old equipment can be made suitable for war.

7.04.2024: *«De strategie achter de Russische traangasaanvallen: «Ze jagen de soldaten uit de loopgraaf, en dan openen ze het vuur» | «Russia's Tear Gas Attack Strategy: 'Drive Soldiers Out of Trenches, Then Open Fire'» (Ndl (2024, April 7); «Yf Reykers is expert Europese defensie: «Trump of Biden? In beide gevallen hou ik mijn hart vast» | «If Rakers, European Defense Expert: «Trump or Biden? In both cases, I hold my breath» (Van Diepen, 2024).*

*2De strategie achter de Russische traangasaanvallen: «Ze jagen de soldaten uit de loopgraaf, en dan openen ze het vuur» | «Russia's Tear Gas Attack Strategy: 'Drive Soldiers Out of Trenches, Then Open Fire'» (Ndl (2024, April 7);*

Prohibited methods of warfare actively used by Russia on the territory of Ukraine. We consider it important to cover such moments by foreign media, because they become indisputable independent evidence of the crimes of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the Ukrainian army and the people.

*«Yf Reykers is expert Europese defensie: “Trump of Biden? In beide gevallen hou ik mijn hart vast» | «If Rakers, European Defense Expert: «Trump or Biden? In both cases, I hold my breath» (Van Diepen, 2024).*

The interview with Maastricht University professor of international politics If Reikers is quite revealing in terms of Europe's defense capability. Europe, in the opinion of the professor, should have realized the state of its own defense capabilities a long time ago, as Ukraine has done. Thus, Ukraine became an example and a catalyst for the awakening of the EU countries, awareness of Russia as an enemy and determination of the real assessment of the Russian-Ukrainian war. If Rakers also speaks frankly about Putin's ambitions, mentioning the desire of the enemy to restore

the lost Russian Empire. The fact that the professor also mentions unjustified promises of the EU and NATO to supply Ukraine with weapons and military equipment is important. Such procrastination poses a threat to world security, because Putin's occupation desires may spill over into the Baltic States and Europe.

8.04.2024: «Nieuwe president van Slovaakije is pro-Russisch: wat betekent dat voor de oorlog?» | «The new president of Slovakia is pro-Russian: what does this mean for the war?» (Renson, 2024, April 8). Droneaanvallen op Oekraïense kerncentrale van Zaporizja: «Sprake van ernstig incident» | «Drone attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhya: 'Serious incident'» (LLA, Belga (2024, April 8); «Oekraïne verliest oorlog als VS niet helpen, vreest Zelenski» | «Ukraine will lose the war if the US does not help, Zelensky fears» (Belga (2024, April 8).

*«Nieuwe president van Slovaakije is pro-Russisch: wat betekent dat voor de oorlog?» | «The new president of Slovakia is pro-Russian: what does this mean for the war?» (Renson, 2024, April 8).*

Geopolitics is perhaps the most important factor influencing the Russian-Ukrainian war. The help of Western partners determines the course and development of the Ukrainian confrontation. The presence of pro-Russian helmsmen on the geopolitical map of the world means the delay and obstruction of military, humanitarian and financial aid to Ukraine. As a result, the deaths of peaceful Ukrainians and those at the front. Equally important is the fact of public support for Russia's actions, which harms the image of Ukraine on the geopolitical arena of the world.

*«Droneaanvallen op Oekraïense kerncentrale van Zaporizja: "Sprake van ernstig incident"» | «Drone attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhya: 'Serious incident'» (LLA, Belga (2024, April 8).*

Another act of highlighting Russia's crimes on the territory of Ukraine within the global information space, refuting the disinformation of Russian propagandists regarding the denial of such incidents. It is worth noting the following: such foreign media materials provide indisputable evidence of the Russian Federation's guilt.

*«Oekraïne verliest oorlog als VS niet helpen, vreest Zelenski» | «Ukraine will lose the war if the US does not help, Zelensky fears» (Belga (2024, April 8).*

A real assessment of the situation and risks without any embellishments. Journalists of «Gazet van Antwerpen» openly state the possible risk to a wide audience, quoting the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Draw the world's attention to the problem of aid delivery by Western partners and contribute to speeding up the solution to this problem.

09.04.2024: «Kritiek op Russische overheid groeit na dambreuk in Orsk: «Wat een theater godverdomme, alleen Poetin ontbreekt nog» | «After the breach of the dam in Orsk, criticism of the Russian authorities intensifies: «What a damn theater, only Putin is not there yet» Van (Roosbroeck, Beeckman, 2024, April 9); «Waarom nieuwe 'bewijzen' voor betrokkenheid Oekraïne bij aanslag Poetin goed uitkomen» | «Why the new «evidence» of Ukraine's involvement in the attack on Putin is convenient» (Mijlemans, P. (2024, April 9); «Josep Borrell wil Europees defensiemechanisme creëren, want «de oorlog gloort aan de horizon» | «Joseph Borrell wants to create a European defense mechanism because 'war is on the horizon'» (Belga (2024, April 9); «LIVE. Volg hier al het nieuws over de oorlog in Oekraïne» | «LIVE. Follow all the news about the war in Ukraine here» (Red (2024, April 9); «Voortdurend kat-en-muisspel»: in de Noordzee woedt een schaduwstrijd met

de Russen» | 'Continuous cat-and-mouse game': Shadow battle with Russians in the North Sea» (Vanhecke, De Lobel, 2024, April 9).

*«Kritiek op Russische overheid groeit na dambreuk in Orsk: "Wat een theater godverdomme, alleen Poetin ontbreekt nog» | «After the breach of the dam in Orsk, criticism of the Russian authorities intensifies: «What a damn theater, only Putin is not there yet» Van (Roosbroeck, Beeckman, 2024, April 9).*

Open condemnation of the socio-political situation in Russia and the destruction of the image of an «ideal and powerful state». Moreover, turning the war on the beavers, which allegedly gnawed through the dam, is now known abroad. The author of the article also calls the visit of the governor of the region and the minister of emergency situations a «passage». Let's make a casual mention of the tragedy at the Kakhovskaya HPP, which was committed by Russia last year on the territory of Ukraine. We can call it a reminder/warning of what Russians and Russia are capable of.

*«Waarom nieuwe 'bewijzen' voor betrokkenheid Oekraïne bij aanslag Poetin goed uitkomen» | «Why the new «evidence» of Ukraine's involvement in the attack on Putin is convenient» (Mijlemans, 2024).*

Objective interpretation of the «evidence» and refutation of Ukraine's involvement in the tragedy in the Crocus City shopping center in Moscow. Equally important is the fact that the newspaper's journalists do not trust Russian history, which is broadcast to the masses.

*«Josep Borrell wil Europees defensiemechanisme creëren, want «de oorlog gloort aan de horizon» | «Joseph Borrell wants to create a European defense mechanism because 'war is on the horizon'» (Belga (2024, April 9).*

The world is aware of the real picture of reality, with wars and armed confrontations.

«The war in Ukraine showed the world as it is, not as we wanted it to be (...). The possibility of an intense conventional war in Europe is no longer a fantasy. We must do everything we can to prevent this», – Josep Borrell» (Belga (2024, April 9). It is fair to say that Ukraine has become a catalyst for improving Europe's defense capabilities.

*«LIVE. Volg hier al het nieuws over de oorlog in Oekraïne» | «LIVE. Follow all the news about the war in Ukraine here» (Red, 2024).*

A separate collective publication of the latest news regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war of the third period. It is updated each time the link is clicked. All-important publications in one place, which is convenient for the foreign recipient on the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukraine, Russia and related topics.

*«Voortdurend kat-en-muisspel»: in de Noordzee woedt een schaduwstrijd met de Russen» | 'Continuous cat-and-mouse game': Shadow battle with Russians in the North Sea» (Vanhecke, De Lobel, 2024).*

The world finally understood that Russia is a threat, so the appearance of a Russian reconnaissance ship was taken quite seriously and recognized as a genuine concern.

10.04.2024: «Waalse John Cockerill Defense bouwt gepantserde voertuigen om tot ambulances voor Oekraïne» | «The Walloon company John Cockerill Defense will convert armored



vehicles into sanitary vehicles for Ukraine» (Belga (2024, April 10); «Bezoek Lavrov aan China werpt schaduw op Chinees-Amerikaanse band, waarschuwen VS» | «Lavrov's visit to China casts a shadow over Sino-American ties, US warns» (Belga (2024, April 10); «Rusland heeft bijna vrij spel in de lucht, en dat voelt Oekraïne overal op de grond» | «Russia has almost complete freedom of the air, and Ukraine feels it everywhere on earth» (Mijlemans, 2024, April 10); «Koning Filip spreekt Europees Parlement toe: «De Unie is nog te gefragmenteerd» | «King Philip tells European Parliament: 'Union still too fragmented'» (BLG, Belga. (2024, April 10).

*“Waalse John Cockerill Defense bouwt gepantserde voertuigen om tot ambulances voor Oekraïne» | «The Walloon company John Cockerill Defense will convert armored vehicles into sanitary vehicles for Ukraine» (Belga, 2024).*

Belgium, by its own example, calls on the world to support and help Ukraine. These publications are important in the context of world involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian war of the third period.

*«Bezoek Lavrov aan China werpt schaduw op Chinees-Amerikaanse band, waarschuwen VS» | «Lavrov's visit to China casts a shadow over Sino-American ties, US warns» (Belga, 2024).*

China sided with Russia in the Russian-Ukrainian war, helping Putin with «necessary resources.» However, the intervention of the United States shows that the world is on our side, and therefore will not allow the situation for Ukraine to worsen. Journalists of «Gazet Van Antwerpen» announce this to a wide audience.

*«Rusland heeft bijna vrij spel in de lucht, en dat voelt Oekraïne overal op de grond» | «Russia has almost complete freedom of the air, and Ukraine feels it everywhere on earth» (Mijlemans, 2024).*

«Russia is slowly but surely approaching the goal it has been pursuing for a long time: full control of the airspace over the front. This control is felt in several places. At the front, in the rear and in Kharkiv, which has been turned into ruins» (Mijlemans, 2024).

Truthfully and frankly about the consequences of the Russian invasion, in particular for Kharkiv. Equally important is the focus of the newspaper's journalists on Volodymyr Zelenskyi's calls to provide Ukraine with MANPADS and other means of air defense. After all, Russia continues to strike from the air, while Ukraine is gradually exhausting its defense reserves. The number of victims after the Russian shelling is also mentioned – 15, including children. In addition, the number of Russian planes destroyed by Ukraine in a month is 15, which demonstrates Russian vulnerability, according to the Antwerp media. In addition to the mentioned facts, the reporters emphasize the importance of the timely delivery of anti-aircraft defense systems to our country, because the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the lives of the civilian population depend on it.

*«Koning Filip spreekt Europees Parlement toe: “De Unie is nog te gefragmenteerd» | «King Philip tells European Parliament: 'Union still too fragmented'» (BLG, Belga, 2024).*

Even the topic of the integrity of the European Union involves the mention of Ukraine – the Union must unite around a common goal – comprehensive assistance to Ukraine in the Russian-Ukrainian war, which Russia started on the territory of our country. Since Belgium is a founding country of the EU, it is the Union's responsibility to stimulate its evolution. King Philip publicly

called the war in Ukraine «our struggle too» (BLG, Belga. (2024, April 10), which automatically raises the status of the country in the geopolitical arena of the world.

Based on the data obtained during the qualitative and quantitative content analysis of the Antwerp online newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen», the tools of the specified media in the process of image building of Ukraine against the background of the third period of the Russian-Ukrainian war were determined.

1. Objective and frank coverage of Russia's crimes on the territory of Ukraine during the third period of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

2. Call for support for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.

3. The image of Ukraine as a defense-capable country, which became a catalyst for Europe's rethinking of its own defense capability.

4. Condemnation of Russia's actions in Ukraine and the world.

5. Daily reminder to the Antwerp audience about the problem of life and death of Ukrainians.

6. Destruction of the image of «great and powerful Russia» abroad.

7. Debunking Russian fakes and disinformation about the Russian-Ukrainian war.

8. Returning Ukraine to its historical significance.

### **Discussion of research results**

An important element of building a successful external image of a country is the creation of a solid «foundation» - its internal image. The media self-identification of Ukrainians as a strong and progressive nation lays the foundation for the system of media tools in the process of image building of Ukraine at home and on the international infosphere. It is important to remind Ukrainians and the world about the Russian-Ukrainian war, our gains and losses at the state level and at the front. Ukraine's competitiveness is largely determined by its media presence at the geopolitical level. The Ivano-Frankivsk online resource «Course» daily reminds us of the greatness of our culture, the strength and moral stability of the people, the valor and courage of soldiers on the battlefield. In this way, Kurs journalists destroy the enemy's propaganda about the origin and development of Ukrainian statehood. It also contributes to the formation of «informational immunity» of Ukrainians.

The journalists of «Gazet Van Antwerpen» comprehensively cover the Russian-Ukrainian war, openly talking about the risks and losses, the crimes of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, focusing on military and financial aid. In this way, the employees and editors of the newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen» show an act of trust and support for post-Soviet Ukraine, which has been given a chance to compare with the rest of the world. It is important to note that references to Ukraine, Ukrainians and the Russian-Ukrainian war of the third period appear in the news feed every day in the special section «Oorlog in Oekraïne» («War in Ukraine»). In addition, our country demonstrates its prowess on the battlefield to the world, which is often the subject of «Gazet Van Antwerpen» publications.

### **Conclusions**

At the beginning of the research, the goal of further work was determined. It consisted in identifying, describing, classifying and comparing the tools (tools) of the electronic resources of the Antwerp newspaper «Gazet van Antwerpen» and the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper «Kurs» in the process of image building of Ukraine.

The hypothesis formulated by us was confirmed: the tools of the domestic media (the Ivano-Frankivsk newspaper «Kurs») indirectly influence the creation of the image of Ukraine by the foreign media (the Antwerp newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen»).

We were able to determine the toolkit of the Ivano-Frankivsk online newspaper «Kurs» in the image-building process of Ukraine by carrying out a qualitative and quantitative content analysis of ten issues of the newspaper from April 1, 2024. This is how «Kurs» publishes news of the economic, political, social and military life of Ukrainians. This approach contributes to the development of the country's internal and, accordingly, external image. News of the war, honouring the memory of heroes form the basis of the information load of the resource. In this way, Kurs journalists position Ukraine as a country with high moral values, which respects the contribution of every Ukrainian in the war for freedom.

Our content analysis of the Antwerp online newspaper «Gazet Van Antwerpen» confirmed that systematic publications of Ukrainian media news from the front and the general situation of the Russian-Ukrainian war play a key role in the process of forming the image of Ukraine at the geopolitical level.

Qualitative content analysis showed that a significant part of news publications about Ukraine in «Gazet Van Antwerpen» contribute to the formation of a positive image of the country abroad. Journalists of the Antwerp online newspaper openly and often (every day) talk about the war in Ukraine, death at the front and casualties, highlight the consequences of Russian shelling, condemn the actions of the Russian president on the territory of Ukraine, contribute to the provision of military and humanitarian aid to our country, constantly reminding of this the world. In addition, «Gazet Van Antwerpen» calls Ukraine an example of stability and courage, and condemns the actions of the Russian side. Russia's failures at the front are also publicly covered. Journalists of «Gazet Van Antwerpen» use Ukrainian primary sources in their own publications.

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### Conflict of interest

There is no conflict of interest.

### Ethics

The material presented in this article meets all the points and requirements put forward by the Ethics Commission of the Editorial and Publishing Department of the public organization «Scientific and Educational Center «SUCCESSFUL»».

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**Інструментарій електронних медіа в процесі іміджблдингу**  
(на прикладі порівняння публікацій про Україну в антверпенській газеті «Gazet van Antwerpen» та івано-франківській газеті «Курс»)

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**Анотація**

Метою дослідження було обрано виявлення, опис, класифікацію та порівняння інструментарію (засобів) електронних ресурсів антверпенської газети «Gazet van Antwerpen» та івано-франківської газети «Курс» у процесі іміджблдингу України.

Методика дослідження. Дослідження було здійснено в три етапи: початковий, контент-аналіз та завершальний. Кожен з етапів має конкретне завдання та мету. Початковий етап полягав у визначенні основних завдань та мети подальшого дослідження, виборі й попередньому аналізі вітчизняного та іноземного регіональних електронних медіа. Другий етап – контент-аналіз – проведення кількісного та якісного контент-аналізу івано-франківського та антверпенського медіа за одиницею теми впродовж періоду від 1 квітня 2024 року до 10 квітня 2024 року. Завершальний етап дослідження мав на меті визначити основний інструментарій електронних медіа в процесі іміджблдингу України (зовнішнього та внутрішнього). Загальна кількість проаналізованих публікацій івано-франківської газети онлайн-газети «Курс» – 209. Загальна кількість проаналізованих публікацій антверпенської онлайн-газети «Gazet van Antwerpen» – 2313.

За результатами обробки отриманих даних було встановлено, що інструментарій вітчизняного медіа (івано-франківської газети «Курс») опосередковано впливає на створення іміджу України іноземним медіа, зокрема антверпенською газетою «Gazet Van Antwerpen».


Висновки. «Курс», як і «Gazet Van Antwerpen», щодня нагадують українцям та світу про російсько-українську війну, втрати та звитяги українського народу на лінії фронту та в тилу, об'єктивно висвітлюють злочини Російської Федерації на території України, що сприяє оптимізації гуманітарної й військової допомоги нашій країні. Таким чином світ серйозніше сприймає Україну – пострадянську країну, що демонструє світові конкурентоспроможність. Журналісти «Gazet Van Antwerpen» руйнують пропагандистські наративи країни-агресорки.

**Ключові слова:** іміджблдинг, інструментарій електронних медіа, електронні медіа, процес іміджблдингу.





**Russian Propaganda as a Means of Forming  
the Image of the External Enemy**  
(on the Example of the Analysis  
of Electronic Resources of Nine Agencies of the World)

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<p><b>Keywords:</b> <i>Russian propaganda, electronic resources,</i></p>	

<i>international information agencies, image of the external enemy.</i>	<i>influence can have serious consequences for international relations and therefore requires attention and a critical approach to information from these sources.</i>
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## Introduction

In today's world, information technologies are at the centre of global changes, influencing all spheres of social life. However, this progress sometimes becomes a source of dissemination and strengthening of specific informational events that influence mass perception, forming images of the world, distorting facts and creating an alternative reality. One of the key components of this phenomenon is Russian propaganda. It is characterized by the systematic and strategic dissemination of specific messages and views to influence the consciousness and persuasion of the audience.

Discussing the topic «Russian propaganda as a means of forming the image of the external enemy», we note the relevance of this study in the context of modern geopolitical realities. Geopolitical tensions and growing competition between countries in the international arena give special importance to methods and strategies of information influence. Russian propaganda acts not only as a means of internal political manipulation but also as a tool for forming the image of the external enemy, which is reflected in the worsening of international relations and affects the perception of real events.

The research on the problems of Russian propaganda is important for understanding modern challenges and threats facing the international community. The analysis of the principles and methods of functioning Russian propaganda will contribute to the formation of counter-strategies aimed at the stability of the information space and the values of democracy and human rights.

We chose Russian propaganda as a means of forming the image of the external enemy as the object of the study, and the subject was the analysis of the electronic resources of nine agencies of the world in the process of forming the image of the external enemy through Russian propaganda

We want to analyze and generalize the specific aspects of the functioning of Russian propaganda as a tool for forming the image of the external enemy.

## Research methods and procedures

Scientific and special methods we are in this study to achieve the set goal and solve specific tasks. Analysis and synthesis there are for studying and evaluating scientific publications on the topic. It allows you to analyze the content of publications, while synthesis helps to summarize the obtained results. Web monitoring – for collecting and analyzing information resources available in publications on various websites, submitted in particular in the field of scientific and technical expertise and information. This method allows you to get comprehensive information about the presented resources. Content analysis is a study of texts, videos, photos and other materials to identify the main themes, messages, tone, words and images used. This method makes it possible to determine exactly which messages and images we are to create the image of the external enemy, and how often they are found in propaganda materials. Comparative analysis is a comparison of various sources of information to identify differences and similarities in the presentation of events and facts, which make it possible to reveal how Russian mass media differ in covering events from international agencies, and which elements of propaganda, are used to create a certain image. Quantitative analysis – allows you to calculate the frequency of use of certain words, phrases or topics in propaganda materials. This method helps to assess the intensity of propaganda influence and to determine the main accents in the coverage of events.

*Varieties and approaches  
to the conceptualization of the concepts «propaganda» and «Russian propaganda»*

V.O. Торічний and A.G. Стадник put forward an interpretation of the concept of propaganda: «It is a conscious, systematic attempt to change perception, influence cognitive processes and manage social behaviour to achieve a reaction that is aimed at a propaganda goal» (Facebook, YouTube і Twitter махнули рукою на російську пропаганду, 2024; Васильєва, 2022). Propaganda does not impose but persuades and manipulates the motivational environment of human behaviour. Propaganda unites the thinking, evaluations and reactions of men, transforming society into a monolithic mass with a distorted consciousness and a totalitarian culture (Facebook, YouTube і Twitter махнули рукою на російську пропаганду, 2024).

In her article «Information warfare, propaganda and PR: so similar and so different...» the researcher С. Шпилик provides an alternative definition of propaganda: «Propaganda ... is a form of interaction through communication aimed at spreading facts, arguments, rumours and other information to influence public opinion in support of a specific social cause or position» (Високий рівень медіаграмотності..., 2024).

The concept of «Russian propaganda» has become quite popular in recent years. It is a term that reflects the influence of information campaigns aimed at spreading certain distorted or specific points of view, ideologies and informational messages promoted or supported by Russia. This concept can have different conceptual approaches and reflect various aspects of information influence, depending on the context and analytical paradigm.

Russian propaganda can manifest itself in various forms, aimed at forming a certain influence on public opinion. These forms are aimed at disinformation, which consists of spreading false information about events in Ukraine and the world; manipulation, when techniques are used to control the opinions of the audience, for example, a one-sided presentation of the conflict in Donbas; and propaganda aimed at supporting Russia through the use of propaganda methods, such as claims to protect the rights of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine (Звоздецька, 2021).

There are several approaches to the idea of »Russian propaganda.« The political approach considers it an instrument of state policy aimed at supporting Russian interests. The informational approach considers propaganda as a means of influencing public opinion for the dissemination of certain information. The cultural approach considers propaganda as a means of forming cultural values and identities, aimed at changing the perception of the world (Звоздецька, 2021).

Russian propaganda plays a significant role in shaping public opinion both in Ukraine and in other countries of the world. According to the results of scientific research conducted by Ukrainian and international scientific organizations, Russian propaganda contributes to the formation of a negative attitude towards Ukraine and its Western partners, as well as the spread of misinformation and manipulation. For example, a study conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology at the request of the public organization «Detector Media» indicates that a significant part of the interviewed Ukrainians receives information about internal events in Ukraine from unofficial sources, while trust in Russian TV channels is minimal (Канарська, Митко, 2018).

In the occupied territories of Ukraine, Russian propaganda has a significant impact on residents. According to RFE/RL, Russian occupation forces are actively disseminating their information resources, mostly through aggressive methods, while citizens are restricted in their access to Ukrainian media. Undoubtedly, Russian propaganda can also cause the division of society and create the impression of disunity in the positions of the general opinion of the population, which complicates the conditions for influencing the mass consciousness. These factors are added to the general influence of Russian propaganda, which creates a negative attitude towards Ukraine

and its Western partners, spreads misinformation and manipulation, and creates a threat of social division.

Propaganda mainly uses the means of mass communication and takes the form of persuasive influence, although it is mainly activated using the method of psychological suggestion, which means the direct introduction of specific mental information into the mental space and takes place during the transfer of information from one person to another without the active participation of the receiving person, and often even without her conscious understanding (Звоздецька, 2021).

The key components of the propaganda process include its subject (a social group that expresses its interests through propaganda), the content, forms, methods, means or channels of propaganda (such as radio, television, the press, lecture propaganda, etc.), as well as the object (purpose of propaganda for target audiences or social communities). The understanding of the propaganda process is determined by the social interests of its subject, their relationship to the interests of society in general and individual groups targeted by propaganda, which affects the content and determines the choice of forms, methods and means of propaganda (Довгань, 2019).

The main psychological goal of propaganda is to influence the system of ideological, social and political relations of people, which can be changed by forming new relations or strengthening (or weakening) existing relations.

Additionally, analyzing the work О.Г. Радзівської, it is important to note the effectiveness of propaganda for children, which increases with age and emotional receptivity. It is necessary to assess the level of damage caused by the information as a direct negative impact on the child's consciousness, which is the result of an action determined by the period, affecting his psychophysical health, emotional state and personality formation. Therefore, countering the negative impact of information on a child should be considered as a component of the state's national security (Зосимчук, 2023).

Throughout its historical development, mankind has constantly improved various methods of influencing public opinion. At the same time, it is possible to single out several features that determined these changes. Depending on the level of development of communications, a certain channel of deep influence prevailed in society.

In the process of waging information wars, three main methods are used:

- propaganda;
- public relations (relations with the public);
- advertising (political advertising) (Війна сенсів: шляхи і напрями опору..., 2024).

In the modern information space, several types of propaganda are noted and considered from the point of view of their influence on public opinion and the goals they pursue. Black propaganda hides the true source of information, disguising it as something else, thereby misleading others. Grey propaganda spreads information without clearly identifying its source or authorship. Positive propaganda is aimed at promoting social harmony and the formation of appropriate values in society for its development, different from manipulative techniques. Negative propaganda aims to promote enmity and conflict in society by using disinformation to control citizens in totalitarian regimes or military conflicts (Волчек, 2021).

In today's information environment, there is also an increase in the influence of digital propaganda. It is based on the use of Internet platforms, social media and algorithms. This form of advocacy can effectively engage an audience and spread specific ideas based on users' data and prior preferences.

In addition, modern technologies make it possible to improve propaganda methods through the use of artificial intelligence, analytical algorithms and mental systems, which creates new opportunities for personalizing messages and adapting them to the specific needs and preferences of recipients.

In scientific literature, several types of propaganda are distinguished, including official, unofficial, direct, indirect, propaganda using art, scientific, ideological, true and axial propaganda. Each of the types has its characteristics and methods of influencing the audience, from announced official goals to the use of scientific concepts or ideological value systems to shape public opinion (Гаврилюк, 2012).

In modern conditions, it is impossible to fully describe the variety of methods of propagandistic manipulation, since they contain a wide range of specific methods. Among the most common, we can distinguish: the systematic dissemination of public myths, falsification of facts, dissemination of lies and speculations, manipulation of information processing and biased commenting on it, as well as the use of special methods to create an illusory perception of reality (for example, «half-truth», «involuntary influence», «foreign government», etc.). This complex also includes techniques such as showing politicians in an unfavourable light on television and using photomontage to distort reality to compromise opponents. One of the complex manipulative election techniques is the use of manipulations to influence voters (Гапій, 2018).

Propaganda is widely used as a method of political manipulation through mass media in society. This mass media propaganda is based on specific «values», social images, political myths and illusions, which are consolidated in people's minds in simplified standards of behaviour.

Russian state propaganda manifests itself as total, cynical and lying, based on the experience of other authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Since the beginning of the 2000s, it has actively opposed Ukraine and Western countries through anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western propaganda. However, starting with the fourth phase of the Putin regime, especially after the start of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in 2013–2014, Russian propaganda radically changed its character. It became openly chauvinistic, aggressively imperial and fascist, and moved to a full-fledged information war. Such actions are aimed at massive manipulation of public opinion, preparation of the Russian population to support external aggression and obtaining approval for measures against Ukraine. After the military aggression and occupation of Crimea, the methods and techniques of Russian propaganda became military, characterized by criminal and total disinformation, containing the spread of total lies.

Therefore, in various scientific literature, the formation of the image of the enemy is considered a significant aspect of political and socio-cultural dynamics. For further theoretical and practical research on this issue, it is important to establish the main mechanisms and strategies used by various subjects (states, political regimes, social groups, etc.) to create and assert the image of the enemy. At the same time, the main tasks are the analysis of historical contexts, political strategies and socio-cultural conditions that contribute to the formation and maintenance of such images. In addition, it is important to examine the impact of these images on society, including their impact on international relations, political stability, and sociocultural identity.

The main mechanisms and strategies used by various subjects (states, political regimes, social groups, etc.) to form and establish the image of the enemy are propaganda and media, political statements and actions, manipulation of historical facts, social campaigns and educational programs, economic sanctions and blockades, as well as political alliances and international relations. These mechanisms can be used individually or in combination, depending on the specific goals and context, to form a negative image of the chosen «enemy» to achieve various political or geopolitical goals.

Russian propaganda reveals several distinctive features, including multiple versions of the truth, flexibility and unprincipledness, and the constant injection of disinformation into the media. It is characterized by absolute falsehood, which creates a so-called «parallel reality», simultaneousness and contradiction of information for mixing cards. A crude and simple way of communication, manifestations of anti-Semitism and double standards are also characteristic features of Russian propaganda. Other methods of demagoguery and populism include an appeal to

someone else's experience, an emotional approach, and an attempt to present oneself as a victim of circumstances.

Russian propaganda creates an image of the enemy, which is presented as an agent of external threat, acting against the national interests and stability of the country. This image of the enemy is characterized as untrustworthy, abusing its influence and seeking to undermine the sovereignty and security of Russia. Any force or group that criticizes the policies and actions of the Russian government or directs efforts to support alternative values and ideals becomes an enemy. This image of the enemy is strengthened by the emphasis on his criminality, dishonesty and efforts to destroy the Russian way of life.

*The study of Russian propaganda in various fields of knowledge:  
analysis of the results of domestic and foreign research*

Russian propaganda is one of the most relevant topics of modern politics and international relations. It affects various fields of knowledge, such as politics, economy, culture, science and others. Studying Russian propaganda is an important task for understanding its mechanisms and consequences.

Aggressive state propaganda, about a one-party system and the use of terror, is a sign of an authoritarian society. Usually, in totalitarian states, propagandists have a two-fold task: the first is to present the current economic and political situation in the country in the most favourable way for the authorities, and the second is to discredit any opponents of the regime.

In 2007, V. Putin's «Russian World» fund was launched in Latvia, which financed the activities of politicians and public organizations to spread Russian culture outside the country. This was interpreted as a manifestation of «soft power», similar to the approach chosen by some European countries. However, it soon became known that the fund did not adhere to transparency. The public fund indicated a focus on culture but financed the actions of politicians who promoted pro-Russian views, such as MEP Tetiana Zhdanok and former mayor of Riga, now MEP Nil Ushakov. Later, according to the European Parliament vote on Ukraine, it was clear that Zhdanok remained loyal to the Kremlin, while Ushakov took a firm stand in support of Ukraine. The influence on the local population in the Baltics was initially carried out through the propaganda programs of Russian state television channels, especially in the eastern part of Estonia and Latvia, where the share of the Russian-speaking population was the highest. In the Baltic countries, there were local publications that published materials giving the impression that life had become very difficult in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These publications emphasized that Europe imposes foreign values, which lead to the degradation of society (Пропаганда нинішня..., 2024).

The role of the Russian disinformation mechanism was not adequately assessed until some analysts began to point to Russia's attempts to influence the results of elections in various countries around the world. This marked the moment when the discussion about Russian foreign policy propaganda as a tool of informational pressure began. Since 2008, especially after the invasion of Georgia (perhaps even earlier), Russia's approach to propaganda has undergone a marked change. Real opportunities to demonstrate the effectiveness of new methods arose in 2014 during the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The current conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, as well as the desire to achieve controversial goals in the «near abroad» and against NATO allies, are noted as a news area where we continue to see the impact of new propaganda (Озюменко, 2019).

RT, formerly known as «Russia Today» or «Russia Today», is one of the main multimedia news providers in Russia. With an annual budget of more than \$300 million, the media group broadcasts news in English, French, German, Spanish and Russian, as well as Eastern European languages. This channel is very popular on the Internet, where its pages receive more than a billion

views. If this statement is true, then RT may be the most visited news source on the Internet. However, in addition to obvious contributors such as RT, several dozen news websites promote Russian propaganda without disclosing or disguising their affiliation with it. (Олексієнко, Андрощук, 2020).

During a visit to Moscow, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Angela Merkel, during a joint press conference with President, Vladimir Putin, in 2015, made an assessment of Russia's policy, expressing outrage over the annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. She called these actions «criminal» and a violation of international law, which seriously damaged cooperation between Germany and Russia and violated the pan-European peace order. However, the word «criminal» was removed from the Russian translation of Merkel's statement, even in the full version of the press conference broadcast on Russian television, causing outrage in the world media and sparking discussions about censorship in Russia.

This example refers to the topic of studying Russian propaganda in the context of analyzing the results of both domestic and foreign research. It shows how Russian propaganda changes coverage of events and evaluations of political events depending on its goals and interests. The case demonstrates how the authorities in Russia manipulate information and use censorship to hide or distort facts to create a favourable image. Such an analysis of research allows for a better understanding of the functioning mechanisms of Russian propaganda and its impact on society in various fields of knowledge.

Analysis of the results of domestic and foreign research on Russian propaganda shows that it has a significant impact on various fields of knowledge. For example, research in the field of politics shows that Russian propaganda is used to change the geopolitical situation in the world and increase Russia's influence on international relations. Studies in the field of culture and science show that Russian propaganda is used to change the worldview and beliefs of people.

Propaganda of an aggressive war against Ukraine is one of the key aspects of the information war waged by the Russian Federation. It is used to justify and smear Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea and military operations in eastern Ukraine. Russian propaganda tries to create the impression that the conflict in Ukraine arose solely because of the country's internal problems and the actions of local separatist formations, ignoring Russia's role in supporting and financing these formations.

In addition, Russian propaganda demonizes the Ukrainian leadership and political forces, using terms such as «junta» and «fascist junta», even though the legality and constitutionality of the Ukrainian government is recognized by the international community. The President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, periodically makes objections and fabricated information regarding the presence of the Russian military in military conflicts on the territory of Ukraine.

Russian propaganda, using various channels, including the state media and the president of the Russian Federation, influences public thinking in Russia and the world, creating a distorted understanding of the situation in Ukraine and contributing to the legitimization of Russia's aggressive policy.

Starting in September 2008, Oleksandr Dugin, a Russian politician known for his fascist views and referred to as «Putin's mastermind» publicly expressed his demands for an invasion of Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. In his book *Fundamentals of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia*, he promoted the idea of annexation of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, arguing that Ukraine is irrelevant to Russia's geopolitical interests and should be a controlled country. This book influenced Putin's foreign policy and contributed to the escalation of the situation, which led to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

In April 2014, the rebroadcasting of four Russian TV channels in Ukraine was banned due to their role in inciting inter-ethnic enmity and propaganda for war. The NATO Secretary General also accused the Russian Federation of war propaganda and attempts to seize power in Ukraine.



Putin's Russian regime actively uses various propaganda channels, including even children's television programs, to spread the ideology of «ours» and «fascists» in Ukraine, where «ours» represents the Russian-speaking population, and «fascists» – the Ukrainian-speaking population. Thus, Russian propaganda tries to justify its aggressive policy and legitimize Russia's actions in Ukraine.

Employees of the TV channel "Zvezda", which belongs to the Ministry of Defense of Russia, Yevhen Davydov and Nikita Konashenkov, admitted their participation in distorting and fabricating information about the events in eastern Ukraine. They admitted that they transmitted false information about the use of phosphorus bombs and Grad rocket launchers by Ukrainian security forces, portraying them as a threat to the civilian population. At the same time, shelling carried out by pro-Russian terrorists and units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, which operated both on the territory of Ukraine and from the side of Russia, was a real threat to the civilian population. Even after these facts were revealed, Russian state TV channels continued to spread disinformation about the Ukrainian shelling of populated areas.

Russian propaganda actively used various methods, including falsification of facts and distortion of events in eastern Ukraine. For example, she tried to create an image of "beasts" of the Ukrainian military to justify Russia's aggression. False stories about the shootings of civilians and the ill-treatment of prisoners were spread. Also, the Russian mass media invented stories about the heroic deeds of the separatists, which, were false. All these actions, including the distortion of facts, are aimed at creating a favourable image of Russia and justifying its aggressive policy towards Ukraine. Such behaviour is contrary to international norms and can be qualified as an action directed against the peace and security of humanity.

Analyzing the causes and consequences of studying Russian propaganda in various fields of knowledge, it can be determined that the main reasons include political motivations, cultural differences and threats to national security (Канарська, Митко, 2018). (see Tables 1–2 below).

Tables 1

## Reasons for studying Russian propaganda in various fields of knowledge

Reasons for studying Russian propaganda	Description
Political motivations	Russian propaganda is used to influence public opinion and shape the worldview of the population. The study of propaganda helps reveal Russia's political motivations and goals.
Cultural differences	Russian propaganda has its own characteristics and differences from the propaganda of other countries. The study of propaganda helps to better understand the cultural differences and specificity of Russia.
Security of national interests	Russian propaganda can be aimed at undermining Ukraine's national security and interests. The study of propaganda makes it possible to identify threats and risks to national security.

Table 2

## Consequences of studying Russian propaganda in various fields of knowledge

Consequences of studying Russian	Description
----------------------------------	-------------

propaganda	
Political consequences	Russian propaganda can have an impact on political processes in Ukraine and the world. The study of propaganda helps to understand Russia's goals and motivations and to respond to their influence on political processes.
Cultural implications	Russian propaganda can have an impact on cultural processes and the worldview of the population. The study of propaganda helps to understand the cultural differences and specificity of Russia and respond to their influence on cultural processes.
Security implications	Russian propaganda can pose a threat to Ukraine's national security and interests. The study of propaganda allows identifying threats and risks to national security and developing measures to prevent them.

First of all, the study of Russian propaganda allows us to reveal the political motivations and goals of Russia, which uses propaganda as a tool to influence public opinion and shape the worldview. In addition, the analysis helps to better understand the cultural differences and specificity of Russia.

Regarding the implications, the study of Russian propaganda identifies political, cultural, and security aspects. Influence on political processes in Ukraine and the world, interaction with cultural processes and potential threat to national security are the main consequences that the study of Russian propaganda helps to recognize and counteract. This approach makes it possible to understand and respond to the influence of Russia in various spheres, contributing to the preservation of national interests and the stability of society.

Therefore, Russian propaganda has actively evolved since the collapse of the USSR. Starting with a relatively mild version in the early 1990s, it turned into an aggressive propaganda system after the war broke out in 2014. The credibility lies in the fact that the events that have taken place in Ukraine since 2014 mark the extreme importance of the informational and psychological aspects of the conflict, especially in the hybrid war. Russia's aggression in the military-political sphere emphasized that informational influence in international relations can be used not only to achieve pragmatic goals of foreign policy but also to prepare a favourable environment for a real full-scale war. It was established that the informational and psychological influence began even before the start of hostilities in the preparation of the Russian Federation for war. Therefore, the lack of an adequate reaction to open anti-Ukrainian propaganda serves as a basis for the destruction of the state.

The study of Russian propaganda in various fields of knowledge is an urgent task determined by political, cultural and security aspects. The political motivations revealed in the context of Russia's activities emphasize the importance of understanding its goals and strategies for influencing public opinion. The analysis of cultural differences in the context of propaganda allows us to better understand the specifics and features of its influence, which is important in the context of intercultural relations. The security of national interests becomes a priority since Russian propaganda can pose a threat to the stability of society and its security. Analysis of the consequences of Russian propaganda shows that it can influence political and cultural processes, as well as have a potentially negative impact on national security. This approach contributes not only to understanding the essence of propaganda but also to the development of effective strategies to prevent its negative consequences.

*Dynamics and peculiarities of the development  
of the Institute of Propaganda in the Russian Federation*

The Institute of Propaganda in the Russian Federation plays a significant role in shaping public opinion, influencing mass consciousness, and manipulating information. Propaganda in the Russian Federation is a complex system that includes various mass media, social networks, state structures and public organizations.

The Institute of Propaganda in the Russian Federation is characterized by strong centralization and significant influence of state management bodies. The central government determines information dissemination strategies and controls its content for political and ideological purposes. To achieve maximum impact on the public, propaganda uses various media platforms such as television, radio, newspapers, magazines, the Internet and social networks. By appealing to the emotional reactions of the audience and using symbolic images, propaganda creates a favourable environment for the formation of certain beliefs and the orientation of public opinion.

Analyzing Russian propaganda in various fields of knowledge, it can be noted that disinformation and manipulation of information is a common practices for achieving propaganda goals. These methods are aimed at forming a certain image in society, focusing on geopolitical influence, historical events and patriotic motives.

Propaganda in the Russian Federation actively uses the historical component to support national identity and the perception of modern politics. It combines the active use of historical events, symbols and heroic pages of history to encourage pride in one's country and support national unity. In particular, propaganda recalls past achievements and creates specific allusions and analogies that reinforce certain political or ideological views.

In addition, propaganda uses patriotic motives to strengthen support for the government and its policies. These motifs contain an emphasis on traditions, culture and national values to arouse pride in the country and support important state decisions.

In particular, propaganda in the Russian Federation uses geopolitical aspects to form a specific image picture of the world. This strategy is aimed at emphasizing the importance of Russia as a geopolitical player on the world stage and forming a favourable image of it in the international community.

The era of pre-media propaganda in the Russian Federation was defined by the introduction of total censorship, the initial act of which was the "Decree on the Press" by V.I. Lenin in 1917. The law closed publications that criticized the government, spread false information or called for protests. Propaganda in the USSR was based on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and changed depending on historical conditions. She made extensive use of mass media, film, literature and visual arts to influence society. Propaganda activities focused on the creation of specific symbols and ideological images, as well as on monumental propaganda, which did not always use high-quality materials. In addition, great emphasis was placed on cinematography, which was considered the most important of all arts for the Soviet authorities, and was also used for agitation and propaganda.

The primary Putinism that has formed in the Russian Federation since the beginning of the 2000s was aimed at establishing an order for the country's development and strengthening its influence in the world. Its ideological basis was the growth of Russia's geopolitical status among developed countries and the realization of significant events on its territory. Modern Putinism is aimed at asserting Russia as the centre of the "multipolar world" and reviving its former political influence, in particular, at the ideological level and through the use of military force. One of the important means of modern Putinism is cyber war, which manifests itself in cyberattacks on the information systems of various countries. Propaganda in Russia is also directed at domestic objects

that contain Russian citizens, with a particular emphasis on educating the youth and using school programs to shape views on history and territorial issues.

In the summer of 2013, an office was opened in the Olhino district of St. Petersburg to carry out Russian propaganda via the Internet, which became one of the early organizations of systemic "trolling". Paid propagandists actively commented and published posts on social networks, blogs and under news in online publications, focusing on criticism of the opposition, Ukraine, the United States and the politicians of these countries, as well as on praising Russia and the Russian authorities. The propaganda campaign, which began in February 2014, caused a sudden change of mood in Russian society, which was associated with the totality and aggressiveness of the propaganda rhetoric. This effectiveness of propaganda is explained by the great depth and detail of information processing that Russian citizens received. This caused the creation of a system of perception of the surrounding world, which is separated from the real picture of events. Thus, the propaganda special forces managed to achieve an impressive victory, convincing a large part of the population.

In the context of the study of Russian propaganda in various fields of knowledge, the strategy of emphasizing the geopolitical influence, strategic importance and leadership role of Russia is studied. Propaganda efforts are aimed at forming a belief about the threat emanating from external forces, particularly Western countries. In this format, the political, economic, and cultural aspects of the activities of these countries are demonized, contributing to the establishment of national unity and the mobilization of citizens. Such a strategy is aimed at forming a defensive position among the population and readiness to act in the international arena.

Summarizing the above information, we can state that propaganda in the Russian Federation uses a complex approach to influence public opinion and form ideas in society. Its strategy includes elements of centralized control, the use of various media platforms, emotional and symbolic aspects, disinformation and information manipulation, as well as an emphasis on historical and patriotic motives and geopolitical aspects.

Centralization and state control guarantee the direction of propaganda efforts under the political and ideological goals of the authorities. A wide media network allows you to reach the audience as much as possible and use various methods of influence. The emotional and symbolic component creates certain ideas and stereotypes, influencing the emotional state and perception of information. Disinformation and information manipulation are aimed at distorting facts and steering public opinion in a favourable direction.

The use of historical and patriotic motives encourages pride in one's country and support for the government, while geopolitical aspects try to emphasize the importance of Russia as a player on the world stage and emphasize threats from other countries, especially the West. In general, propaganda uses this complex of strategies to strengthen its influence and form an optimized perception of events in society (Олексієнко, Андрощук, 2020).

Table 3

The number of propaganda materials on the Internet

Year	The number of propaganda materials on the Internet
2022	10000
2021	5000
2020	2500

*Source: Today's Propaganda Unlike Yesterday's: From Direct Propaganda to Covert Propaganda (Today's Propaganda..., 2024).*

Table 4


## Number of propaganda programs on television

Year	The number of propaganda materials on the Internet
2022	500
2021	400
2020	350

*Source: Today's Propaganda Unlike Yesterday's: From Direct Propaganda to Covert Propaganda (Today's Propaganda..., 2024).*

Over the past three years, the Institute of Propaganda in the Russian Federation has changed in connection with the political situation in the country and on the world stage. In particular, since the beginning of 2020, Russia has begun actively using social networks and other online resources to spread its propaganda. According to analysts, the number of propaganda materials distributed on the Internet doubled compared to 2018. It is also worth noting that since the beginning of 2022, Russia has been actively using television to spread its propaganda. According to the Ministry of Information and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation, the number of propaganda programs on television increased by 30% compared to 2021. A study of the index of the effectiveness of Russian propaganda on Ukrainian territory in 2015 and 2020 showed that Russian propaganda (except for Donbas) has the greatest impact on the residents of Kharkiv (RRP index = 50) and Odesa regions (RRP index = 43). The situation is much better in Kherson, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions (RRP index = 28-29). In Kyiv, the situation is no different from other territories of the North and the Center of Ukraine (RRP index = 19). Therefore, serious counter-propaganda work should be concentrated in the Kharkiv and Odesa regions (Озюменко, 2019). The results of the study of the index of the effectiveness of Russian propaganda in the regions of Ukraine (Fig.A.1). For a better understanding of the dynamics of the development of the Institute of Propaganda in the Russian Federation, we present tables with data for the last three years (Пропаганда нинішня..., 2024) (see Tables 3–4 earlier).

As can be seen from the indicators of fig. 1., tab. 2 and 3, the number of propaganda materials on the Internet has doubled in the last three years, and the number of propaganda programs on television has increased by 30% compared to 2020. The data show that the institution of propaganda in the Russian Federation continues to actively develop and change, as well as that Russia actively uses various media resources to spread its propaganda. In conclusion, we can conclude that the Institute of Propaganda in the Russian Federation has undergone significant changes over the past three years, which are reflected in the dynamics of its development. Russia continues to actively use various media resources to spread its propaganda, which indicates that this institution remains an important element of the country's political system.



*Figure 1 Index of the effectiveness of Russian propaganda in the regions of Ukraine (Озюменко, 2019).*

*Methodology and research methods of Russian propaganda as a means of forming the image of the external enemy*

One of the main elements of mass consciousness propaganda by the propagandist is the mechanism of formation of the image of the "enemy". Therefore, researchers study this topic using different methodologies.

In the article "Psychological features of the conflict in the system of modern relations between Russians and Ukrainians" by Ukrainian researcher S. Kharkavets, the psychological side of relations between Ukrainians and Russians is investigated. The main idea of the author is that Russian television plays an important role in shaping Ukrainians as "enemies". The author claims that the mass level of formation of the image of the "enemy" is established by an emotional background, which is accompanied by manifestations of rejection of other people's preferences. This process can have a symbolic or symbolic form and can generally be compared to the opposition of relatives or close people (Чеберяк, 2018).

In addition, the author of the study shows differences in the value orientations of Russians and Ukrainians. For example, Russians value security more, while Ukrainians value belonging to European integration more. Russians are more interested in preserving "Russian peace", while Ukrainians are more interested in preserving their national identity. Russians are more eager to return to the system of the USSR, while Ukrainians are more eager to preserve territorial integrity and freedom. The author of the study claims that this process of differences in value orientations is the result of mass media propaganda, which negatively affects mass consciousness by introducing a person into hypnosis, which leads to the fact that a person is not able to critically interpret information, and negative emotions can be excessive for him and can lead to the fact that a person does not perceive excess information truthfully. Thus, the author of the study explains the

mechanism of the formation of the image of the "enemy" among Russians from the point of view of the methodology of researching their differences and influence on mass consciousness (Чеберяк, 2018).

A. Cheberyak in his article "Mechanism of creating a negative image of Ukraine on the pages of the Russian mass media" using the methodology of content analysis, investigated the manipulative nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict formed by the Russian mass media regarding Ukraine. The author singled out two components of the image of the "enemy": external and internal. The external enemy is the USA in the form of NATO and Ukraine, and the internal enemy is dissidents or those who support Ukraine within the state. The author studied Russian articles published in the period 2014–2018 and concluded that Ukraine is portrayed in the Russian mass media as an "aggressor" and "occupier" characterized by "aggressiveness", "cruelty" and "cynicism". The main actions of Ukraine are "attack", "destruction", "murders" and "shelling". The author singled out the main mechanisms of formation of the image of the "enemy": the use of the opposition "we-they"; the difference between "own" and "others"; danger from the enemy and blaming him; symbolization and demystification with evil (Чернова, 2020).

A. Zakharchenko's article "Hate Language" requires detailed consideration, as it examines the problem of "hate speech" in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. The author emphasizes that the "language of enmity" can also refer to the image of the "enemy" since there is a difference between "own" and "alien", that is, enemies for the existence of the country. The author gives examples of lexemes — associations related to the image of Ukrainians from the point of view of Russians due to the influence of the Russian information space. They are "Banderivites", "fighters", "our smaller brothers", "punishers", "Kyiv terrorists", "Nazi junta", "inhumans", "racists", "Khokhls", "Russophobes", "extremists". The author also singles out three levels of manifestation of "hate speech" associated with the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.

Soft "hate speech": involves creating a negative image of a certain country or group by affirming its shortcomings in a derogatory context, contrasting one group with another. For example, the rhetoric of the Russian mass media in the West about Ukraine as an incomplete state that will fall apart without Russia's support.

Medium "hate speech": This involves justifying incidents of violence and discrimination by blaming a particular group for inferiority and criminality that negatively affects the country. For example, the destruction of the Ukrainian ethnic group, supported by cases of "crucifixion of boys in Donbas" or the murders of civilians in the DPR and LPR.

Harsh "hate speech": these are open calls for violence and discrimination, which does not allow the region to stabilize. For example, rhetoric in the Russian information space against representatives of "Azov" or "Right Sector" (Як працює російська пропаганда у Східній Європі, 2024).

During the formation of the research methodology, it is important to take into account the difference between the periods when Russian propaganda of the image of the "enemy" was carried out in the information space. Each period differs in completeness and volume of information depending on the audience. Author of the article "The Other/alien in the Russian Federation Strategic Communications during the Russian-Ukrainian Confrontation (2014–2021)" (Почепцов, 2018) investigated the informational and psychological influence of the Russian mass media for the effective promotion of the image of the "enemy" or "foreigner" in the period 2014–2021. In their research, the authors studied how media technologies are used by the Russian mass media against Ukraine. It is noted that the main media technologies for modelling the image of the "enemy" in the Russian-Ukrainian information war are the use of the concept of "enemy", which contains a threat.

For example, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were labelled with derogatory terms such as fascists, Nazis, security forces, punishers, Banderites, and occupiers. Visual images of the excessive force of the "enemy" were also used, accompanied by shots of destroyed houses, schools, and

hospitals, as well as the story of the crucifixion of a boy in 2014 by the Ukrainian military near Slovyansk. In addition, manipulative techniques of fear were used, such as visual images of military equipment, images of prohibited weapons, and images of a "secret conspiracy", especially regarding the West and NATO forces. The authors of the study highlighted the trends of communication and content aggression from the "enemy", such as constant tension in relations between Russians and Ukrainians, the use of manipulative practices of cruelty in social networks and television, the use of social research data of public organizations as authoritative opinion and the use of other communication channels. such as books, films and specially produced television programmes (Як розвивалася російська пропаганда, 2024).

Recently, propaganda against Ukraine has been spreading in the Russian information space, using the history and formation of the image of the "enemy" through various instruments of influence. Most often, the Russian mass media use the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the commonality of traditions and culture of "our peoples". V. Topalskyi's article "Using the construct "Great Patriotic War" in Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda" analyzed the use of this construct to create the image of the "enemy" of Ukraine, the state leadership, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other power structures of the state. The ideological basis against Ukraine is justified by myths about the Second World War and appeals to the fascists, which have become entrenched in the memory of the older generation.

Propagandists often use the phrase "fascist regime". For example, they compare the "parade of shame" of prisoners of war in Donetsk on the Independence Day of Ukraine with the "parade of the defeated" in 1944 by the Germans in Moscow. Russian propaganda also uses TV channels, in particular the "First TV channel", which shows the stories of pseudo-witnesses of the Second World War and the events of 2014 in the Donetsk region. In addition, propagandists use the Internet to spread fake news about the brutal actions of the so-called "punishers" in 2014 and their subsequent execution. Russian propagandists talk about the Yarosh Land camp of the Right Sector, which can be compared to Hitler's Hitler Youth camp. The number of Russian propaganda fakes increases before major holidays related to the Second World War or the Soviet period (Як російська пропаганда..., 2024).

In his studies of Russian propaganda, Ihor Yakovenko draws parallels between the methodology of this propaganda and the plot of the Hollywood film "The Running Man". He points out that Russian propaganda is used to create a specific image of an external enemy, similar to the enemy depicted in the film. She tries to change the perception of the audience, convincing them of the need to fight against the fictional "fascist aggressor" to perceive events according to the benefit of propaganda tactics. This aspect of propaganda became an important influential factor in Russian society, changing the mentality and psyche of the majority of the population.

Additionally, propaganda shows such as Soldiers, which promote military service and show disdain for those who avoid it, are another example of the use of propaganda techniques in the mass media. The events are aimed at manipulating the audience and forming certain values and attitudes.

In the context of international events, propaganda interventions, such as incidents involving accredited journalists, indicate attempts to influence the perception of events and control the information space on an international scale.

According to the research presented, Russian propaganda has had a decisive influence on the information space from 2014 to the present. One of the examples of the use of a propaganda tool is the image of the enemy, which is used in the information space of Russia.

Russian propaganda is one of the most active and effective in the world. It is used to create the image of an external enemy, which allows the Russian government to strengthen its power and influence on national and international politics. In this regard, the methodology of studying Russian propaganda is important for understanding and countering its influence.



There are many methods of propaganda that journalists use to misinform and manipulate the masses. These include distorting and manipulating facts, playing with people's emotions and feelings, spreading rumours, imposing labels and stereotypes, and referring to authoritative sources. Pravda.ru is the first Russian information and analytical publication that appeared on the Russian-language network. As reported on the publication's website, it has a respectable reputation and high ratings. The Internet resource is visited daily by 250,000 users who view about 1.5 million web pages (Якуніна, 2023).

We analyzed several journalistic materials of this mass media for the presence of propaganda and discovered the methods used by the authors for propaganda purposes. On October 15, 2015, "Pravda.ru" published the article "Ukrainians are taught to "chow down Muscovites" with the help of the "insurgent alphabet", which refers to the new Ukrainian school textbooks, the main character of which is Adol" Fik and Alyarmik - to teach younger classes to kill "Poles " and "Moscovites (World Press Freedom Index: Journalism,..., 2021).

This article uses the method of distortion of facts. The prototype of the textbook on murder published by Russian journalists was the "Insurgent Alphabet", which tells about the events of the Second World War in an accessible illustrated form.

In the article "Steven Cohen: The idea of "two Ukraines" is not so bad", published on August 17, 2015, it is said that Ukrainian and American politicians seek to divide the Donetsk region, thus dividing the territory of the state into "two Ukraines". The method of ascertaining the facts is used here, and the subjective opinion of the American professor Steven Cohen is presented as the official position of politicians (Eskjaer, Hjarvard, & Mortensen, 2015).

On July 14, 2015, the article "Ukraine Kills Journalists: Mass Media Report New Shooting" was published about the murder of MIA "Russia Today" journalist Margarita Valenko in Kyiv. This person did not exist, and there is no mention of him - this is disinformation using fabricated facts (Brown, 1963).

On April 30, 2015, the website published the message "Poroshenko approved the Banderiv flag as a symbol of Victory Day" (Anadolu Agency, 2024).

Here again, the facts are distorted because Petro Poroshenko discussed with the heads of regional state administrations the red and black emblem in the form of a poppy flower, which is a symbol of memory of the victims of the Second World War.

To combat disinformation and Russian propaganda in the Internet media, it is necessary to ensure public awareness of this issue. Although it is impossible to completely protect against manipulative influence, checking information, clarifying information through other sources, knowing the methods of propagandistic influence and the ability to identify them in journalistic materials will help to detect manipulative techniques and technologies. Sometimes the process of verifying information can take a lot of time and information resources, which indicates the power of the Russian propaganda mechanism.

Analysis of the Russian online resource Pravda.ru confirmed the fact of active aggressive Russian propaganda, which is used as a weapon in the information war against Ukraine. The materials published on this site contain false information that is intended to manipulate the minds of a wide audience.

During the last phase of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began on February 24, the Russian mass media, under the control of the authorities, continued to use the technique of creating fake news, which had been actively used since 2014. These news items contained both oral fabricated messages and staged fakes with video accompaniment.

In the initial phase of the invasion, telegram channels spread false information about the events of the war, including claims of Ukrainian intervention or even the signing of surrender treaties. Information was also spread about the fact that the population of the captured cities

welcomes the Russian military as "liberators", as well as about the surveillance and wiretapping of citizens by the Ukrainian special services.

Some incidents, such as the arrival of propagandist journalists at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant to create a "positive" image of the military or cases of abduction of Ukrainian civilians by the Russian military, used to create "fake" accusations, have become the focus of international media attention.

An extremely illustrative example of the impact of Russian propaganda on the minds of citizens was a video shot in the city of Ryazan on April 4, 2022, where a man decided to break the windshield of a random driver's car, believing that it was necessary for his participation in the "war with Ukraine." These incidents and facts testify to the complexity and importance of researching Russian propaganda as a means of forming the image of the external enemy. The study of these methods allows a better understanding of the mechanisms of manipulation of public opinion and the influence on international relations.

In the context of the study of Russian propaganda as a tool for forming the image of the external enemy, it is important to consider various methods of media control in Russia. According to the report, the Russian Federation has strict restrictions on the use of the term "war" in materials related to Russia's "military operation" in Ukraine. Such restrictions confirm the tendency to control information, which is demonstrated in the decisions of the Russian legislation.

The consequence of this control is the adoption of amendments to the legislation, which provide for severe punishments, including fines and imprisonment, for the public dissemination of "knowingly false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." Such amendments create an atmosphere of fear among the media and journalists and can limit the ability to express criticism or consider alternative views of events.

Additionally, the Russian Federal Service for Oversight in the Field of Communications, Information Technologies and Mass Communications actively appeals to the mass media to remove "unreliable information" about Russia's special military operation on the territory of Ukraine. Such measures of banning access to information resources, such as radio stations and TV channels, testify to the focus on discourse control and reflect the government's strategy in shaping public opinion.

In addition, measures to block access to Internet resources and interference with the content of Wikipedia indicate a wide range of measures that are used to control information on the network. Such actions create serious challenges for the study of the influence of Russian propaganda and the methodology of its study as a means of forming the image of the external enemy.

The President of Russia and Russian propaganda use the term "special military operation in Donbas" to describe Russia's aggressive activity against Ukraine, which includes invading the southern, eastern and northern borders of Ukraine with the aim of "demilitarizing and denazifying" the latter. However, the reality in Ukraine shows the absence of national socialist (Nazi) ideas and tendencies, as well as the opposition to anti-Semitism and xenophobia at the legislative level.

According to Ukrainian legislation, all forms of propaganda of communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes are prohibited, which emphasizes the anti-Nazi and anti-Semitic nature of Ukrainian society. The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, as a Russian-speaking Jew, is a living example of the absence of nationalist and neo-Nazi tendencies in the country's political leadership.


Despite attempts by Russian propaganda to paint Ukraine as a Nazi state, such claims have been rejected by leading politicians and researchers of Nazism and genocide. This is evidenced by the statements of the Chancellor of Germany, the Secretary General of the United Nations and other authoritative persons.

Russian propaganda uses a variety of methods, including the dissemination of false information and manipulation to influence public consciousness. In particular, in Russian schools

and universities, lectures are held and methods are distributed, which are aimed at justifying Russia's war against Ukraine and forming the impression of the necessity of these actions.

Protests against the war did not receive adequate coverage in the pro-government media in Russia. More than 6,000 people were detained for participating in the protests. The study covered pro-Kremlin information resources operating in Crimea, such as RIA Novosti. Krym", "Kryminform", "Sevastopol Media", "Komsomolskaya Pravda Krym", "Crimean Information Agency".

Analysis of materials for the period January 25-27, 2023 showed that a third of them were devoted to military topics and the sources of the occupation of Crimea. In particular, 31% of the materials related to punishment for discrediting the Russian army, 27% to commemoration and assistance to the participants of the "SVO", 12% to transport connections between Crimea and the occupied south, 12% to Western administration, 6% to Zelensky's speeches on Crimean TV and statements of Crimean officials about Ukraine (see Fig. 2 below).



*Fig. 2 Materials with references to the Russian war and Ukraine for the period January 25–27, 2023.*

Interestingly, according to the occupation media, it was the residents of Crimea who were accused of discrediting the Russian military and Ukrainian subversive activities on the territory of the peninsula.

A study of the military-related materials of information resources in Crimea showed that 31% of them were devoted to the threat of discrediting the Russian military and Ukrainian subversive activities on the territory of the peninsula. The data indicate that it was the residents of Crimea, according to the occupation media, who became the instrument of this discrediting.

For example, one of the bloggers noted that the Russian authorities in Crimea are losing the information war, as pro-Ukrainian activity on the peninsula is growing. Target audiences such as journalists, political scientists and bloggers who have been supported by the Russian authorities are also considered losers in this struggle. Also, Israeli political scientist Yakov Kedmi, who was subject to personal EU sanctions for his justification of Russian aggression against Ukraine, gave lectures in Crimea.

In addition, Crimean woman and blogger Zarema Seitablayeva noted the attempts of Roskomnadzor to block access to the site "Crimea. Realiy", and also provided an alternative way of obtaining information through a mirror site and recommendations for using a VPN to bypass access to content.

Dr Jade McGlynn, a research associate at the Department of Military Studies at King's College London, conducted a detailed study of the methods, narratives and stages of Russian propaganda in the occupied territories of Ukraine after 2022. She turned to consider how the occupiers plunged the population of these territories into a Russian "parallel imaginary reality", which is sometimes reproduced with the help of words such as Stalin: "Life [under the new government] has become better, comrades, life has become more fun."


McGlynn examines two main stages of Russian propaganda in the occupied territories. The first stage is related to propaganda narratives about the causes of the war and the expected improvements in the quality of life after the occupation. For example, residents of the occupied territories are forced to believe that the war in 2022 was provoked by Ukraine through the genocide of the population of Donbas. Propaganda tries to substantiate this thesis with the help of fake reports about the killing of the local population by Ukrainian forces and other manipulative techniques. Later, in the second stage, the war and the former belonging of the occupied territories to Ukraine are silenced. Propaganda increasingly appeals to Russian citizens, trying to present a positive image of the war and occupation. At the same time, propaganda narratives become more wary and demoralizing toward the local population, shifting their goals from persuasion to insurance and demoralization.

In the methodology of the study of Russian propaganda as a means of forming the image of the external enemy, a comprehensive analysis of propaganda narratives, methods and stages used to manipulate information in the occupied territories is carried out. The analysis involves a detailed examination of the narratives being promoted, their content and distribution, as well as uncovering the techniques and techniques used to reinforce these narratives. The study includes the study of the stages of the development of propaganda strategies from the beginning of the conflict to the modern period, which allows to the identification of changes in the approaches and trends of propaganda activity. The results of such an analysis are of strategic importance for the development of effective measures to counter propaganda and strengthen information security in the conditions of hybrid warfare.

It is important to understand that information warfare has become one of the most urgent problems in the modern world. Russian propaganda is one of the most aggressive and at the same time effective forms of information warfare. One of the key elements of Russian propaganda is creating the image of an external enemy. Various electronic resources such as websites, social networks, videos and others are used in this process.

A model based on a comprehensive assessment of quantitative and qualitative parameters of information sources was used to analyze the electronic resources of nine international agencies. The model involves the analysis of key characteristics: volume of information, relevance, objectivity, as

well as the presence of propaganda or distorted materials. An important part of the analysis was the consideration of contextual factors, such as political, social and economic conditions, which may influence the content and direction of information resources. The results of such analysis made it possible to obtain an objective assessment of each source of information and to clarify its role in the formation of the worldview and ideas about the outside world for the audience (see Fig. 3 below).




*Fig. 3 Complex model.*

A comprehensive model containing several stages has been developed and applied to analyze the electronic resources of nine leading international agencies. The first stage is the identification of nine international agencies that have a great influence on world politics and the information space. The next step is to analyze the electronic resources of each selected agency, including their websites and social networks. Then an assessment of the number and nature of materials related to Russia and its foreign policy is carried out, followed by an analysis of the content of these materials to identify the image of the external enemy. The methods and techniques used to form this image are determined. The final stage is the evaluation of the effectiveness of the methods and techniques (see Fig. 4 below).

The main methods used for this are.

- use of negative headlines and information about Russia;
- use of negative images and videos related to Russia;
- use of negative comments and reviews about Russia;
- use of negative articles and information about Russia;
- using negative social networks and other electronic resources to spread negative information about Russia.



*Rice. 4 Stages of analysis*

So, the model of the analysis of electronic resources of nine international agencies in the process of formation of the image of the external enemy by Russian propaganda allows us to identify methods and methods that are used for further research.

We provided a detailed overview of the methodology and methods of studying Russian propaganda as a means of forming the image of the external enemy. The methodology of studying Russian propaganda turns out to be complex and multi-method, taking into account various factors that influence the process of forming an information image. The study method is considered in analyzing specific sources of information and determining their role in forming the image of the external enemy.

The specificity of the model of the analysis of electronic resources of nine international agencies in the process of formation of the image of the external enemy by Russian propaganda is revealed in its complexity and comprehensiveness. This model makes it possible to systematize and

analyze information sources, determining their influence on ideas and attitudes towards external actors. Such an approach is important for understanding the mechanisms of propagandistic influence and developing strategies for countering disinformation.

## **Results and discussion**

### **Features of the formation of the image of the external enemy in the publications of the news agency "Agence France Press" (France)**

In modern conditions, propaganda has become one of the key tools of influence on society, which is particularly effective in forming the image of an external enemy. Russian propaganda, in particular, is actively used for this purpose, influencing public opinion and perceptions of the outside world. Mass media, in particular, agencies with world names, play an important role in this process.

Agence France Presse (AFP) is a long-established French international news agency headquartered in Paris, France. Founded in 1835 as Havas, AFP is one of the oldest news agencies in the world. The agency covers news from all over the world, including a section devoted to events in Russia. AFP provides a wide range of information products, including text, photo, video, audio and graphic materials.

During the analysis of the content of the agency "Agence France Press" (France), it was found that Russian propaganda actively uses the image of an external enemy to construct its ideology. Specifically, the agency's texts highlighted the following topics related to the image of the external enemy.

1. Research has shown a significant number of references to the conflict in the East of Ukraine. Russian propaganda actively uses this conflict to create an image of Ukraine as an enemy of Russia.

2. A large number of references to sanctions against Russia were found. Russian propaganda uses these sanctions to reinforce the image of the West as an enemy of Russia.

3. In particular, terrorism is present in the texts of the agency. Russian propaganda uses this aspect to create an image of the West as an enemy of Russia.

Five analytical articles published on the Agence France Press (AFP) website are considered. The articles consider various aspects of global events, including conducting training projects on digital investigation for Ukrainian mass media, participation of journalists in prestigious international competitions, showing the works of photographers at major photojournalism festivals, the demand for a thorough investigation of the attack on journalists in Lebanon, as well as an analysis of the situation in Ukraine in the context of military events and population mobilization (see Table 5 below).

The text is based on an analysis of five analytical articles published on the Agence France Press (AFP) website. Key words are "Ukrainian mass media", "Albert-London prize", "photojournalism", "attack on journalists", "war in Ukraine", and "mobilization". The topic is the analysis of various aspects of global events through the prism of the work of journalists and photographers in different countries of the world (see Table 1 below).

The unifying elements are the active involvement of Agence France Press (AFP) in events related to Ukraine and regions facing conflict such as Russia and Lebanon. In addition, the articles examine the work of journalists and photographers in dangerous environments, particularly during times of war and tension in the Middle East, which is a common theme. The high level of professionalism and courage of the agency's employees in the performance of their duties is also noted.

Table 5

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource "Agence France Press" (AFP), based on the number of mentions of the conflict/support for Ukraine in journalistic materials

No s/p	Title of the article <i>1</i>	Topic <i>2</i>	Cases:	
			Number <i>3</i>	% <i>4</i>
1.	Training Ukrainian mass media in digital investigation [73]	Media education, information security	2	10.53
2.	Two AFP journalists pre-selected for Albert–London Prize [74]	Work of journalists, investigation, conflict in Eastern Ukraine	1	5.26
3.	From Ukraine to Mauritania, AFP is in the spotlight at the 35th Visa Festival pour l'Image in Perpignan [75]	Photojournalism, war in Ukraine, conflict in Eastern Ukraine	5	26.32
4.	AFP calls for in-depth investigation into attack on journalists in southern Lebanon [76]	Safety of journalists, investigations, international conflicts	1	5.26
5.	The war in Ukraine: these men are fleeing mobilization (repeated list) [77]	Military events, conflict in the East of Ukraine, mobilization of the population	10	52.63
6.	TOTAL:	–	19	100

During the analysis of the materials, it was established that there were no mentions or support of Ukraine in the published articles. Even on the date of 09.03.2024, at 9:33, it is indicated that Russia reported the destruction of 47 Ukrainian drones over the southern regions (see Fig. 5 below).

**Moscou (AFP) - 09/03/2024 - 09:33 La Russie affirme avoir détruit 47 drones ukrainiens survolant les régions du sud dans la nuit**

*Rice. 5 Moscow AFP «Russia said that overnight it destroyed 47 Ukrainian drones flying over the southern regions»*

However, no mention of support or expressions of sympathy for Ukraine was found in the mentioned publications. It is worth noting that some materials refer to other cities in different parts of the world, which indicates the wide-ranging nature of the events considered by the agency.

The articles published by Agence France Press (AFP) are diverse in their subject matter and cover various aspects of social and political life. However, several texts were found among them that directly or indirectly refer to the image of the external enemy that Russia creates. The first article deals with the training of Ukrainian mass media in digital investigation, which may be related to the detection of possible threats or negative influence from Russia. The second article mentions the work of AFP journalists in Moscow and their investigations in the context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which may reinforce the image of Russia as a potential threat actor. The



third article mentions the work of AFP photographers in Ukraine, which illustrates the consequences of the war and can form a negative image of Russia as a participant in the conflict. The fourth article examines the request by the AFP to investigate the attack on journalists in southern Lebanon, which could be an indicator of Russia's aggressive actions or influence in the region. The fifth article again talks about the military events in Ukraine and the reaction to them, which can also contribute to the formation of the image of an external enemy.

With the help of content analysis of the AFP agency, it can be concluded that Russian propaganda is actively forming the image of the external enemy. In particular, the news published by AFP often mentions conflicts involving Russia and accusations against neighbouring countries. For example, in the article "Russia Accuses Ukraine of 'Provocation' as US warship heads to the Black Sea", the author mentions Russia accusing Ukraine of provocation, which is a typical example of forming the image of an external enemy.

On the other hand, the AFP agency is not the only one that pays attention to the problem of Russian propaganda. In their articles, agencies from all over the world draw attention to forming the image of an external enemy through Russian propaganda. For example, in the article "Russia's propaganda machine amplifies conspiracy theories", the author draws attention to the fact that Russian propaganda actively uses conspiracy theories to create an image of an external enemy.

So, the content analysis of the AFP agency confirms that Russian propaganda actively creates the image of an external enemy. This is a serious problem that needs the attention and study of the international community.

*Features of the formation of the image of the external enemy  
in the publications of the news agency "Reuters" agency" (Great Britain)*

Reuters is a global news agency owned by the Thomson Reuters Corporation. Reuters is committed to acting honestly, independently and without bias, as outlined in the Reuters Trust Principles. The news agency covers news from and has a section dedicated to Russian news. In 2022, Reuters employees removed the Russian news agency TASS from its content market due to concerns about the spread of disinformation about the war in Ukraine.

The Reuters agency creates the image of an external enemy created by Russia by publishing analytical materials that emphasize Russia's aggressive actions and influence on the international situation. These articles highlight conflict situations, the economic and political consequences of Russia's actions, and its foreign policy strategies and propaganda actions aimed at undermining international order and stability, which contributes to the establishment of the image of Russia as an external enemy in the world community.

Five analytical articles published on the website of the "Reuters" agency were considered. The articles focus on the study and analysis of various aspects of the geopolitical situation in the world, economic trends, events in financial markets, international relations, and other key aspects of world business and political life. In addition, the selected articles carefully examine the influence of Russia on the international arena and also form an image of the external enemy, which is created by Russia itself (see Table 6 below).

Table 6

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource "Reuters agency" (Great Britain), based on the number of mentions of the conflict/support for Ukraine in journalistic materials

No s/p	Title of the article	Topic	Cases:	
			number	%
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>

1.	Putin praises Russian women for motherhood, beauty [79]	Cultural attitudes and gender policy	1	12.5
2.	The Pope says that Ukraine should have the "white flag courage" of negotiations [80]	International relations	2	25
3.	The Polish government promises to reduce grain surpluses, farmers continue to protest [81]	Economy	1	12.5
4.	Turkey and the USA are discussing Ukraine, Gaza, ways to improve relations, said the Minister of Foreign Affairs [82]	International relations	3	37.5
5.	The US Embassy warned of an imminent attack on Moscow by "extremists" [83]	Politics and security	1	12.5
6.	TOTAL:	–	8	100

Reuters covers news about Russia in the Russia Headlines section of its website. The news agency employs about 2,500 journalists and 600 photojournalists in approximately 200 locations around the world.

The search results do not contain specific information about how Reuters covers news about Russia. However, the Reuters website has articles reporting Russia-related news, such as the Russian military thwarting Ukraine's attempt to establish a beachhead on the east bank of the Dnipro River.

Additionally, the Reuters Institute website has an article analyzing the influence of the Kremlin's Spanish-language propaganda with two fact-checkers and two experts explaining how Putin's propaganda thrives in Spanish on television and social media.

In general, Reuters is a reputable news agency that covers news about Russia and adheres to the principles of independence and objectivity.

*Features of the formation of the image of the external enemy  
in the publications of the BBC news agency (Great Britain)*

BBC" (British Broadcasting Corporation) is a British public television and radio company, the world's oldest national broadcaster and one of the largest media organizations in the world. The BBC provides television, radio and online services to audiences in the UK and the world. It is known for its impartial and high-quality journalism, and its programs cover a wide range of topics, including news, entertainment, sports and culture.

The BBC agency actively covers events related to Russia and its foreign policy. Most of the articles contain critical remarks about the actions of Russia and its leaders. Many articles mention Russia's image as an external enemy. For example, in the article "Russia's propaganda war against Ukraine", the author notes that Russia uses propaganda to create an image of Ukraine as an enemy.

In the article "Russia's propaganda machine: Same Old Tricks", the author notes that Russia uses the same propaganda techniques used in the Soviet era to create the image of an external enemy.

Analysis of the content of the BBC agencies regarding the formation of the image of the foreign enemy by Russian propaganda showed that this is a relevant topic for international media. "BBC" agencies actively cover events related to Russia and its foreign policy and point out that Russia is creating the image of an external enemy. This information indicates that the problem of propaganda and the formation of the image of the external enemy is relevant to the international community.

Five analytical articles published on the BBC website were considered. These articles focus on various events, political and economic processes in different countries, and social and cultural phenomena. "BVS" analysts predict the possible consequences of these events, reveal their impact on the international arena and society, and try to understand the deep reasons and factors that led to their occurrence (Appendix B, Table 3).

According to the results of the analysis of the content of the agencies "Agence France Press" (France), "Reuters" and "VVS", it can be concluded that Russian propaganda actively creates the image of an external enemy. In the texts of these agencies, a large number of references to the conflict in the East of Ukraine, sanctions against Russia, and terrorism were found, which indicates the active use of these topics by Russian propaganda to create the image of an external enemy. Agencies from all over the world are paying attention to the problem of forming the image of an external enemy through Russian propaganda, which indicates the seriousness of this problem and the need for its study by the international community. In their materials, agencies try to adhere to objectivity and impartiality, but some materials may contain elements of propaganda. First, it is important to pay attention to the sources of information and analyze their content with a critical approach.

Therefore, the BBC, through the use of various methods of journalistic analysis and information coverage, forms the image of an external enemy created by Russia. This process is based on investigations, factual reports, expert commentary, interviews with participants in the events and analysis of political actions. The BBC articles use data on Russia's military actions, its role in international conflicts and interference in political processes, supported by evidence and documents. Reports from the scene of the events, expert analysis and opinions of representatives of different countries help to form an objective picture of the events and reproduce the position of the BBC regarding the role of Russia in world politics and society.

3.2. Content of the agencies "Deutsche Presse-Agentur" (DPA; Germany), "Xinhua" (China), "Anadolu Agency" (Turkey): summary of the analysis

*Features of the formation of the image of the external enemy  
in the publications of the news agency "Deutsche Presse-Agentur" (DPA; Germany)*

"Deutsche Presse-Agentur" (DPA) is a German news agency founded in 1949. It is the largest press agency in Germany with headquarters in Hamburg and a central editorial office in Berlin.

The agency has grown into a large international enterprise serving print media, radio, television, online, mobile phones and national news agencies. News is available in seven languages, including German, English, Spanish and Arabic.

In 2022, the agency had 697 employees, and the turnover amounted to 103.2 million euros. The agency belongs to more than 170 media companies, which ensures its independence. Journalists working for DPA are free and independent in their reporting and must not declare any preference or support for political parties, religious or cultural beliefs, or any industry or other interest groups.

DPA works closely with several news gathering and distribution agencies, including foreign companies such as the Austrian Press Agency and the Swiss Depeschagentur.

Since 2013, DPA has been working with the US-based Associated Press news agency, selling AP services in German-speaking countries. The agency is a reliable, accurate and independent news provider with digital and multimedia content to support the media at home and abroad.

At the beginning of 2023, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), one of the leading German content agencies, published a study devoted to forming the image of the external enemy through Russian propaganda.

The study was conducted based on analysing materials published by Russian mass media and social networks and revealed some interesting trends. According to the DPA study, Russian propaganda actively creates the image of an external enemy, which includes the countries of the West, in particular, the USA and the European Union (see Tables 7-8).

The main methods of forming this image are disinformation, manipulation and the use of stereotypes. One of the key methods of Russian propaganda is the use of disinformation. With the help of fake news and information that has no scientific basis, Russian propaganda tries to create an image of the West as an aggressive and dangerous enemy.

Table 7

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource "BVS" (British Broadcasting Corporation) (Great Britain), based on the number of mentions of the conflict/support for Ukraine in journalistic materials

No s/p	Title of the article <i>1</i>	Topic <i>2</i>	Cases:	
			number <i>3</i>	% <i>4</i>
1.	The war in Ukraine: residents of the East are preparing for the Russian offensive [83]	Preparation of residents of Eastern Ukraine for a possible Russian attack	12	40
2.	Dorset man raises funds for military equipment [84]	Public mobilization in support of Ukraine in the conflict	3	10
3.	War in Ukraine: explosions rang out in Odesa during Zelenskyi's meeting with the Prime Minister of Greece [85]	Events during official meetings in the context of the war in Ukraine	6	20
4.	Russian-Ukrainian war: Moscow ignores arrest warrants for Putin's commanders [86]	Russia's unofficial position on the arrest of suspected commanders	5	16.67
5.	War in Ukraine: India exposed human trafficking network to Russia [87]	Disclosure of the human trafficking network to Russia due to the conflict in Ukraine	4	13.33
6.	TOTAL:	–	30	100

One example cited by the DPA is the portrayal of the US and the European Union as aggressive adversaries of Russia seeking to destroy its economy and influence in world politics. This impression is supported by various historical and political arguments that try to show that Russia is a victim of Western aggression.

Another example is the depiction of the Russian army as peacekeepers and defenders of the world from terrorism and aggression. The mentioned form is supported by various military operations conducted by Russia in recent years, particularly in Syria and the Donbas.

In addition, Russian propaganda actively uses manipulation and stereotypes to create an image of the external enemy. For example, Russian media often use stereotypes about the West as a place of lawlessness and chaos to create an image of the West as a dangerous enemy. According to DPA research, Russian propaganda tries to create an image of an external enemy to attract public attention and distract it from domestic problems. (see table 8 below).

Table 8

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource "Deutsche Presse-Agentur" (DPA; Germany), based on the number of mentions of the conflict/support for Ukraine in journalistic materials

No	Title of the article	Topic	Cases:	
			number	%
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
1.	Portraying the US and the European Union as aggressive adversaries of Russia	Presentation of the USA and the EU as a threat to Russia	0	0
2.	The image of the Russian army as peacekeepers and defenders of the world	Positioning of the Russian army as defenders of the world	2	60
3.	Russia is increasing its military presence in the west	Statement on security threat from Russia	1	40
4.	Russia interferes in elections in Europe	Statement on Russian interference in elections in Europe	0	0
5.	TOTAL:	–	3	100

One example is the publication of the article "Russia is increasing its military presence in the West." In the article, the author tries to show that Russia threatens security in Europe due to the increase of its military presence in the West. However, the article does not contain any evidence that Russia threatens security in Europe.

Another example of DPA's propaganda activity is the publication of the article "Russia interferes in elections in Europe." In this article, the author tries to show that Russia interferes in European elections to change the political situation in European countries in its favour. However, the article does not contain any evidence that Russia is meddling in European elections.

Based on an analysis of articles published by DPA ("Deutsche Presse-Agentur"), which is a German international reporting and analysis agency. Keywords include "Russia", "war in Ukraine", "Russian army", "military presence", "interference in elections", "Europe", "USA", and "European Union". The unifying element is the analysis of the DPA's approaches to the presentation of information about Russia, its actions and its influence in various aspects, particularly in the war in Ukraine and the influence on the political situation in Europe.

However, it is worth noting that such propaganda can hurt international relations and contribute to the further increase of tensions between countries.

The agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) directs its activities to the formation of the image of the external enemy, which was created by Russia, using the analysis of events and the publication of articles using specified language and information strategies. One method of forming this image is to mark the difference between Russia and the West, in particular, the European Union and the United States, as conflicting actors. DPA often emphasizes the negative aspects of Russia's actions, such as military conflicts on the territory of Ukraine, interference in political processes in Europe and other regions, as well as violations of international law. In addition, the DPA can use commonly accepted stereotypes and negative images of Russia to reinforce the image of an external enemy. The use of such strategies contributes to the formation of a negative perception of Russia as a threat to international stability and security.

In conclusion, the DPA study testifies to the active role of Russian propaganda in shaping the image of the external enemy through the use of disinformation, manipulation and stereotypes. Such influence can have negative consequences for international relations and increase tensions between countries.

*Features of the formation of the image of the external enemy  
in the publications of the news agency "Xinhua" (China)*

Xinhua Agency is the official news agency of the People's Republic of China and is one of the largest state media in China. It was founded in 1931 by the Chinese Communist Party [88].

Xinhua Agency produces news and information for domestic and foreign consumers. Xinhua Agency is headquartered in Beijing and has offices in more than 170 countries around the world. Xinhua Agency publishes news in Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic and Japanese.

Xinhua is an important source of news for the Chinese people and the world. It is engaged in the production of news from various spheres of life, such as politics, economy, science, culture, sports and others. The Xinhua agency also actively uses propaganda methods to create an image of the external enemy, in particular, Russia.

In its work, the Xinhua agency adheres to the principles of objectivity and independence, but at the same time, like any state media, it can be influenced by political and other factors. "Xinhua" actively uses propaganda methods to form the image of the external enemy, in particular, Russia.

One of the examples of the propaganda activity of the "Xinhua" agency is the publication of the article "Russia: from an external enemy to a strategic partner." In this article, the author tries to show that Russia is not only an external enemy but also an important strategic partner of China. However, at the same time, the article contains many negative comments about Russia, in particular, regarding its relations with Ukraine and Syria.

Another example of Xinhua agency's propaganda activity is the publication of the article "Russia Increases Military Presence in the West." In this article, the author tries to show that Russia is a threat to security in Europe due to the increase of the military presence in the West. However, the article does not contain evidence that Russia threatens security in Europe.

The described five analytical articles published on the Xinhua website focus on analyzing various aspects, including current political events, economic trends, international relations and socio-cultural phenomena (see Table 9 below).

The analysis is based on analytical articles published on the Xinhua website. The keywords used in these articles are contained in their titles and text and may vary depending on the specific topic of each article. However, the unifying element for all analytical materials is their focus on studying and analyzing certain aspects of world events from a certain perspective, which may be unique to Xinhua News Agency.

Table 9

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource of the British Broadcasting Corporation (Great Britain), based on the number of mentions of the conflict/support for Ukraine in journalistic materials

No	Title of the article	Topic	Cases:	
			number	%
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
1.	The United States again provides military aid to Ukraine [88]	Military support of Ukraine from the USA	6	42.86
2.	Spain opens "Ukrainian practice"[89]	Development of cooperation between Spain and Ukraine in certain areas	2	14.29
3.	The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia: Western countries have sent active military personnel to Ukraine[90]	Statements by the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry about the military presence of Western countries in Ukraine	4	28.57
4.	China calls for a political solution to the Ukrainian crisis[91]	China's position on the Ukrainian crisis and a call for a political solution	1	7.14
5.	Explosions rang out in many places in Ukraine[92]	The security situation in Ukraine	1	7.14
6.	TOTAL:	–	14	100

Therefore, Xinhua can create an image of Russia as an external enemy by publishing articles that focus on Russian activities that suit their own political or geopolitical interests. The aforementioned articles may contain a variety of information, ranging from alleged military threats to diplomatic conflicts, portraying Russia as an enemy or threat to stability and security in the region or the world as a whole. They can use different strategies, such as emphasizing the differences between political systems, accusing it of meddling in the internal affairs of other countries, or even emphasizing Russia's external threat to the world order. This image is supported by appropriate headlines, photographs and illustrations that reinforce the negative or threatening nature of Russia in the eyes of readers.

Thus, the "Xinhua" agency actively uses propaganda methods to create an image of an external enemy, in particular, Russia, which can hurt relations between China and Russia, as well as the general situation in the world.

*Features of the formation of the image of the external enemy  
in the publications of the news agency "Anadolu Agency" (Turkey)*

Anadolu Agency is a state news agency headquartered in Ankara, Turkey. It was founded in 1920 during the Turkish War of Independence by order of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The agency offers news, photos and videos about Turkey, the world, economy, sports, health and technology. About 3,800 employees work in the "Anadolu" agency. The agency is active on social networks such as Twitter [93].

In addition to Turkish, the agency's website is available in English, Bosnian, Russian, French, Arabic, Kurdish, Kashmiri, Albanian, Persian, Macedonian, Indonesian and Spanish.

Anadolu Agency reports on various topics, including politics, security and sports.

The "Anadolu Agency" agency from Turkey conducted a content analysis related to the formation of the image of an external enemy by Russia. The results of the analysis showed that Russian propaganda actively uses topics such as "threat from the West" and "enmity with Ukraine" to create the image of an external enemy.

According to the analysis, Russian propaganda uses various media, including television, radio and social media, to spread its ideas. For example, they actively use social networks such as "Facebook" and "Twitter" to spread their ideas and influence public opinion.

One of the key elements of Russian propaganda is the creation of an image of an external enemy. This allows them to attract public attention and create the impression that Russia is a victim of external aggression. It also allows them to divert attention from internal problems and strengthen their power.

Articles posted directly on the Anadolu Agency website focus on analyzing various aspects of global events and conflicts. Analytical materials can cover such topics as the political situation in the region, international relations, humanitarian crises, military conflicts, the economic state of countries, etc. Based on its profile and geographical location, Anadolu Agency can focus on events in the Middle East region, Turkey and neighbouring countries, but also analyzes other global events. Keywords used in such articles include country names, political leaders, international organizations, and terms related to conflicts, diplomacy, economics, and social issues.

The unifying element is an objective analysis of events and their impact on the region and the world as a whole, as well as an attempt to understand different sides of conflicts and events from different points of view (see Table 10 below).

Therefore, the Xinhua agency can form the image of an external enemy created by Russia by publishing articles that focus on the negative aspects of Russia's activities in international relations, military conflicts, geopolitical interventions and other events that contribute to the formation of a negative image. Keywords and topics that can be used include "aggression", "intervention", "expansion", "destabilization", "propaganda", "political pressure", "security threat", "militarization", "subversion", "disinformation" and others that create an image of Russia as a potential threatening entity in the international arena.



Table 10

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource of the British Broadcasting Corporation (Great Britain), based on the number of mentions of the conflict/support for Ukraine in journalistic materials

No	Title of the article	Topic	Cases:	
			number	%
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
1.	UN: The conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine claimed the lives of 10,703 civilians [93]	War in Ukraine, humanitarian situation	2	22.22
2.	The Russian Federation reported repelling a mass UAV attack [94]	Military operations, security	1	11.11
3.	The head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated the need to put an end to the tragedy in the Gaza Strip[95]	Political relations, conflict in the Middle East	1	11.11
4.	India claims that its citizens were lured into the Russian army with the promise of work.[96]	International relations, labor migration	1	11.11
5.	France: Sending troops to Ukraine is out of the question[97]	International politics, military relations	4	44.44
6.	TOTAL:	–	9	100

Analysis of the content of "Anadolu Agency" showed that Russian propaganda actively uses topics such as "threat from the West" and "enmity with Ukraine" to create the image of an external

enemy. They also use other themes such as "terrorism" and "imperial aggression" to create an image of an external enemy and attract public attention.

In conclusion, the analysis of the content of "Anadolu Agency" showed that Russian propaganda actively uses the creation of the image of an external enemy to attract public attention and strengthen its power. This highlights the importance of critical thinking and information analysis to avoid the influence of propaganda and maintain objectivity in evaluating events.

*Agencies "Press Trust of India" (India), "Kyodo News" (Japan), "National Public Information Agency" (Brazil) in the process of formation by Russian propaganda of the image of an external enemy for the Russian Federation*

Press Trust of India (PTI) is a news agency that provides news on politics, business, sports, technology, entertainment, lifestyle, photos, videos, etc. [68]

In recent years, PTI has reported on Russia's foreign policy and its attempts to portray Russia as an external enemy. For example, in March 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new Foreign Policy Concept that emphasized strengthening and deepening relations with China and India.

The concept also stated that Russia will continue to protect its national interests and sovereignty, which can be interpreted as a warning to other countries. PTI also reported on India's relations with Russia and the implications for US interests. In March 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of India issued a statement supporting the call of the international community for a ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv and confirmed India's faith in the territorial integrity of Ukraine [12].

However, India needs to be mindful of how its smaller neighbours in the subcontinent perceive its tacit support for Russian aggression and any doubts it may harbour in their minds about New Delhi's behaviour as a regional power.

Five analytical articles published on the PTI website were reviewed. These articles focus on the reactions of various countries to the conflict in Ukraine. Each of them reflects important aspects of the situation, including the possibility of deploying NATO troops in Ukraine, providing support to Ukraine in the form of drones, proposals for a peace summit with Russia, Zelensky's visit to Turkey to discuss ending the war, as well as the disclosure of human trafficking involving Russia. These articles reflect various aspects of the international response to the difficult political situation in Ukraine:

1. The article "The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland stated that the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine is not unthinkable" analyzes the possibility of the presence of NATO troops on the territory of Ukraine from the point of view of Poland [68].

2. The article "Britain declares that it will provide Ukraine with 10,000 drones to fight Russia" examines Britain's role in supporting Ukraine and providing drones for military operations [69].

3. The article "Turkey Erdogan Proposes to Hold a Peace Summit with Russia During Zelensky's Visit to Ukraine" examines the initiative of Turkish President Erdogan to hold a peace summit with Russia in the context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine [70].

4. The article "Zelensky in Turkey, where Erdogan is expected to insist on negotiations on ending the war with Russia" examines the visit of Ukrainian President Zelensky to Turkey and his meeting with Turkish President Erdogan in the context of the issue of ending the war with Russia [71].

5. In the article "Revelation of a human trafficking gang: 2 Russian agents under CBI scanning for sending Indians to war in Ukraine" an investigation is carried out into the activities of a gang that was involved in human trafficking, who were sent to Ukraine to participate in the conflict (see table 11 below) [72].

Table 11

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource "Press Trust of India" (India), based on the number of mentions of the conflict/support for Ukraine in journalistic materials

No	Title of the article	Topic	Cases:	
			number	%
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
1.	The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland on the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine [68]	The presence of NATO troops in Ukraine	1	16.67
2.	Britain will provide Ukraine with 10,000 drones to fight Russia [69]	Support of Ukraine from Britain	1	16.67
3.	Turkey's proposal to hold a peace summit with Russia [70]	Peace negotiations with Russia	1	16.67
4.	Zelensky is in Turkey for negotiations on ending the war with Russia [71]	Peace negotiations with Russia	2	33.33
5.	Disclosure of a human trafficking gang to send Indians to war in Ukraine [72]	Human trafficking and intervention in the conflict in eastern Ukraine	1	16.67
6.	TOTAL:	–	6	100

This content analysis is based on keywords and topics that reflect the main aspects of news articles. Keywords include names of countries (Poland, Great Britain, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine), organizations (NATO), actions (provide, conduct, disclosure), and topics (presence of troops, support, peace negotiations, human trafficking). The topic of analysis is the reactions of various countries and actions in the context of the war in Ukraine, including support, proposals for peace negotiations, and other aspects of the conflict and its impact on various aspects of life.

The unifying element is the participation of different countries and their actions in the context of the war in Ukraine. All articles describe the reactions of various countries to the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, their support for Ukraine, proposals for peace talks, or other aspects related to this conflict. Thus, the unifying element is the impact of the war in Ukraine on international politics and relations between countries.

The Press Trust of India creates an image of an external enemy created by Russia through the publication of articles that emphasize Russian actions and behavior that cause tension or threat to other countries. First of all, military actions or threats, interference with the sovereignty of other

states, as well as humanitarian aspects of conflicts, such as human trafficking. By considering such situations and events, "Press Trust of India" creates an image of Russia as a potential threatening adversary, which helps to shape the opinion about the need to respond and protect against Russia's actions.

Overall, PTI's coverage of Russia's foreign policy and its efforts to portray Russia as an external enemy underscores the importance of understanding the geopolitical landscape and relations between countries. It is important to be aware of global events and their consequences for different countries and regions.

*Features of the formation of the image of the external enemy in the publications of the news agency "National Public Information Agency" ("Agência Brasil") (Brazil)*

The "National Public Information Agency of Brazil" is engaged in forming the image of an external enemy for Russia with the help of Russian propaganda. This became known from numerous studies and analyzes conducted by experts from different countries.

According to research, Brazil's "National Public Information Agency" actively uses Russian propaganda to create an image of Russia as an external enemy. In particular, the agency uses such methods as disinformation, manipulation and distortion of facts.

One of the examples of the use of Russian propaganda by the National Public Information Agency of Brazil is the creation of an image of Ukraine as an enemy of Russia. The agency actively spreads information about the conflict in eastern Ukraine and uses it to create a negative image of Ukraine and its people.

Also, the "National Public Information Agency" of Brazil actively uses Russian propaganda to create an image of the West as an enemy of Russia. The agency spreads information about the sanctions that have been imposed against Russia and uses it to create a negative image of Western countries.

Unfortunately, such actions of the National Public Information Agency of Brazil may lead to further aggravation of relations between Russia and other countries. Therefore, it is important to detect and stop such actions to maintain international peace and stability.

Five analytical articles published on the website of the National Public Information Agency (Agência Brasil) were examined. The articles focus on different aspects of the conflict related to Russia and Ukraine, as well as on the geopolitical consequences of this conflict for different countries and regions of the world.

They are united by a common theme - geopolitical and military aspects of modern international relations. Each article examines a particular aspect of this conflict or its consequences, such as possible military action, the response of various countries, sanctions, and political positions. The unifying element is their focus on understanding and analyzing global geopolitical processes and their impact on international security and stability. The materials are a representative sample of analytical articles that will allow for objective content analysis and reveal the main trends in the methods and strategies used by Russian propaganda to create the image of the external enemy.

As part of the content analysis carried out for the specified articles from the website of the National Public Information Agency ("Agência Brasil"), the following can be noted:

1. The article "Russia Declares that it will take measures in response to Sweden's Membership in NATO" highlights Russia's reaction to Sweden's accession to NATO, which reflects the theme of geopolitical changes in Europe [57].

2. In the article "War in Ukraine and the Environment - themes of the Mural in Sao Paulo" the "relat equal sanctions against Russia" analyzes the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia in the context of the long war on the territory of Ukraine [60].

3. "The G7 foreign ministers expressed their support for Kyiv" emphasizes the support of the "Big Seven" countries of Ukraine in the context of geopolitical events [5].

This analysis shows the geopolitical relevance of the events taking place in Europe and the world, and shows the interest of the global mass media in these issues, which allows us to form Table 8 with the results of the content analysis (see Table 12 below):

In the conducted content analysis, keywords and topics were used that directly indicate relations between Russia and other countries, in particular, Sweden, Europe, Ukraine and the countries of the "Big Seven". Also, the articles noted Russia's reaction to the actions of other countries and international organizations. Thus, the topic of analysis was geopolitical relations, political conflicts and the impact of sanctions on the international problem.

Table 12

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource "National Public Information Agency" ("Agência Brasil") (Brazil), based on the number of mentions of the conflict/support for Ukraine in journalistic materials

No	Title of the article	Topic	Cases:	
			number	%
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
1.	Russia declares that it will take measures in response to Sweden's membership in NATO [57]	Russia's response to Sweden's NATO membership	2	7.69
2.	The war in Ukraine and the environment are the themes of the mural in Sao Paulo[58]	The influence of the war in Ukraine on art	9	34.62
3.	Macron does not rule out that the Europeans will introduce troops into Ukraine[59]	Macron's position on the military conflict in Ukraine	5	19.23
4.	Ukraine: war ends 2 years with failed sanctions against Russia[60]	Assessment of sanctions against Russia by Ukraine	5	19.23
5.	G7 foreign ministers expressed support for Kyiv[61]	Support of Kyiv from the foreign ministers of the G7 countries	5	19.23
6.	TOTAL:	–	26	100

"National Public Information Agency" ("Agência Brasil") forms the image of an external enemy created by Russia, based on articles analyzing the geopolitical and military aspects of its actions and reactions to world events. The article "Russia Declares that it will take measures in response to Sweden's Membership in NATO" reflects the perception of Russia as a potentially

threatening adversary in the context of changes in European geopolitics [57]. The research in the article "War in Ukraine and the Environment" reinforces the image of Russia as a state that leads to environmental problems due to its military actions [58]. The article "Macron does not rule out that the Europeans will send troops into Ukraine" focuses on the possible military intervention of European countries in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which emphasizes the threat posed by Russia to the stability of the region [59]. The analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia in the context of the long war on the territory of Ukraine in the article "Ukraine: the War Ends 2 Years with Failed Sanctions against Russia" also helps to form a negative perception of Russia as a potential threatening adversary [60]. Agência Brasil's articles create an image of Russia as a geopolitical and military enemy, which is reflected in its actions and influence on international politics and security.

*Features of the formation of the image of the external enemy  
in the publications of the information agency "Kyodo News"*

Kyodo News Agency, founded in 1945, is one of Japan's leading news-gathering and distribution media. In its work, the agency adheres to the principles of independence and objectivity, which allows it to occupy a leading position in the mass information market [63].

Important tasks of the Kyodo News agency are the collection and distribution of news from around the world, including Russia. In this regard, the agency actively studies and analyzes the Russian mass media, in particular, regarding the formation of the image of an external enemy for the Russian Federation [7].

One of the examples when the Kyodo News agency paid attention to the formation of the image of an external enemy by Russian propaganda was the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In its materials, the agency drew attention to the fact that the Russian mass media actively use the term "fascist regime" to describe the Ukrainian government, which is a clear example of forming the image of an external enemy.

Another example, when the agency "Kyodo News" paid attention to the formation of the image of an external enemy by Russian propaganda, was the conflict between Russia and Japan regarding the acquisition of the islands of Kunashiro, Shikotan, Habomai and Abashiri. In its materials, the agency noted that Russian mass media actively use the term "territories that were taken from Russia" to describe the islands, which is a clear example of forming the image of an external enemy.

Five analytical articles published on the website of the agency "Kyodo News" (Japan) are considered. They focus mainly on various aspects of the conflict in Ukraine and the reaction of the international community to this situation. All of them are united by a common topic, which includes the issue of military actions, the political and economic consequences of the conflict, as well as the role of external factors in the development of the situation in Ukraine.

The unifying element in all articles is their focus on events related to the conflict in Ukraine and its impact on the international situation. Each article examines a certain aspect of the conflict or the reaction of the international community to the events in Ukraine.

Based on the content analysis of the articles from the website "Kyodo News" (Japan), it was found that each of them contains only one case related to the conflict or support for Ukraine. The keywords "Ukraine" and "Russia" were used as a basis to determine how often the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is mentioned.

1. The article "Participation of the private sector is key to Japan's support for Ukraine" examines the importance of the involvement of the private sector in allies' support of Ukraine, which reflects the theme of Japan's support for Ukraine [63].

2. The article "The North Korean missile discovered in Ukraine used parts of European and American production" considers the use of a North Korean missile on the territory of Ukraine, which reflects the topic of security and international relations [64].

3. The article "G7 agrees to continue supporting Ukraine" examines the agreement between the G7 countries to continue supporting Ukraine, which reflects the theme of international support for Ukraine [65].

4. The article "Russia is developing an anti-satellite potential: the White House" examines the development of Russia's anti-satellite potential, which reflects the theme of Russia's military actions and strategies [66].

5. The article "The Prime Minister of Ukraine Says that Japanese Companies Can Play a Big Role in the Resumption of the War" examines the possible role of Japanese companies in the resumption of the war in Ukraine, which reflects the theme of the economic aspects of the conflict in Ukraine [67].

Thus, in all the researched materials, the general context related to the situation in Ukraine is confirmed, however, mentions of the conflict or support for Ukraine are limited to isolated cases (see Table 13 below).

Table 13

Results of content analysis of articles published on the electronic resource "Kyodo News" (Japan), based on a number of mysteries about the conflict/support of Ukraine in journalistic materials

No.	Name of the statistics	Subject	Vipadki:	
			quantity	%
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>
1.	FOCUS: The participation of the private sector is key to supporting Ukraine on the side of Japan [63]	The role of the private sector in supporting Ukraine from the side of Japan	7	53.85
2.	A Korean missile was discovered in Ukraine, violating parts of the European and American weapons[64]	Discovery of a South Korean missile in Ukraine	2	15.38
3.	G7 hopes to continue supporting Ukraine[65]	G7 decision to continue supporting Ukraine	2	15.38
4.	Russia is dismantling its anti-satellite potential: White House[66]	Development of Russia's pro-satellite potential	1	7.69
5.	The Prime Minister of Ukraine said that Japanese companies can play a great role in the new war[67]	The role of Japanese companies in the renewed war in Ukraine	1	7.69
6.	AT ONCE:	—	13	100

In this content analysis, the keywords and topics are Japan's support for Ukraine, security and international relations, international support for Ukraine, the development of Russia's military potential, and the economic aspect of the conflict in Ukraine.

Based on the analysis of the articles published on the website "Kyodo News", it is possible to determine how to form the image of Russia's external enemy in the context of the current geopolitical situation. The articles provide evidence and arguments that Russian activities in Ukraine are a threat to international security and stability. Russia is presented as the main adversary, whose actions violate international law and threaten stability in the region. The texts note


the need for the international community to strengthen support for Ukraine to resist Russian aggression. It is noted that overcoming this threat requires not only political but also economic and diplomatic support from allied countries. Thus, Kyodo News articles create an image of Russia as an external enemy and highlight the importance of international cooperation to ensure security and stability in the region.

So, the Kyodo News agency is a leading Japanese media that collects and distributes news from around the world, including Russia. In its work, the agency adheres to the principles of independence and objectivity, which allows it to occupy a leading position in the mass information market. The active work of the agency "Kyodo News" regarding the analysis of the Russian mass media allows us to identify examples of the formation of the image of an external enemy of the Russian Federation by Russian propaganda.

Analyzing the results of content analysis of articles published on various websites of news agencies, it is possible to identify different approaches to presenting the conflict in Ukraine and supporting Ukraine. In particular, Agence France Press (AFP) mainly focuses on military events and population mobilization in the context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Reuters usually covers international affairs, but some articles discuss support for Ukraine and the role of various countries in the conflict. The BBC's website focuses on military events and political developments in Ukraine, while Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) focuses on various aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, including the security threat from Russia and its election meddling in Europe. On the Xinhua website, articles usually focus on international relations, but some discuss support for Ukraine and China's position on the conflict. The Anadolu Agency website focuses on the humanitarian aspects of the conflict in Ukraine and international responses to the situation. Support for Ukraine and the international response to the conflict in Ukraine is a prominent topic on the Press Trust of India website. The Agência Brasil website focuses on various aspects of the conflict in Ukraine and support for Ukraine, including economic and political aspects. Finally, on the Kyodo News website, most of the articles focus on support for Ukraine and the international response to the conflict, as well as discussing the geopolitical aspects of the situation.

According to the results of the content analysis conducted for nine news agencies, it was found that the largest contribution to mentions of the conflict or support for Ukraine was made by the BBC (30%), Agência Brasil (26%) and Agence France Press (19%). The smallest contribution to the total number of references to the conflict/support for Ukraine is observed in DPA (3%). "Reuters" agency and "Press Trust of India" have respectively 8% and 6% of the total mentions. "Xinhua" and "Kyodo News" (Japan) are represented at the level of 14% and 13%. "Anadolu Agency" (Turkey) showed 9% in the total number of mentions (see diagram 1 below).





*Diagram 1. Distribution of references to the conflict/support for Ukraine among news agencies*

## Conclusions

Based on the analysis of the electronic resources of nine agencies of the world, it was established that Russian propaganda is an effective means of forming the image of the external enemy. It is used to create a negative attitude towards countries that do not support Russian policy and to change the geopolitical situation on the world stage. Russian propaganda uses various techniques such as disinformation, manipulation and distortion of facts to achieve its goals. However, taking into account different points of view and sources of information, we can conclude that Russian propaganda is not an objective and reliable source of information.

It was found that propaganda is a system of methods and means of influencing people's consciousness to form certain views and beliefs. Russian propaganda is a specific type of propaganda used by the Russian authorities to influence the minds of the population of Ukraine and other countries.

Russian propaganda has actively evolved since the collapse of the USSR. Starting with a relatively mild version in the early 1990s, it turned into an aggressive propaganda system after the war broke out in 2014. The truth here is that the events that have taken place in Ukraine since 2014 mark the extreme importance of the informational and psychological aspects of the conflict, especially in the hybrid war. Russia's aggression in the military-political sphere emphasized that informational influence in international relations can be used not only to achieve pragmatic goals of foreign policy but also to prepare a favourable environment for a real full-scale war. It was established that the informational and psychological influence began even before the start of

hostilities in the preparation of the Russian Federation for war. Therefore, the lack of an adequate reaction to open anti-Ukrainian propaganda serves as a basis for the destruction of the state.

The search results provide information about the mechanisms of the formation of the image of the enemy in the mass consciousness of people. Researchers study this topic using different methodologies.

In the article of the Ukrainian researcher S. Kharkavets "Psychological features of the conflict in the system of modern relations between Russians and Ukrainians" the psychological aspect of relations between Ukrainians and Russians is investigated. The author proves that Russian television plays an important role in the formation of Ukrainians as "enemies", and shows the differences in the value orientations of Russians and Ukrainians, which are the result of media propaganda, which negatively affects the mass consciousness, putting people into a state of hypnosis. This leads to the fact that a person is not able to think critically, and analyze information, and negative emotions can be excessive for him.

In the article by A. Cheberyak "Mechanism of creating a negative image of Ukraine on the pages of the Russian mass media", the manipulative nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which is formed by the Russian mass media about Ukraine, is considered using the methodology of content analysis. The author singles out two components of the image of the "enemy": external and internal. The external enemy is the USA represented by NATO and Ukraine, and the internal enemy is people who disagree or those who support Ukraine inside the country. The author defines the main mechanisms of creating the image of the "enemy": the use of the opposition "us-them"; the difference between "own" and "others"; danger from the enemy and attribution of guilt to him; symbolism and demythologizing with evil.

A. Zakharchenko's article "The Language of Enmity" examines the problem of "language of enmity" in the context of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict. The author emphasizes that the "language of enmity" can also refer to the image of the "enemy" since there is a difference between "own" and "alien", that is, enemies for the existence of the country. The author gives examples of lexemes - associations related to the image of Ukrainians from the point of view of Russians due to the influence of the Russian information space. The author identifies three levels of manifestation of "hate speech" associated with the Ukrainian-Russian conflict: soft, medium and hard.

The image of the enemy is formed by various mechanisms, including media propaganda, and can have a significant impact on mass consciousness.

As a result of the analysis of the content of the electronic resources of well-known international agencies, such as Agence France Press (France), Reuters and the BBC, it can be concluded that Russian propaganda actively uses mass media to create the image of an external enemy. Agencies not only cover events related to Russia and its foreign policy but also focus on various aspects, such as the conflict in eastern Ukraine, sanctions against Russia and terrorism.

Agence France Press often points to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, sanctions against Russia and terrorism as key topics used by Russian propaganda to create the image of an external enemy. The general summary of AFP's content analysis indicates that Russian propaganda actively uses these topics for the formation of ideology.

Reuters, as a global news agency, covers news from different parts of the world. Although the results of the analysis do not provide specific information about how Reuters covers news about Russia, the analysis of individual articles shows the agency's objectivity and critical approach to events related to Russia.

In turn, the BBC, as a large media organization, focuses on events related to Russia and actively covers the formation of the image of an external enemy by Russian propaganda. BBC articles indicate that Russia uses traditional propaganda methods to create an image of an external enemy, which indicates the need for attention to this phenomenon on the part of the international community.

Press Trust of India, the largest news agency in India, actively covers Russia's foreign policy and focuses on its attempts to create an image of an external enemy. The work also points to the importance of understanding the geopolitical landscape and relations between countries.

The National Public Information Agency of Brazil uses Russian propaganda to create a negative image of Russia and its neighbours, in particular, Ukraine and Western countries. This can lead to aggravation of relations and a threat to international stability.

Kyodo News from Japan acts as an independent and objective agency that actively analyzes the Russian mass media and reveals examples of the formation of the image of the external enemy. This shows the importance of independent journalism and objectivity in working with information.

The general conclusion from the analysis of the content of electronic resources indicates that Russian propaganda effectively uses international media to create an image of the external enemy. Such influence can have serious consequences for international relations and therefore requires attention and a critical approach to information coming from these sources.

From a scientific point of view, the research contributes to the expansion of theoretical knowledge in the field of propaganda and communications. It deepens the understanding of the mechanisms and strategies used in Russian propaganda to form the image of the external enemy, supplementing the existing theories and models of propaganda communications with new data and conclusions. An important aspect is the development of interdisciplinary research, because the work combines elements of media analysis, political science, sociology and psychology, contributing to a comprehensive approach to the study of information wars and propaganda. In addition, the development and application of different methods of analysis of propaganda materials, such as content analysis, discourse analysis, comparative analysis, quantitative analysis and social network analysis, can be used in future research as methodological tools.

The practical significance of the research lies in several key aspects. First, it contributes to increasing the media literacy of the population. The results of the study can be used to create educational programs and materials that will help people to better recognize misinformation and propaganda, reducing their influence on public opinion. Second, the findings and recommendations of the study will be useful for journalists and media analysts, helping them to recognize and expose propaganda materials, which will increase the quality and credibility of information in the media. The contribution to the development of national and international security policy is also important, as the research findings can be taken into account when forming adequate responses to information threats and ensuring stability in international relations. Finally, the results of the study will be useful to analytical centres and research organizations for conducting further research in the field of information security and advocacy, which will contribute to the deepening of scientific knowledge and the development of recommendations for practical activities.

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**Російська пропаганда як засіб формування образу зовнішнього ворога  
(на прикладі аналізу електронних ресурсів дев'яти агентств світу)**

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**Анотація**

*Метою дослідження є аналіз й узагальнення специфічних аспектів функціонування російської пропаганди як інструменту формування образу зовнішнього ворога.*

*Методи й методики, використані в нашому дослідженні, – вебмоніторинг для збору й аналізу публікацій на вебсайтах у галузі науково-технічної експертизи й інформації. Контент-аналіз дозволив нам здійснити систематичний аналіз текстів, відео, фотографій та інших матеріалів із метою ідентифікації основних тем, повідомлень, тональності, використаних слів й образів. Завдяки контент-аналізу ми визначили, які повідомлення та образи використовуються для створення образу зовнішнього ворога і як часто вони зустрічаються в пропагандистських матеріалах.*

*Методологія дослідження передбачала відбір рандомним способом сорока п'яти публікацій на сайтах дев'яти міжнародних агентств світу (по п'ять публікацій кожного з дев'яти) і подальший їхній аналіз із метою встановлення специфічних аспектів функціонування російської пропаганди як інструменту формування образу зовнішнього ворога. Серед міжнародних агентств були відібрані «Agence France Press» (Франція), «Reuters» agency» (Велика Британія), «BBC» (Велика Британія), «Deutsche Presse-Agentur» (DPA; Німеччина), «Xinhua» (Китай), «Anadolu Agency» (Туреччина), «Press Trust of India» (Індія), «Kyodo News» (Японія), «Agência Brasil» (Бразилія).*

*Результати дослідження довели, що російська пропаганда впродовж періоду, що ми аналізували, застосовувала типові стандартні й гібридні способи, технології формування.*

*Висновки. Аналіз контенту електронних ресурсів указує на те, що російська пропаганда ефективно використовує міжнародні медіа для формування образу зовнішнього ворога. Такий вплив може мати серйозні наслідки для міжнародних відносин, тому вимагає уваги та критичного підходу до інформації, що надходить із цих джерел.*


**Ключові слова:** російська пропаганда, електронні ресурси, міжнародні інформаційні агентства, образ зовнішнього ворога.





## The role of journalists in the identification of informational and psychological operations

*(in the conditions of the 3rd period of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022–2024)*

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## Introduction

To date, there is a war going on in Ukraine. Many spheres of social life have undergone great changes, but the media environment has undergone colossal changes. Our information field is «bombarded» daily by Russian «throw-ins», manipulations and provocations needed by the occupier. All this poses a great threat to Ukrainian society and influences the course of the war.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the situation with informational and psychological operations has also worsened. They have become even larger, more insidious and more complex. Although Ukrainian society has already raised the level of its media literacy, the threat level is still very high.

In addition, citizens of our country, at the stage at which the country is now, have intensified mistrust of Ukrainian journalists. However, we must understand that they, in turn, are our helpers in the media environment, not our enemies. Journalists have a leading role in working with information, so they connected with the information and psychological operation (PSYOP).

It is quite difficult to resist information and psychological operations. From 2014 to today, they have only improved. Therefore, the question of their identification is very relevant and urgent.

We believe that the study of the role of journalists in the identification of PSYOP during the war is a work that should take place in a scientific environment. We chose the informational and psychological operations of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022–2024 as the object of the study, and the role of journalists in the identification of the informational and psychological operations of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022–2024 as the subject.

The purpose of the study is to clarify the role of journalists in identifying informational and psychological operations of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022-2024.

The topic of informational and psychological operations is gaining more and more popularity among researchers, both Ukrainian and foreign. Scientists study such systems of manipulation in various aspects of their existence, analyzing the experience of distribution in many countries.

The topic of information and psychological operations was studied by the following foreign scientists: Brett Bemis (Bemis, 2011), Joseph S. Gordon (1988); Hendra Kaprisma (Kaprisma, 2020), Matthew Soules (Soules, 2015), Randy Bates and Michael Mooney (Bates, & Mooney, 2014), Joseph Mabima (Mabima, 2018), Anik Lukman Shamsul Afkar, Juriyati Sehu Mohamad (Shamsul Afkar & Sehu Mohamad, 2022), as well as Alzhbeta Kovalova (Kovalova, 2024). The above topic was also studied by Ukrainian researchers: Nataliya Shulska, Nataliya Bukina, Nataliya Adamchuk (Шульська, Букіна, Адамчук, 2023), Kateryna Granatova (2024), Kateryna Polishchuk (2023), Alla Megel and Maria Yaremchuk (Мегель, Яремчук, 2022), Oleksandr Markiv (Марків, 2018); Yury Moroz, Yulia Tverdokhlib (2016); Anton Pecherskyi (2024); Oksana Frolova (2013) and others.

There are quite a lot of studies on informational and psychological operations and they considered from different angles. However, it is worth noting that the role of journalists in the identification of PSYOPs not yet been investigated.

## Research methods and techniques

To achieve the set goals, we used the method of analyzing already existing research, close to the topic we analyzed, conducting a survey among different age categories, covering a significant number of respondents, and analyzing the results obtained. We also reviewed the advice offered by other researchers regarding the recognition of PSYOPs, summarized the data obtained and highlighted our practical advice for journalists.

With the help of the electronic unit «Google Forms», we created a questionnaire. We posted it on a personal page on Facebook and Instagram. The form stated that anyone could fill it out. It was

important for us to get responses from different age groups. All respondents who decided to fill out the questionnaire had to answer seven main questions, as well as indicate their age category, location and type of activity.

## **Results and discussion**

Information and psychological operations are weapons that stand in the same row next to assault rifles and machine guns. It strikes massively, renders the military incapacitated, and sometimes even kills.

Information and psychological operations have long become part of the life of all nations of our planet. They can have an impact on us in one way or another, using the most effective techniques. What seems scary is that it is impossible to limit their effect on ourselves, since we do not always understand that we controlled through the media space.

The concept of informational and psychological operations is not new; its use seen even during the First World War. American researcher Brett Bemis (2011) gave a clear definition: «Information-psychological operations are actions taken by an organization to reduce the enemy's morale, its effectiveness, reduce their will to fight, and ultimately force them to surrender» (Bemis, 2011). The author adds that within such operations, organizations prepare a special audio, visual or combined product or message. In addition, appropriate media selected for a specific purpose, which will be able to reach the target audience as much as possible and will have a significant effect on it (Bemis, 2011).

Our views on the definition of informational-psychological operations coincide with the article of Brett Bemis (2011), therefore we suggest starting the review of research by foreign authors from the work of the above-mentioned scientist «Preparation of informational-psychological operations: ingredients of successful informational-psychological operations» (Bemis, 2011). In our opinion, this study is quite thorough and important within the scope of the topic analyzed by us. It reveals strategies and methods of influencing audiences based on the US experience in developing information and psychological operations during the Korean War. The author analyzed three specific operations, namely, Operation Moolah, Safe Passage Slip, and Loudspeaker Call for Surrender. The researcher justified his choice of informational and psychological actions by what they were at that time. This was the first war when a group was fully formed that worked continuously in this direction (Bemis, 2011).

In general, the study of Brett Bemis (2011) covers quite extensively many aspects that are relevant to the topic we are analyzing. We consider the second part of the scientific article to be the most interesting and useful for our work, where the author gave a clear definition of the information-psychological operation and described its seven-phase process. It includes the following stages: planning; analysis of the target audience; development of a series of actions; product creation and design; internal review and approval and audience impact assessment (Bemis, 2011).

The American researcher presented material on how to formulate messages for informational and psychological operations, where he noted the importance of all four of his variables: in-depth knowledge of the target audience, information and consumer favorability. Brett Bemis (2011) further describes the evolution and future of information and psychological operations. The above-mentioned author did not miss the theory of communication in his research (Bemis, 2011).

In conclusion, Brett Bemis (2011) advises analyzing and learning from successful and unsuccessful information and psychological operations, to study the target audience in depth, to form strong messages and to choose effective means of their transmission. The author is convinced that it is necessary to increase the favorability of consumers. In his work, the researcher presented

models and matrices that, as he claims can increase the effectiveness of informational and psychological operations (Bemis, 2011).

Researcher Hendra Kaprisma (2020) made a significant contribution to the study of the topic of information and psychological operations in the article «Psychological Operations: from the Point of View of Communication, Mass Media, Propaganda and Socio-Cultural Perspective» (Kapriska, 2020). He considered informational and psychological operations from four different angles. The first section of the article is devoted to communication, which, according to the researcher, consists not only of three main elements – sender, message and recipient but also of also two additional ones – media and effect. The author also emphasized, «Initial knowledge of the field and socio-cultural conditions is the basis for determining the model, type of messages and media that are suitable for the target audience» (Kapriska, 2020).

The second section of the aforementioned article describes information-psychological operations from the point of view of mass media, where the media shown as a «conveyor» of messages in the communication space. The author emphasizes that the mass media act as a tool for those who want to spread the message to deliver the necessary information effectively, efficiently and with the ability to reach a wide audience. Also in this section, it said that it is important for the operations team to be able to create even the simplest media themselves. In conclusion, the researcher convinces that it is worth noting that the trust of the target audience in the mass media should be as high as possible, because then the level of influence will be as high as possible (Kapriska, 2020).

The next chapter of the work of Hender Kaprisma (2020) was devoted to the consideration of informational and psychological operations from the point of view of propaganda. Here, the author provided an understanding of the interpretation of propaganda by such researchers as Matthew Soules (Soules, 2015), Randy Bates and Michael Mooney (Bates, & Mooney, 2014). In summary, propaganda considered the dissemination of a certain true or false thought/idea, which should influence a certain audience and convince them to adopt a certain attitude or incline them to certain actions. It should act not only during armed conflicts but also before and after them (Kapriska, 2020).

The above section describes the idea that the best propaganda is the truth. In contrast, the worst is a lie (Kapriska, 2020). In our opinion, such a judgment somewhat destroys the Ukrainian vision, against the background of experience with Russian propaganda, but it is quite correct.

The topic of the fourth chapter of the study by Hendra Kaprisma (2020) is informational and psychological operations from the point of view of a sociocultural perspective. This subsection of the topic analyzed by us is one of the integral components for achieving the goals. In the mentioned part of the work, the author emphasizes that during the development of information and psychological operations, the sender must study in detail the knowledge of his target audience in the social, cultural and physical fields. The researcher argues his statement by the fact that the mentioned factors will shape the content and model of the message (Kapriska, 2020).

Studying the life and lifestyle of the target audience will help increase the effectiveness of information dissemination. Such knowledge reveals strengths and weaknesses. Distributed materials should be close to the target audience, as well as appropriate to its culture (Kapriska, 2020).

In the conclusion of his scientific article, Hendra Kaprisma (2020) emphasized the importance of considering informational and psychological operations through the prism of all the points of view analyzed by him. «All perspectives involve factors that influence the course of psychological operations to achieve a target against targets without the use of tools (firearms) but through 'psychological warfare' which attacks the mind and then changes the target's behaviour and mindset» – emphasizes the researcher (Kapriska, 2020).

As the next work in the proposed review, we chose the article by the Slovak researcher Alzhbeta Kovalova entitled «What are informational and psychological operations and how can they be used in hybrid warfare?» (Kovalova, 2024). This study is important within the scope of the topic analyzed by us, as it is relevant to us. In it, the author analyzes the issue we are researching based on the operation that carried out on the territory of Ukraine by the occupying country on the eve of the second anniversary of the war. Equally important, in our opinion, is that the analyzed article was published on the website of the software company ESET, which specializes in cyber security (Kovalova, 2024).

In addition to explaining the concept of an information-psychological operation, Alzhbeta Kovalova (2024) described in detail the operation «Toxonto» (as it called in ESET). The article states that Russia conducted the operation in two stages in November and at the end of December 2023. During the first wave of the analyzed information and psychological operation, e-mails sent out that there might be problems with heating, and shortages of medicine and food in the country. They tried to demoralize Ukrainians with the mentioned fact. During the second wave of the operation, attackers, posing as other citizens of our country, urged people to mutilate themselves to avoid military service (Kovalova, 2024).

Alzhbeta Kovalova (2024) stated that «ESET Research» recorded campaigns of one type of phishing, which aimed at stealing credentials of «Microsoft Office 365» (Kovalova, 2024).

In conclusion, the researcher emphasizes, «The change of battlefields, from physical to psychological, aimed at demoralizing and destabilizing communities with the help of disinformation campaigns» (Kovalova, 2024). Alzhbeta Kovalova (2024) also emphasizes that modern information and psychological operations are more insidious and sophisticated (Kovalova, 2024).

The final work of our review is the article by researcher Joseph Mabima (2018) «Social Network Sites as a Tool for Psychological Operations: A Case Study» (Mabima, 2018). This study deserves our attention, as it reveals PSYOP in the context of the popular platforms Facebook and Twitter, through which the most fake messages from Russia flow. Joseph Mabima (2018) also detailed in his research an overview of several information and psychological operations by the occupying country in the Ukrainian media space (Mabima, 2018).

In his article, the author emphasized that Russian «trolls» have existed in our information space for many years and carry out constant psychological operations designed to create discord within the state. The researcher noted the presence of bots of the aggressor country during the Euromaidan, where fake accounts aimed at supporting the small part of the Ukrainian population that was against signing the association agreement with the European Union (Mabima, 2018).

Next, Joseph Mabima (2018) presented materials with screenshots confirming that Russia often uses social networking sites in its information and psychological operations. The author described operations about the oppression of Russian-speaking people in Ukraine, about the fact that Ukrainians are the «axis» of evil in the Baltic region, and about how the annexed parts of our country become better in occupation. The study recorded «throw-ins» into our media space with slogans that the Russian Orthodox Church is the only true Christian faith, and it also refers to the smearing of our soldiers in Slovyansk (Mabima, 2018).

In the conclusion of his research, Joseph Mabima (2018) emphasizes that social networks have now become an ideal place for informational and psychological operations, where bloggers or even fake mass media can become their reinforcement. The author believes that this trend has led to Russia's active actions in not only Ukraine and the USA, but may also develop in other countries under the same scenarios. The researcher is convinced that in the era of social networks, we must focus on the psychology of decision-making (Mabima, 2018).

During the war between Russia and Ukraine, the information war reached a new level. On the part of the aggressor, a large mass of disinformation, manipulation and other methods of waging



hybrid war pour into the Ukrainian media space every day. During the two years of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian people significantly improved their knowledge in the field of information hygiene. However, we should not forget that Russian information and psychological operations have improved significantly. In this case, it is important to understand that the identification of the PSYOP is an integral part of the life of Ukrainians.

The issue of informational and psychological operations during the Russian-Ukrainian war was described by the following researchers: Наталія Шульська, Наталія Букіна, Наталія Адамчук (2023); Катерина Поліщук (2023); Алла Мегель and Марія Яремчук (2022) and others.

Important, in our opinion, research for the analyzed topic was conducted Наталія Шульська, Наталія Букіна та Наталія Адамчук (Шульська, Букіна, Адамчук, 2023). Work «Typological Markers of Information and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in the Conditions of War in the Media» (Шульська, Букіна, Адамчук, 2023) reveals all the tricks and identifiers of Russian «throw-ins» into Ukrainian social networks during a full-scale invasion. The authors single out several typical signs of PSYOP: synchronicity of publications, factual, linguistic or logical errors, and fakeness of the authors of the messages. The study also states that «Russian PSYOP often hide behind blue and yellow flags, tridents, patriotic appeals» (Шульська, Букіна, Адамчук, 2023). In the article, such misinformers are called «virtual saboteurs» (Шульська, Букіна, Адамчук, 2023).

The researchers state in their work that messages about conflicts between residents of the west and east of Ukraine are increasingly becoming a trap for Ukrainians. The fact that the residents of the occupied territories are to blame for the war coming to their homes because they spoke Russian (Шульська, Букіна, Адамчук, 2023).

At the end of her research, the author singles out three more typical signs of informational and psychological operations of Russians in the Ukrainian media space.

1. The effect of exaggerating the power of the enemy. The manipulators create the impression that Russia is winning in intelligence or has an influence on mobile communications, thereby intimidating the Ukrainian people.

2. «Call to active actions due to excessive emotional load of the message» [18]. Using lexical, visual or manipulative means, the enemy causes a strong emotional excitement, during which Ukrainians forget about critical thinking.

3. Discrediting Ukrainian official sources. Propagandists of the aggressor country speculate with the phrases «the government does not say anything», «everything is hidden from us», and «the official mass media is silent» (Шульська, Букіна, Адамчук, 2023).

In summary, the researchers stated that the Ukrainians were able to resist the first aggressive waves of disinformation with the beginning of a full-scale invasion and to develop effective tools and strategies for countering PSYOP, and most importantly, they proved that they could resist information warfare (Шульська, Букіна, Адамчук, 2023).

Within the framework of studying the identification of informational and psychological operations, we must understand that PSYOPs divided into types according to different criteria.

Олександра Марків (2018) – the author of the work «Hybrid War and Journalism. Problems of Information Security» (Марків, 2018) proposed a clear classification of PSYOP. According to her research, information and psychological operations divided into offensive and defensive. According to the purpose and direction, the author identified four types of manipulation systems: those aimed at influencing management decisions; those aimed at compromising material; those that aim to disable or damage something; designed to destabilize the economic or political situation (Марків, 2018).

The researcher stated that there are short-term, medium-term and long-term operations that last 1–2 weeks, 2–4 or more months, respectively (Марків, 2018).

For effectively counteract powerful Russian propaganda and disinformation, which have a great impact, we must clearly understand the mechanisms of information and psychological operations. Based on this, we offer to consider the results of the research of Kateryna Polishchuk (2023) on the topic: «The system of countering information and psychological operations during the full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine» (Поліщук, 2023).

In the above work, the author emphasizes that the aggressor country has developed a powerful mechanism of propaganda and influence on all spheres of life. This apparatus consists of well-honed message cases and strategies. To carry out its information and psychological operations against Ukraine, Russia most often uses the following «mouthpieces»: «social networks («YouTube», «TikTok»), foreign mass media, in particular, its channels that still operate in other countries (RT, «Sputnik»); trolls, bloggers and bots (chatbots); leaflets, free campaign newspapers; face-to-face campaigning...» (Поліщук, 2023).

Also in his research Катерина Поліщук (Поліщук, 2023) noticed that in their informational and psychological operations, Putin's propagandists often use the mirroring method, transferring their guilt to our state.

In the process of identifying PSYOP, it is important which topics Russians most often choose for propaganda. The author highlighted the main narratives, which are indicators that the audience manipulated. Such topics include stories that Ukraine is a pseudo-state and it is part of Russia. In addition, in the materials of PSYOP, it often said that Ukrainians are evil, and Russians want the best for people. News that our people are Nazis, fascists, and the like and that Ukrainians, in general, are «puppets of the West» is widespread misinformation. (Поліщук, 2023).

To avoid Russian manipulations in the Ukrainian media space in the future, we should know why some information and psychological operations were successful during a full-scale invasion. The researcher singled out three reasons.

1. Experience of the aggressor country in waging hybrid wars with other countries (Georgia, Moldova, Chechnya). Certain informational and psychological operations have already tested on other people and improved.


2. Russia has long had many large information resources, which it uses for mass «infusion» of fakes.

3. Ukraine was not economically and politically stable at the time of the full-scale invasion. Inside the state, we had many people (in particular, politicians who worked for Russia for years). Therefore, the Ukrainian people were vulnerable to manipulation (Поліщук, 2023).

Summarizing, Kateryna Polishchuk (2023) added that despite all the successes of Ukraine in countering the PSYOP of the aggressor country, the threat is still very great and we must work effectively on creating an effective mechanism that would quickly discredit the manipulations of the occupiers in the Ukrainian media space.

In our opinion, the work became an important publication for Ukrainian society during the full-scale invasion Алли Мегель та Марії Яремчук (2022) under the name «Enemy PSYOP. How to change and resist?» (Мегель, Яремчук, 2022) Within the framework of the topic we have considered, we will analyze an example of the technology for conducting informational and psychological operations.

According to the authors, Russia can use various tools to integrate into our media field: fakes, interpretations or manipulations. However, the principle of influence on mass consciousness must be the same. Алла Мегель and Марія Яремчук (2022) showed their opinion in a diagram (see Figure 1 below).



*Fig. 1 The principle of informational influence of PSYOP*

According to the diagram in Fig. 1, narratives formed from messages, and those in turn are formed from fakes, interpretations and manipulations. Next, the researchers considered such a theory using real examples. As examples of fakes, interpretations, or manipulations, the authors presented messages such as «everyone in the Armed Forces abuses alcohol», «fighters on the front line fight only with assault rifles and rifles» and «the Ukrainian army is naked, bareheaded, and hungry» (Мегель, Яремчук, 2022). The message that our army is weak and incapable of anything traced in such information leaks. This is where the narrative follows that: «Ukraine is an unsustainable state» (Мегель, Яремчук, 2022).

Such an example Алла Мегель та Марія Яремчук (2022) were able to convey that even the smallest Russian fakes are part of systemic actions in the informational and psychological operation.

Among the large flow of messages about what PSYOP is, how to counter it and their examples, it is still important to highlight systematic instructions on identifying such manipulations by the aggressor country. Just such an article published on the «Media of Great Histories» portal by their authors, where information warfare specialist Dmytro Zolotukhin identified five signs of informational and psychological information (Медіа Великих Історій..., 2022).

1. The goal of any informational and psychological operation is to change the behaviour of a person or a group of people.

2. Someone has a concrete benefit from the fact that the behaviour of a large number of people will change.

3. It is important to check the source of the message. «And if that source is anonymous, people will think that the person concerned has a motive to hide their benefit» (Медіа Великих Історій..., 2022).

4. If certain information creates an involuntary effect of repetition, and the reason for this is not social significance – you should think and understand that there is a resource for conducting an operation.

5. The information cannot confirmed, there is no objective evidence that it is true (Медіа Великих Історій..., 2022).


In conclusion, it can be understood that when receiving any message that evokes strong emotions, does not have a clear primary source and has a feeling of intrusiveness, it is worth «turning on» critical thinking and thinking about who benefits from such intrusiveness.

According to the methodology of our practical research, we conducted a survey consisting of seven questions. We received 100 completed forms, the results of which will describe below.

Table 1.  
The results of respondents' answers to question 1.

<i>Do you know what such informational and psychological operation (PSYOP)?</i>	
Options answers	%
«Yes»	63
«No»	35
«Partly»	2
TOGETHER	100

Cyclogram 1.  
The results answers respondents to question 1.



The survey was attended by 46 respondents (46%) aged 18 to 24, 29 (29%) from 25 to 44, 19 (19%) from 45 to 60, and 6 (6%) who are over 60. 88 people (88%) of all respondents are in Ukraine, and the remaining 12 (12%) are outside Ukraine. The majority, namely 65 people (65%) are working, 25 people (25%) are studying and 10 people (10%) are not working.

In the first question, we asked the respondents «Do you know what information-psychological operation (PSYOP) is?»

63 people (63%) chose the answer «yes», and 35 people (35%) – «partially». Another 2 persons (2%) do not know this term (see table 1 below).

The next question was «How do you know the meaning of the above term? »

The largest part of respondents, namely 32 people (32%), marked the answer option «read in an article on a news site» 30 people (30%) heard about information and psychological operations on radio or television. Another 27 respondents answered: «read on Google». The remaining 11 people (11%) offered their option in the «Other» column. Among the answers received were: «professionally related to teaching the specifics of PSYOP in journalistic activities»; «learned in

pairs at the university»; «studied at the university»; «I study journalism and study this terminology»; «learned from my daughter»; «from various sources»; «from a friend who studies journalism»; «in the book»; «met at work»; «the book «Political Science»; «video of military analysts» (see table 2 below).


Table 2.

The results of the answers respondents to question 2.

<i>«How do you know? Value the term above?»</i>	
Options answers	%
«Read in the article news site»	32
«I heard it on television or on the radio»	30
«Read it on Google»	27
«Other»	11
TOGETHER	100

Cyclogram 2.

Results of respondents' answers to question 2  
"How do you know aforementioned term?"




In the third question, we asked our respondents «Did you encounter an information and psychological operation (PSYOP) from Russia during the full-scale invasion?».

An unequivocal majority, namely 73 people (73%), answered «Yes». The other 21 respondents (21%) could not say whether they had encountered PSYOP from Russia during the full-scale invasion. And another 6 respondents (6%) left a mark next to the answer option «no» (see Table 3 below).

Table 3.  
The results answer respondents to question 3.

«Did you encounter an information and psychological operation (PSYOP) from Russia during the full-scale invasion? «	
Options answers	%
«Yes»	73
«I can't say for sure»	21
«No»	6
TOGETHER	100




The fourth question was optional for everyone. Those people who faced the PSYOP during the full-scale invasion gave the answer. There are 93 such respondents. The question was: «What helped you recognize the informational and psychological operation?».

54 people (58.1%) answered, «Own critical thinking». Another 22 respondents (23.7%) left a mark next to the option «warning about the possibility of an operation on television/radio/in a newspaper/on a news site.» Another 15 people (16.1%) were helped recognize the information and psychological operation of media literacy skills. 2 respondents (2.2%) chose the option «Other» wrote: «Own critical thinking and media literacy skills» and «did not collide» (see Table 4 below).

Table 4.  
The result answers respondents to question 4 «What helped you recognize informational and psychological operation?»

«What helped you recognize informational and psychological operation?»	
Options answers	%
«Own critical thinking»	58.1
«Warning about the possibility of an operation on television/radio/in a newspaper/on a news site »	23.7
«Media literacy skills»	16.1
«Other»	2.2
TOGETHER	100

Table 4.  
The result answers respondents to question 4 «What helped you recognize informational and psychological operation?»




The fifth question was for all 100 respondents and sounded like this: «In your opinion, what role do journalists play in recognising PSYOP during the war?»

20 respondents (20%) chose «the role of an informant about a possible threat». Another 9 people (9%) believe that journalists perform «the role of a defender who does not allow PSYOP into our media space». Another 5 respondents (5%) marked the answer «the role of a mentor who teaches us to identify them». However, the majority, namely 64 respondents (64%), chose the «all of the above» option. 2 people decided to offer their answer next to the «Other» mark and wrote: «Is part of the PSYOP scheme» and «the role of an informant about a possible threat, the role of a mentor who teaches them to identify» (see table 5 below).

Table 5.  
The result answers respondents in question 5 «In your opinion, what is the role in the recognition of PSYOP during the war playback journalists? »

«In your opinion, what is the role in recognising PSYOP during the war play back journalists?»	
Options answers	%
«Everything listed»	64
«The role of the informant about the possible threat»	20
«The role of a defender who does not allow PSYOP into our media space»	9
«The role of the mentor, who teaches us to identify them»	5
«Other»	2
TOGETHER	100

Table 5.  
The result answers respondents in question 5 «In your opinion, what is the role in the recognition of PSYOP during the war playback journalists?»



The sixth question to the people we interviewed was «Do you think journalists can carry out PSYOP? »


88 respondents (88%) answered, «Can». The other 10 people (10%) can't answer. 2 respondents (2%) believe that journalists cannot carry out PSYOP (see table 6 below).



Table 6.  
The results answers respondents in question 6  
«Do you think journalists can carry out PSYOP?»

«Do you think journalists can carry out PSYOP?»	
Options answers	%
«Can»	88
«I can't answer»	10
«Can't»	2
TOGETHER	100

Table 6.  
The results answers respondents in question 6  
«Do you think journalists can carry out PSYOP?»




In the final question, we asked respondents to leave advice to journalists so that they could better recognize informational and psychological operations.

We received 83 answers from our respondents to the above question. We decided to group all the tips since most of them repeated. Therefore, we got 7 conditional answers-categories (see Table 7 below).

Table 7.  
The results answers respondents in question 7  
«What can you advise journalists to so that they can better recognize PSYOP»

No s/p	« What can you advise to journalists in order to that they could do better recognize PSYOP?»	
	Options answers	%
1.	Improve / use skills media literacy	6
2.	Check sources of information	28
3.	Develop / use critical thinking	12
4.	Learn / explore PSYOP topic	8
5.	Be alert	4
6.	Other	24
7.	The most interesting and the most meaningful , on our opinion, answers	18
8.	TOGETHER	100

Table 7.  
The results answers respondents in question 7  
«What can you advise journalists to so that they  
can better recognize PSYOP»



We included the advice of five people (6%) in the first group. The largest number of respondents, namely 23 people (28%), believes that journalists need to check the sources of information well to recognize the information-psychological operation. We classified another 10 people (12%) into the third category. In addition, 7 respondents (8%) believe journalists should constantly learn the topic of PSYOP. 3 respondents (4%) wrote that it is enough to be vigilant to

recognize Russian «throwbacks». In the «Other» category, we included all answers that do not fit into any of the groups. 20 respondents (24%) received advice from her. The answers of the interviewees were as follows:

- «View the list of channels coordinated by Russia (list from the Center for Countering Disinformation)»;
- «Don't trust unofficial Telegram channels, take a «media literacy» course, sign up for fact-checking initiatives»;
- «To act as an informant»;
- «Include critical thinking and do not succumb to temptations (money, career...)»;
- «To be yourself, remember why you are doing it and go to the end»;
- «To be competent and honest in all matters»;
- «Tell the truth»;
- «To be a true patriot of Ukraine»;
- «Receive information from various sources, check it many times, and have intuition, and not to write false titles that do not reflect the content of the text»;
- «Be guided by verified sources. Don't write anything for the sake of likes!»;
- «Pay attention to the details near the location of the PSYOP shooting, look for the primary source»;
- «Turn on the brains»;
- «If you don't see it, don't think it up»;
- «It is important to adhere to professional (journalistic) ethical principles for identifying PSYOP»;
- «To study deeply psychology and types of thinking»;
- «Be patient»;
- «Not to allow negative information about Ukraine into the media space...»;
- «Strength and patience to distinguish between lies and truth»;
- «Good luck»;
- «Only real facts».

We also highlighted 15, in our opinion, specific answers (18%):

- «Analyze all sources of information and news through the lens of your critical thinking. To study human psychology»;
- «Analysis of the situation, trust only the first source of information, double-check information and do not chase sensation»;
- «To think critically, not succumb to PSYOP, also read and learn information about how to properly react and analyze this or that attack by the aggressor. The most important thing is not to spread such information, but on the contrary to tell that this or that information is unreliable and can be considered PSYOP so that other people know about it and do not succumb to propaganda»;
- «Check information in at least three sources. Receive information only from authorized persons. Avoid using techniques that give overload in the emotional colour of information»;
- «Do not use one, or even 10 sources of information. Analyze the «News» of the enemy and compare them with reality. And convey information as it is, without exaggeration and vice versa, even if the conditional situation is not on our side»;
- «First of all, check information by available means, do not be afraid and do not be ashamed to ask for help and advice from colleagues. Seek confirmation or refutation from competent authorities, special services, etc. And to think critically»;
- «At this time, give more priority to studying PSYOP itself, analyze Russia's actions, improve skills in this regard and inform society more about PSYOP»;
- «Work on yourself, constantly improve, develop, learn new information, learn from other people's experience»;

- «Think critically, ask yourself questions about who could benefit or benefit from it and why, be aware of politics and geopolitics, be able to analyze and have a good memory»;
- «Act by the rules of journalistic ethics. Do not try to «sell» information by manipulating headlines or texts that are sharp for society, and in no case do not distribute information from unverified sources. Also, do not spread information that could discredit the Armed Forces in any way»;
- «Study examples of PSYOPs and their methods. Check sources of information Watch for patterns and try to recognize them. Consult with experts. Maintain systematic documentation of PSYOP cases»;
- «Not to present information to society as if tomorrow is the end of the world, thereby provoking panic in all aspects (for example, there will be no sugar, salt, light, water, eggs, etc.)»;
- «It is good to check sources of information, and always focus on official authorities (and not even on popular media). Always be aware of the latest events, because this is how you can critically analyze information and expose PSYOP. Pay attention to the presentation of information (headline, photo, source, possible words of manipulation in the text)»;
- «Learning to detect the fact of the beginning of the PSYOP to have time to prepare for a real conflict.» For this, it is necessary to monitor the information space to detect an information operation»;
- «Communication with society is important for journalists to understand the psychological state of people».

Summing up, we can say that most people know what an informational and psychological operation is. However, opinions about where the interviewees learned the meaning of this term divided: some read it in an article on a news website, others heard it on the radio or television, some learned from Google, and some gave their versions.

A large proportion of people have already had time to face the PSYOP during the full-scale invasion of Russia on the territory of Ukraine. A small part of the respondents confidently testified that they had no contact with such manipulation systems from the aggressor country. There are people who cannot accurately answer the question. They are indicates people's lack of confidence in the ability to identify informational and psychological operations.

The opinions of the interviewees who encountered PSYOP divided on what helped them to recognize Russian propaganda. Most people guided by criticality when determining an informational and psychological operation. This shows that for more than 2 years of a full-scale invasion, people have learned to process the information presented and be guided by logic, not emotions. We also recorded that a little less than ¼ of the people we interviewed identified the PSYOP after being warned about the possibility of an operation on television/radio/in a newspaper/on a news website. Such indicators show that journalists have become our defenders or helpers in the media environment and play an important role in recognizing Russian propaganda. Many respondents use media literacy skills to identify informational and psychological operations.

Almost all the people we interviewed agreed with the options offered to us regarding the role that journalists can play in the recognition of PSYOP. We recorded that the majority of people who took part in our research believe that people who work on radio, television, in a newspaper, or on a news website can act as informants about a possible threat, and defenders who prevent PSYOP in our media space, and even mentors who teach them to identify. One respondent believes the journalist may be part of a Russian propaganda scheme. Such a statement may indicate distrust of Ukrainian publicists.

Almost all of the people we interviewed believe that journalists can carry out PSYOP. Only two people out of a hundred are convinced that they cannot. However, there were also those respondents who could not accurately answer the question.

Analyzing the advice of the respondents in the last question of our questionnaire, we can say that most people gave important hints about which journalists are better at recognizing informational and psychological operations. In their answers, the interviewees put the greatest emphasis on the importance of checking any information. We also noted that many respondents advise using media literacy skills and critical thinking when processing messages. Some interviewees are convinced that vigilance and desire to study the topic of PSYOP is an important aspect of the work of journalists.

Looking at the answers that we assigned to the «Other» category, we can assume that some Ukrainians do not completely trust journalists, so they are advised to present only dry, real facts, not to make up anything, not to write «false headlines» and «not to give in to temptations (monetary, career...)».

Comment «Don't write anything for the sake of likes!» led us to think that among Ukrainians there are also those who do not completely distinguish professional journalistic publications from news posts on social networks.

In the answers, which we classified as the most interesting and meaningful, in our opinion, we followed a series of tips about the importance of taking into account other people's experiences, checking information, taking into account the rules of journalistic ethics, early detection of the beginning of an operation and studying human psychology. The respondents also noted that it is worth paying attention to information about the Armed Forces and honestly talking about the situation in the country.

Russian propaganda has been actively trying to interfere in the Ukrainian media space for a very long time. PSYOP performers are increasingly inventing new schemes for spreading their narratives through any available channels of influence on the mass consciousness. Since 2014, Russian bots have even more actively begun to deploy entire informational and psychological operations to achieve the desired reaction inside Ukraine. Every year, such systematic interventions of the aggressor country in our information environment become more and more powerful and influential.

To date, when two years have already passed since the full-scale invasion of Russia, we can state that information and psychological operations are very good at manipulating the emotional state of Ukrainian society. Moreover, although the people of our country have already acquired some media literacy skills during the war, the PSYOP of the aggressor countries are also not standing still, but are only improving every day.

Based on the survey we conducted above, we can state that journalists play an important role in helping society identify Russia's information and psychological operations, especially during a full-scale invasion. False information negatively affects the situation in the country. Access to it should be limited. Information space specialists should know PSYOP and be able to recognize them quickly. For this purpose, we highlight several practical recommendations for journalists regarding informational and psychological operations.

Our survey showed that almost all respondents mentioned checking information and finding sources in their advice to media workers. In our opinion, this is the first and most important recommendation for journalists.

In the modern media space of Ukraine, the competition between mass media is quite high. Everyone wants to publish sensational material and be the first. It is necessary to check the message when the information field of our countries constantly exposed to bots.

Finding the source is the most important thing when preparing material for mass media. It is unacceptable for professional journalists to broadcast publish or even hint at information that a media worker has heard or read somewhere, and it is impossible to find confirmation of this.

To help Ukrainian society and journalists in particular, the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, even before the full-scale invasion of Russia, the Counter-

Disinformation Center was established. According to the free online encyclopedia «Wikipedia», it «ensures the implementation of measures to counter current and projected threats to Ukraine's national security and national interests in the information sphere, ensuring Ukraine's information security, identifying and countering disinformation, effectively countering propaganda, destructive informational influences and campaigns, preventing attempts to manipulate public opinion» (Wikimedia project participants, 2024). In addition, its specialists developed a manual for countering disinformation, which analyzed the techniques and tools of influence with the help of information enemy resources and already worked out cases of the Russian Federation.

The next important recommendation for journalists regarding the recognition of PSYOP is to study the psychology of the Ukrainian audience and people in general. Nowadays, it is difficult to work in the field of creating media content without knowing how people will react to it. In our opinion, at a time when the moral state of society is difficult due to constant negativity and pressure, journalists need to control both their emotions and those that arise in people after reading certain material. Since the main tool of Russian propagandists in waging a hybrid war is the manipulation of citizens' consciousness, media workers need to understand what emotions specific information carries.

Knowledge of the working scheme of human psychology will allow you to understand by what means it can influence and managed.

In addition, a very effective life hack when identifying informational and psychological operations by a journalist is to control one's primary emotions and thoughts when reading a message. In this way, you can catch yourself, before analyzing the information, on what a consumer who not guided by critical thinking can think, or on violent emotions that propagandists want to get.

Monitoring the current situation in Russia and its media space is also important in the identification by journalists PSYOP. This will make it possible to control the situation and follow the chain of disinformation leakage or prevent the operation.

A final practical recommendation for journalists to identify information-psychological operations is to ask you the following questions when receiving a report that cannot be verified.

1. What did I feel when I first read the information?
2. Were there sharply positive or negative emotions from what you read?
3. Does it motivate me to take specific actions?
4. Does the distribution of such information violate any ethical values or the Law of Ukraine on the dissemination of messages in times of war?
5. Did I not notice a similar manipulation of my consciousness during contact with informational and psychological operations that have already taken place on the territory of Ukraine?

Summing up, it is worth noting that media workers must always adhere to journalistic standards and rules for the dissemination of information during wartime, be comprehensively informed, control all, their perceptions of messages and study the topic of PSYOP.

## **Conclusions**

We analyzed Ukrainian and foreign works that studied PSYOP in various aspects of their implementation. Thanks to this, we were an overview of already performed manipulations, to highlight five signs of informational and psychological operations and the principle of their implementation.

Using the analysis and generalization of knowledge from the theoretical part, we created an effective online survey, in which 100 respondents took part. From its results, we learned that most people know what PSYOP is. They see them increasing in our media space with the arrival of a full-scale invasion. Journalists also played a leading role in the identification of informational and

psychological operations for a significant number of interviewees. Media workers acted as teachers in recognizing Russian manipulations, informants about the possible threat of Russian propaganda penetrating our space, and defenders who did not allow provocations to be «thrown» at the aggressor country. However, quite a large number of people noted that journalists themselves can a part of PSYOP.

At the end of the survey, respondents gave effective advice to media workers so that they could better identify informational and psychological operations.

Summarizing, we have collected the most effective practical recommendations for journalists.

We found out the role of journalists in the identification of informational and psychological operations of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022-2024.

The topic described by us is quite acute and relevant, and its coverage is socially important for Ukraine. This work is a significant contribution both to the development of the PSYOP topic and to helping the citizens of our country. However, unfortunately, the war continues, information and psychological operations are only being improved, so their research will be relevant for a long time for all countries of the world.

### Statement

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#### Conflict of interest

There is no conflict of interest.

#### Ethics

The material presented in this article meets all the points and requirements put forward by the Ethics Commission of the Editorial and Publishing Department of the public organization «Scientific and Educational Center «SUCCESSFUL».

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**Роль журналістів у ідентифікації інформаційно-психологічних операцій  
(в умовах 3-го періоду російсько-української війни 2022–2024 років)**

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У статті ми досліджуємо роль журналістів у ідентифікації інформаційно-психологічних операцій (ІПСО) російсько-української війни 2022–2024 років. Використовували метод аналізу реакцій 100 респондентів різних вікових категорій. Ми переглянули поради інших дослідників щодо ідентифікації ІПСО, узагальнили отримані дані та висвітлили наші практичні поради для журналістів. Методологія дослідження передбачала створення анкети за допомогою програмного забезпечення «Google Форми». Ми розмістили анкету на особистих сторінках у мережі «Фейсбук» і мережі «Інстаграм» і попросили респондентів заповнити анкету й відповісти на 7 запитань. Результати опитування відображено в представлених таблицях і циклограмах.

Відповідно до результатів опитування ми виділили 5 ознак інформаційно-психологічних операцій і принципи їхнього проведення. Ми дізналися, що респонденти мають уявлення про ІПСО й зафіксували зростання кількості респондентів в українському медіапросторі з початком повномасштабного вторгнення Російської Федерації в Україну. Провідну роль у виявленні інформаційно-психологічних операцій відіграли журналісти. Працівники медіа є вчителями у виявленні російських маніпуляцій, інформаторами про можливу загрозу проникнення російської пропаганди в інформаційний простір.

Вважаємо, що інформаційно-психологічні операції вдосконалюються в умовах російсько-української війни, тому їхнє дослідження залишається актуальним. На нашу думку, оскільки російсько-українська війна триває, а разом із нею вдосконалюються інформаційно-психологічні операції, їхнє дослідження буде актуальним ще довго.

**Ключові слова:** роль журналістів, російсько-українська війна, інформаційно-психологічні операції, ідентифікація.



# **SOCIAL COMMUNICATIONS IN MENEEDGMENT**


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## **СОЦІАЛЬНІ КОМУНІКАЦІЇ В УПРАВЛІННІ**





## Specifics of motivation for civil servants in Ukraine and recommendations for increasing their motivation

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Hanna Kholod,</b>  <i>candidate of philological sciences,</i>  <i>E-mail: kholodanna@ukr.net</i>  <a href="https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2479-9721">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2479-9721</a>  <i>SEO of the NGO «Scientific and Educational Center «Successful»,</i>  <i>Professor of the Department of Journalism</i>  <i>Educational and Scientific Institute</i>  <i>Psychology and Social Sciences of</i>  <i>Interregional Academy of Personnel</i>  <i>Management,</i>  <i>Frometivska St., 2, Kyiv,</i>  <i>Ukraine, 03118</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Abstract</b></p> <p><i>The article aims to highlight the specifics of civil servants' motivation in Ukraine and formulate recommendations for increasing their motivation. The research used analysis, synthesis, generalization, comparative, and descriptive methods.</i></p> <p><i>To achieve the goal, the Ukrainian regulatory framework related to the civil service, modern Ukrainian realities, and Ukrainian and foreign articles that covered the topic of "motivation of civil servants" were analyzed, and recommendations were proposed for increasing the motivation of civil servants.</i></p> <p><i>The results of the study make it possible to state the insufficient material motivation of Ukrainian civil servants in the modern realities of martial law and the intensification of various types of crises, including the economic crisis. Given this, to avoid a personnel crisis in the civil service, attention should be paid to the intensification of labour, status, and incentive motivation. The head of the civil service must create comfortable conditions for the work and self-development of civil servants, take care of a healthy psychological atmosphere in the team, organize daily meditative practices developed by specialists and implemented with the consent of the team, ensure a democratic style of communication, emphasizing the value of each employee, organize systematic surveys to determine the level of motivation of civil servants and build a motivation trajectory for each, tracking the emergence of threats of professional burnout and making adjustments to neutralize these threats. Systemic changes should be carried out at the state level to increase the trust of Ukrainian society in state authorities, which is also an important motivational factor for civil servants.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Citation:</b>            Kholod, H. (2024).            Specifics of motivation for civil servants in Ukraine and recommendations for increasing their motivation. <i>Social Communications: Theory and Practice</i>, 16 (2).            DOI: 10.51423/2524-0471-2024-16-2-2            © Kholod, H. (2024).</p> <p style="text-align: center;">            Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)</p>	
<p>Submitted to the editor – 21.11.2024            Review 1 – 17.12.2024            Review 2 – 27.12.2024            Accepted for printing – 10.01.2025</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Keywords:</b></p> <p>civil servants, motivation, types of motivation, recommendations.</p>	

## Вступ

Актуальність висвітлення теми «Специфіка мотивації державних службовців в Україні й рекомендації щодо підвищення їхньої мотивації» зумовлена необхідністю висвітлити фактори, що мотивують державних службовців якісно виконувати свої обов'язки. Це допоможе покращити якість управління та надання державних послуг, що важливо для ефективного функціонування держави. Ознайомлення з науковими роботами дослідників щодо вищезазначеної теми дозволить з'ясувати стан її висвітлення.

Н. Ф. Артеменко в статті «Особливості мотивації персоналу у сфері державної служби» (Артеменко, 2016) проаналізував різні визначення терміна «мотивація», запропонував класифікацію видів мотивації, детально висвітлив кожен вид, визначив проблеми мотивації державних службовців станом на 2016 рік тощо.

У статті «Мотивація державної служби в Україні» (Жулавський, Гордієнко, Малько, 2021) А. Ю. Жулавський, В. П. Гордієнко, Н. О. Малько аналізують різні види мотивації державних службовців.

У своїй статті «Мотивація трудової діяльності державних службовців: вітчизняний та світовий досвід» (Бондар, 2006) В. Д. Бондар висвітлив досвід Польщі, Великобританії, Сінгапуру.

У статті «Мотиваційні аспекти діяльності державних службовців» (Ярмистий, н.д.) М. В. Ярмистий подав результати опитування державних службовців щодо мотивації й презентував динаміку мотивації, детерміновану стажем роботи на державній службі.

У статті А. Ritz, G. Brewer і О. Neumann «Мотивація державної служби: систематичний огляд літератури та прогноз» (Ritz, Brewer, Neumann, 2016) узагальнено опубліковану за останні 25 років літературу, у якій висвітлювалася тема мотивації державних службовців, описано методику відбору літератури для опрацювання.

У статті J. Colt і J. Piatak «Мотивація державної служби та довіра до уряду: рівня штату й місцевому рівні в США» (Colt, & Piatak, 2023) констатовано зниження рівня довіри громадян США до уряду, а також досліджено взаємозв'язок між PSM (шкала вимірювання мотивації до державної служби) і довірою до федерального, штатного, місцевого рівнів влади.

У статті «Мотивація державної служби, просоціальна поведінка та кар'єрні амбіції» (Piatak, н.д.) J. Piatak намагається з'ясувати, чи пов'язано PSM із просоціальною поведінкою, аналізує результати онлайн-опитування 122 здобувачів вищої освіти з програм «Магістр державного управління», «Магістр державної політики». Аналізуючи статті своїх колег, учений зробив акцент на їхніх висновках щодо діяльності державних службовців, зокрема їхньої схильності до нормативної поведінки, волонтерської діяльності, благодійності.

Ознайомлення зі змістом закордонних джерел дозволило нам виявити важливу тенденцію: науковці активно проводять опитування здобувачів вищої освіти – майбутніх державних службовців, щоб з'ясувати мотивацію їхнього навчання за обраною спеціальністю.

Мета статті – висвітлити специфіку мотивації державних службовців в Україні й сформулювати рекомендації для підвищення їхньої мотивації. Об'єкт статті – мотивація державних службовців в Україні й рекомендації для підвищення їхньої мотивації. Предметом статті є специфіка мотивації державних службовців в Україні й рекомендації для підвищення їхньої мотивації.

### **Методи та методика дослідження**

Під час дослідження було використано методи аналізу, синтезу, узагальнення, порівняльний, описовий методи. Метод аналізу використано для опрацювання української законодавчої бази, наукових статей, у яких ідеться про мотивацію до державної служби, для розгляду різних аспектів мотивації державних службовців. Метод синтезу дозволив об'єднати рекомендації для підвищення мотивації державних службовців, створити цілісну картину мотивувальних чинників. За допомогою узагальнення сформульовано висновки. Порівняльний метод дозволив з'ясувати специфіку мотивації державних службовців в Україні завдяки проведеним паралелям із практикою мотивації державних службовців за кордоном. Описовий метод допоміг зафіксувати картину сучасної мотиваційної ситуації серед держслужбовців в Україні, фактори, що впливають на їхню мотивацію.

Для досягнення поставленої мети було проаналізовано українську нормативно-правову базу, пов'язану з державною службою, сучасні українські реалії, українські та закордонні статті, де було висвітлено тему «мотивація державних службовців», і запропоновано рекомендації для підвищення мотивації державних службовців.

### **Результати й обговорення**

За твердженням J. Perry і L. Wise, мотивація до державної служби – це «індивідуальна схильність реагувати на мотиви, які переважно або унікально притаманні державним закладам» (Perry, Wise, 1990). R. Palma й E. Sepe вважають мотивацію державної служби загальною орієнтацією людей на надання людям послуг для загального блага суспільства (Palma, Sepe, 2017). На нашу думку, мотивація держслужбовця – це комплекс матеріальних і нематеріальних стимулів, що спонукають його до якісного й ефективного виконання посадових обов'язків.

У статті J. S. Piatak «Мотивація до державної служби, просоціальна поведінка та кар'єрні амбіції» (Piatak, н.д.) є інформація щодо мотивації здобувачів вищої освіти в Китаї, Малазії, США бути на державній службі. Це альтруїзм, а також пільги й заробітна плата. Крім того, майбутні державні службовці згадують про можливість інтелектуально розвиватися, робити свій внесок, про перспективи роботи в уряді. Прикметним є те, що за кордоном для вимірювання мотивації до державної служби використовують шкалу (PSM), створену J. Perry. Вищезазначений учений у своєму опитувальнику на 40 пунктів робить акцент на шести аспектах. Зокрема, ідеться про «привабливість для формування державної політики, відданість суспільним інтересам, громадянський обов'язок, соціальну справедливість, самопожертву та співчуття» (Perry, 1996).

На нашу думку, важливо знати мотивацію як потенційних, так і реальних державних службовців, щоб забезпечити державу фахівцями, які будуть ефективно працювати. Саме тому треба активно впроваджувати систематичні опитування, мета яких – з'ясування рівня мотивації як випускників, так і державних службовців до державної служби. Такі систематичні опитування дадуть змогу керівникові відстежити динаміку рівня мотивації державного службовця, адже мотивація потенційного державного службовця, тобто випускника, і цієї ж людини, яка працює державним службовцем деякий час, може бути різною.

Опитування, які 2022 року, 2023 року проводило Національне агентство України з питань державної служби, були орієнтовані на з'ясування таких питань: «особливості організації роботи державних службовців; зміни навантаження, функціоналу та продуктивності; оплата праці; налагодження комунікації та взаємодії у державному органі;

самопочуття під час роботи в умовах воєнного стану; мотивація продовжувати працювати на державній службі; потреба в інформаційно-методологічній підтримці з боку НАДС» (Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2022: 3; Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2023: 3). Варто зазначити, що мотивацію державних службовців у цих опитуваннях з'ясували за допомогою визначення «рівня згоди респондентів з твердженням “Я щасливий (-а), що я державний службовець”» (Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2022: 33; Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2023: 30).

На нашу думку, вищезазначене формулювання не є найкращим способом для визначення мотивації державних службовців, оскільки не дає змоги з'ясувати, які чинники впливають на мотивацію державного службовця. Некоректним, на нашу думку, є ототожнення щастя й мотивації до державної служби, оскільки державний службовець може бути щасливим, однак це не завжди свідчить про мотивацію до праці. Крім того, щастя як емоційний стан залежить від багатьох факторів, а не лише від професійної діяльності. Державний службовець може відчувати задоволення від роботи, але це не означає, що він мотиваційно налаштований на досягнення високих результатів. З огляду на результати опитувань Національного агентства України з питань державної служби, зокрема показники зниження («41% респондентів зазначили, що вони щасливі бути державними службовцями [...]». У 2022 році кількість респондентів, які були щасливі бути державними службовцями складала 59% (без урахування тих, хто вважав себе частково щасливими)» (Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2023: 30–31) мотивації державних службовців на 18% у 2023 році, Національному агентству України з питань державної служби треба розробити опитування, метою якого повинно бути з'ясування чинників зниження, підвищення мотивації державних службовців, а також на основі результатів опитування сформулювати рекомендації, орієнтовані на підвищення мотивації державних службовців, із конкретними механізмами реалізації рекомендацій. Незважаючи на фіксацію в результатах опитування за 2023 рік проблеми зниження мотивації державних службовців, у рекомендаціях немає згадки щодо покращення вищезазначеної ситуації.

Н. Ф. Артеменко запропонував класифікацію видів мотивації: «за основними групами потреб (матеріальна, трудова, статусна), за використаними способами (нормативна, примусова, стимулююча), за джерелами виникнення (внутрішня, зовнішня), за напрямом досягнення цілі (позитивна, негативна)» (Артеменко, 2016: 40). У таблицях 1–4 узагальнено інформацію щодо визначень видів мотивації, переосмислених Г. Я. Холод – автором цієї статті.

Таблиця 1 Мотивація за основними групами потреб

Матеріальна	Трудова	Статусна
Матеріальна мотивація – це система заохочення працівників у формі різних матеріальних благ, які стимулюють краще виконання своїх обов'язків.	Трудова мотивація – це процес застосування різних методів і засобів для стимулювання персоналу до ефективної та якісної роботи.	Статусна мотивація – це один із видів соціально-психологічної мотивації людини, пов'язаний із прагненням досягти певного соціального статусу й підтримувати його.
Заробітна плата, премії,	Організація трудового	Прагнення вищих посад,

соціальні пакети, пенсійне забезпечення, квартирні гроші, доплати на сім'ю тощо.	процесу, умови, режим роботи, змістовність і корисність праці, самореалізація державного службовця, професійний розвиток, гнучкий графік роботи, дистанційний або змішаний формат роботи.	визнання й поваги з боку колег.
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Таблиця 2 Мотивація за використаними способами

Нормативна	Примусова	Стимулювальна
Нормативна мотивація – це вид соціально-психологічної мотивації, спрямованої на виконання норм і цінностей, що панують у суспільстві або групі.	Примусова мотивація – це мотивація за допомогою використання сили, погроз чи інших примусових заходів.	Стимулювальна мотивація – це така мотивація, що досягається за допомогою застосування стимулів.

Таблиця 3. Мотивація за джерелами виникнення

Зовнішня мотивація	Внутрішня мотивація
Зовнішня мотивація – це мотивація, що виникає внаслідок впливу зовнішніх чинників, а не внутрішнього бажання або цікавості до виконання дії.	Внутрішня мотивація – це мотивація, яка виникає з власного бажання особистості, а не під впливом зовнішніх обставин.

Таблиця 4. Мотивація за напрямом досягнення мети

Позитивна	Негативна
Позитивна мотивація – це мотивація, що спонукає людину до дій за допомогою позитивних стимулів та обіцянок.	Негативна мотивація – це мотивація, що базується на страху, погрозах, критиці та негативних наслідках.

У нашій статті приділимо увагу матеріальній, статусній, трудовій, стимулювальній мотиваціям державних службовців, оскільки саме вони, на відміну від негативної мотивації, що може викликати в державного службовця негативні емоції, зумовити появу вигорання, призвести до зниження внутрішньої мотивації, сприяють збільшенню продуктивності й ефективності, підвищенню рівня задоволеності державним службовцем своєю роботою, зниженню рівня стресу та вигорання.

На відміну від матеріальної мотивації державних службовців розвинених країн, державні службовці України мають меншу матеріальну мотивацію. Наприклад, у Французькій Республіці, крім окладу, державним службовцям передбачено квартирні гроші, премії, оплату іншої посади, надбавку тим, у кого є сім'я.

У Німеччині державним службовцям гарантовано соціальні виплати: матеріальну допомогу, пенсію, забезпечення сім'ї після смерті державного службовця, компенсації при нещасних і в інших особливих випадках, щорічну відпустку зі збереженням повної заробітної плати. Якщо у зв'язку зі службою державному службовцю треба змінити місце

проживання, йому гарантують оплату витрат. Заробітну плату державного службовця визначено фіксованою сіткою оплати праці, розмір якої залежить від посади, рангу, стажу державного службовця, й окладами, затвердженими на законодавчому рівні.

Відповідно до статті 7 Закону України «Про державну службу» «державний службовець має право на оплату праці залежно від займаної посади, результатів службової діяльності, стажу державної служби, рангу та умов контракту про проходження державної служби (у разі укладення), відпустки, соціальне та пенсійне забезпечення відповідно до закону, професійне навчання, зокрема за державні кошти, відповідно до потреб державного органу, просування по службі з урахуванням професійної компетентності та сумлінного виконання своїх посадових обов'язків» тощо (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015).

Відповідно до статті 50 Закону України «Про державну службу» передбачено матеріальні стимули: «надбавки за вислугу років, надбавки за ранг державного службовця, премії (у разі встановлення)» (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015). Для українських державних службовців передбачено премії трьох видів: «премію за результатами щорічного оцінювання службової діяльності; місячну або квартальну премію відповідно до особистого внеску державного службовця в загальний результат роботи державного органу; місячну або квартальну премію за належне виконання умов контракту про проходження державної служби (у разі укладення)» (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015) – «виплату за додаткове навантаження у зв'язку з виконанням обов'язків тимчасово відсутнього державного службовця» (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015), «виплату за додаткове навантаження у зв'язку з виконанням обов'язків за вакантною посадою державної служби» (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015), «компенсацію за роботу, що передбачає доступ до державної таємниці» (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015).

У Стратегії реформування державного управління України на 2022–2025 роки анонсовано «проведення комплексної реформи системи оплати праці, що передбачає збільшення сталої частини, обмеження варіативної частини на основі чітких критеріїв, зменшення складових у структурі оплати праці, усунення причин для розривів в оплаті праці, наближення розміру оплати праці державних службовців до рівня показників розміру заробітної плати на посадах аналогічного рівня складності та відповідальності у приватному секторі» (Стратегія реформування державного управління України на 2022– 2025 роки, 2021: 16).

Вищезазначена пропозиція може мати як переваги, так і недоліки. З одного боку, збільшення сталої частини заробітної плати та зменшення варіативної частини дозволить зробити оплату праці більш стабільною й передбачуваною для державних службовців, що може позитивно вплинути на мотивацію державних службовців, з іншого – зменшення варіативної частини заробітної плати може знизити мотивацію державних службовців до досягнення високих результатів.

Показовими в контексті вищезазначеного й на тлі інфляції є результати опитування державних службовців у 2023 році щодо розміру заробітної плати («За результатами опитування встановлено зміни розміру заробітної плати державних службовців за останній рік: 50% зменшилася, 34% залишилася без змін, 16% збільшилася» (Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2023: 14)). Крім того, 84% державних службовців зазначили, що не здійснюється оплата понаднормової роботи (Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2023: 18).

У сучасних українських економічних реаліях з інфляцією й підвищенням податкового тиску, цін на тарифи, на нашу думку, однією з пріоритетних мотивацій для державних службовців є висока заробітна плата, якої поки що держава їм забезпечити не може. Отже, підвищується ризик відтоку професіоналів із цієї сфери, утрати престижності державної



служби. У Великій Британії з подібної ситуації вийшли, забезпечивши державним службовця гідний рівень життя: у 80-х роках ХХ століття рівень заробітної плати прив'язали до обсягу та якості виконаної роботи.

Щодо трудової мотивації державних службовців керівнику державної служби треба докласти максимум зусиль для створення позитивної робочої атмосфери, що сприятиме підвищенню ефективності виконання державним службовцем своїх посадових обов'язків. Пропонуємо керівникові подбати про хороший інтер'єр й умови праці (комфортні крісла, рослини, світло тощо), проводити невеликі заходи для відзначення успіхів державних працівників, створювати атмосферу довіри й відкритості, із повагою ставитися до співробітників, підкреслювати цінність їхньої особистості, заохочувати взаємодопомогу, виявляти оптимізм і позитивний настрій, підтримувати баланс між роботою й особистим життям державних службовців. Щодо останнього, то йому керівник державної служби повинен приділити особливу увагу для уникнення професійного вигорання державних службовців, оскільки в Україні вищезазначений баланс часто порушується через негайну додаткову роботу, яку треба виконати у вільний від роботи час. Це призводить до появи конфліктогенних ситуацій у родині державного службовця, а згодом до виникнення негативної реакції не тільки на додаткову роботу, а й ту, яку державні службовці виконують у межах робочого часу.

На нашу думку, для створення неконфліктної атмосфери на роботі, підвищення рівня задоволення державним службовцем виконання службових обов'язків варто ввести щоденні медитативні практики. Вони зменшують рівень стресу й тривожності, тренують здатність зосереджувати увагу на поточних завданнях, що сприятиме підвищенню ефективності роботи, допомагають розвивати емоційну свідомість і саморегуляцію, покращують психоемоційний стан, допомагають зберігати енергію й мотивацію, підтримувати психічну стійкість, розвивають терпимість і спокій, що є важливим фактором під час спілкування з людьми, тощо. Крім вищезазначеного, державним службовцям треба забезпечити систематичне спілкування з психологом для надання держслужбовцям консультацій із питань, пов'язаних з емоційним виснаженням, стресом, конфліктами тощо. Це позитивно впливатиме на психоемоційний стан і працездатність державних службовців, що є актуальним у період повномасштабного вторгнення Російської Федерації в Україну, коли нервова система людей максимально виснажена через систематичні повітряні тривоги, хвилювання за долю своїх рідних та близьких, обмеження виїзду за кордон у зв'язку з Указом Президента України №27/2023 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 23 січня 2023 року «Про деякі питання щодо перетину державного кордону України в умовах воєнного стану» (Про деякі питання щодо перетину державного кордону України в умовах воєнного стану: Указ Президента України, 2023). Аргументом щодо впровадження медитативних практик, систематичного спілкування державних службовців із психологами й забезпечення на державному рівні такої можливості є результати опитування державних службовців за 2023 рік про негативні стани, які державні службовці відчували «протягом останніх трьох місяців» (Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2023: 36): «72% – тривогу, 67% – втому, 55% – внутрішню напругу, 54% – погіршення сну, 35% – страх, 31% – часті головні болі, 26% – емоційну нестабільність, 25% – погіршення пам'яті та уваги, 22% – депресію, 21% – апатію, 17% – зниження продуктивності, 17% – паніку, 15% – зниження або підвищення апетиту, 6% – втрату сенсу життя, 6% – шок» (Результати опитування «Організація роботи державних службовців та оплата праці в умовах воєнного стану», 2023: 36).

Керівник державної служби повинен дотримуватися демократичного підходу під час спілкування з працівниками й використовувати сучасні методи мотивації. Згідно з

Постановою Кабінету Міністрів України від 12 квітня 2022 року № 440 «Деякі питання організації роботи державних службовців та працівників державних органів у період воєнного стану» «за рішенням керівника державної служби в державному органі може запроваджуватися дистанційна робота у разі наявності організаційних і технічних можливостей для виконання їх посадових обов'язків» (Деякі питання організації роботи державних службовців та працівників державних органів у період воєнного стану: Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України, 2022). В умовах воєнного стану, коли є небезпека життю та здоров'ю або на робочому місці, або під час дороги на роботу через систематичні обстріли країною-агресором територій України, можливість працювати вдома є додатковою трудовою мотивацією для українських державних службовців, оскільки дозволяє гармонізувати психоемоційний стан державних службовців.

Щодо статусної мотивації в Україні варто згадати про розділ V «Службова кар'єра» Закону України «Про державну службу», у якому йдеться про 9 рангів державних службовців – «види спеціальних звань» (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015), механізм призначення вищезазначених рангів, а також «просування державного службовця по службі» (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015) на підставі результатів конкурсу, що може бути ефективним мотиваційним інструментом лише за умови справедливого відбору й забезпечення рівних умов для всіх учасників. Варто зазначити, що надбавка за ранги («9 ранг – 200 грн, 8 ранг – 300 грн, 7 ранг – 400 грн, 6 ранг – 500 грн, 5 ранг – 600 грн, 4 ранг – 700 грн, 3 ранг – 800 грн, 2 ранг – 900 грн, 1 ранг – 1000 грн» (Питання оплати праці працівників державних органів: Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України, 2017) з огляду на інфляцію, підвищення податкового тиску тощо в Україні, на нашу думку, не є мотиваційним чинником для просування кар'єрними сходами.

У розвинених країнах державна служба користується високим статусом у суспільстві, є чіткі ієрархічні шаблі кар'єрного зростання, що задовольняє прагнення до підвищення статусу, вищі посади супроводжуються більшими матеріальними та нематеріальними привілеями, в Україні вищезазначені тенденції слабо виражені.

Автори А. Ю. Жулавський, В.П. Гордієнко, Н.О. Малько пропонують упровадити в Україні досвід Французької Республіки щодо «побудови матриці підвищення та просування на посадах кожного працівника державного органу з метою уникнення професійного вигорання» (Жулавський, Гордієнко, Малько, 2021).

В Україні є нематеріальні види заохочення, зазначені в статті 53 Закону України «Про державну службу»: «оголошення подяки; нагородження грамотою, почесною грамотою, іншими відомчими відзнаками державного органу; дострокове присвоєння рангу в порядку, визначеному цим Законом; представлення до нагородження урядовими відзнаками та відзначення урядовою нагородою (вітальний лист, подяка, почесна грамота); представлення до відзначення державними нагородами» (Про державну службу: Закон України, 2015).

Варто пам'ятати, що на мотивацію державних службовців впливають вікові особливості, які зумовлюють зміну життєвих орієнтирів, пов'язаних із подальшою соціалізацією, зміною статусів в особистому житті, появою нових матеріальних потреб, а також стаж роботи. Тенденцію зміни мотивів діяльності адміністративного персоналу місцевих державних адміністрацій, детерміновану стажем роботи на державній службі, зафіксував М. В. Ярмистий (Ярмистий, н. д.) – «директор Центру перепідготовки та підвищення кваліфікації працівників органів державної влади, органів місцевого самоврядування, державних підприємств, установ та організацій» (Ярмистий, н. д.). На підставі результатів опитування М. В. Ярмистий стверджує, що «працівники ОДА і РДА, які мають стаж державної служби до 5-ти років, в більшій мірі ніж інші державні службовці керуються такими мотивами, як перспективи професійного росту та бажання зробити кар'єру; від 5 до 15 років – відчуття влади та поваги до себе зі сторони інших людей; від 15 і

більше років – престиж статусу державного службовця та бажання реалізувати себе в системі державного управління» (Ярмистий, н. д.). Прикметним є те, що досліднику також вдалося зафіксувати залежність мотивів праці від віку: «бажання реалізувати себе в системі державного управління (державні службовці 19–29 років 43% та 60% вік 50–59 років). І навпаки, коли йдеться про перспективи професійного росту та бажання зробити кар'єру, то цим мотивом керуються 43% державних службовців віком 19–29 років та 30% – віком 50–59 років» (Ярмистий, н. д.).

Вищезазначені опитування, на нашу думку, повинні стати систематичним явищем, оскільки результати систематичного опитування державних службовців щодо мотивації виконання ними обов'язків, а також результати психологічних тестів, кваліфіковано оброблені психологом, дадуть змогу розробити персоналізовані плани розвитку державного службовця, ефективні стратегії для підвищення його задоволення роботою, не допустити професійного вигорання державного службовця, виявити стресові фактори, підвищити ефективність роботи, сприяти згуртованості колективу, запобіганню конфліктів тощо. Систематичні опитування створюють канал для зворотного зв'язку, що дозволить державним службовцям висловити свої думки та пропозиції. Це підвищує залученість державних службовців до процесу прийняття рішень.

Одним із факторів мотивації до державної служби є рівень довіри суспільства до влади. Якщо він низький, це може стати демотиватором якісного виконання державними службовцями своїх обов'язків, тому що в суспільстві є неправильне ототожнення державних службовців і тих суб'єктів владних повноважень, які зазначені в статті 3, частині 3 Закону України «Про державну службу». У результаті в Україні виникає парадоксальна ситуація, коли професіоналами керують ті, хто на свою посаду потрапив за політичним принципом і може приймати неефективні управлінські рішення, наслідком яких може стати виникнення кризи.

Рівень довіри українців до влади суттєво знизився порівняно із 2022 роком, про що свідчать результати опитування, проведеного Київським міжнародним інститутом соціології (КМІС) із 29 листопада 2023 року по 09 грудня 2023 року. Було опитано 1031 респондента методом телефонних інтерв'ю на основі випадкової вибірки мобільних телефонів із використанням комп'ютерів. «До вибірки не включалися жителі територій, які тимчасово не контролювалися владою України до 24 лютого 2022 (АР Крим, м. Севастополь, окремі райони Донецької та Луганської областей), а також опитування не проводилося з громадянами закордоном» (Лисогор, 2023). 2024 року Київський міжнародний інститут соціології впродовж 20 вересня – 03 жовтня опитав 2004 респонденти, до цієї вибірки не включено жителів тимчасово окупованих територій (Гузь, 2024). Результати вищезазначених опитувань узагальнено в таблиці 6.

Таблиця 6. Результати опитування КМІС щодо довіри до влади.

№ з/п	Орган влади, глава держави	Рівень довіри у 2022 році	Рівень довіри у 2023 році.	Рівень довіри у 2024 році
1.	Верховна Рада України	35 %	15 %	11 %
2.	Кабінет Міністрів України	52 %	26%	20%
3.	Президент України	84%	62%	59%
4.	Суди	Відсотки не зазначено. «Критично низькою із	12%	Інформації немає.

		значним погіршенням порівняно з минулим роком є довіра судам і прокурорам» (Лисогор, 2023).		
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Для підвищення рівня довіри українського суспільства до державних органів влади, органів місцевого самоврядування завдяки політичній реформі, запропонованій нами в монографії «Кризи в системі публічного управління та адміністрування України», треба ліквідувати чотири основні причини зниження довіри українського суспільства до влади. Ідеться про несформованість професійної політичної еліти, порушення балансу між гілками влади, комунікативний бар'єр у діаді «українська влада – українське суспільство», корупцію. За твердженням G. Van Ryzin, що, на нашу думку, є слушним, без довіри «адміністративні органи не зможуть розраховувати на те, що громадяни будуть дотримуватися правил, співпрацювати щодо колективних благ й адекватно реагувати на надзвичайні ситуації» (Van Ryzin, 2007).

Закордонні автори A. Ritz, G. Brewer G. і O. Neumann, досліджуючи різні джерела, у своїй статті (Ritz, Brewer, Neumann, 2016) зазначили рекомендації щодо підвищення мотивації до державної служби й дійшли висновку, що не всі рекомендації можна реалізувати з огляду на політичні та юридичні моменти. Деяку інформацію для зручності сприйняття оформлено в таблиці 7.

Таблиця 7. Рекомендації щодо підвищення мотивації до державної служби.

№ з/п	Автор	Рекомендації
1.	Houston David J. (Houston, David, 2006).	Активізація набору потенційних державних службовців у аспірантуру.
2.	Clerkin Richard M., Jerrell D. Cogburn (Clerkin, Cogburn, 2012).	Удосконалення інструментів оцінювання.
3.	Andersen, L. B., Kjeldsen A. M. (Andersen, &, Kjeldsen, 2013).	Наймання працівників із високою мотивацією до державної служби.
4.	Carpenter Jacqueline, Dennis Doverspike, Rosanna F. Miguel (Carpenter, Doverspike, & Miguel, 2012).	Створення бренду громадських послуг.
5.	Giauque David, Simon Anderfuhren-Biget, & Frédéric Varone (Giauque, Anderfuhren-Biget, & Varone, 2013).	«Дозвіл працівникам брати участь у прийнятті важливих рішень» (Giauque, Anderfuhren-Biget, & Varone, 2013).
6.	Pande S., & Jain N. (Pande, & Jain, 2014).	Зменшення корупції, адаптація організаційних структур.
7.	Andersen L. B., Eriksson T., Kristensen N., & Pedersen L. H. (Andersen, Eriksson, Kristensen, & Pedersen, 2013).	Пропозиція замінити бонуси на пакети медичних послуг.
8.	Kim Sangmook (Kim, Sangmook, 2006).	Сприяти появі відчуття суспільної користі від виконаної роботи.

На нашу думку, деякі з вищезазначених рекомендацій треба взяти до уваги й упроваджувати з урахуванням українських реалій як на рівні конкретних колективів державних службовців, так і на державному рівні.

Оскільки Україна поки що не може забезпечити державним службовцям збільшення матеріальної мотивації, варто активізувати інші позитивні види мотивації державних службовців. Однією з форм мотивації в Україні була участь державних службовців у щорічному Всеукраїнському конкурсі «Кращий державний службовець». У Положенні про систему підготовки, спеціалізації та підвищення кваліфікації державних службовців, голів місцевих державних адміністрацій, їх перших заступників та заступників, посадових осіб місцевого самоврядування, затвердженому Постановою Кабінетом Міністрів України від 7 липня 2010 р. № 564, яке втратило чинність 21.02.2019 року, було зазначено, що «щорічний Всеукраїнський конкурс “Кращий державний службовець”» (Про затвердження Положення про систему підготовки, спеціалізації та підвищення кваліфікації державних службовців, голів місцевих державних адміністрацій, їх перших заступників та заступників, посадових осіб місцевого самоврядування: Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України, 2010) є видом підвищення кваліфікації державних службовців. Вищезазначений конкурс давав державним службовцям змогу продемонструвати свої професійні досягнення, що мотивувало державних службовців до подальшого розвитку, сприяв підвищенню конкурентоспроможності державних установ, розвитку мережі професіоналів тощо. Вважаємо доречним відродження традиції проведення Всеукраїнського конкурсу «Кращий державний службовець» із деякою мірою зміненим набором завдань.

На нашу думку, необхідно створювати не тільки українські, а й міжнародні платформи для спілкування державних службовців, що сприятиме активізації обміну не тільки українським та міжнародним досвідом, а також удосконаленню знання іноземної мови.

## **Висновки**

Отже, результати дослідження дають змогу констатувати недостатню матеріальну мотивацію українських державних службовців у сучасних реаліях воєнного стану й активізації різних видів криз, зокрема й економічної кризи. З огляду на це для уникнення кадрової кризи в державній службі треба приділяти увагу активізації трудової, статусної, стимулювальної мотивацій. Керівник державної служби повинен створювати комфортні умови для роботи й саморозвитку державних службовців, дбати про здорову психологічну атмосферу в колективі, організовувати щоденні медитативні практики, розроблені фахівцями й упроваджені за згодою колективу, забезпечувати демократичний стиль спілкування, підкреслюючи цінність кожного працівника, організовувати систематичні опитування щодо з'ясування рівня мотивації державних службовців і вибудовувати для кожного траєкторію мотивації, відстежуючи появу загроз професійного вигорання й вносячи корективи для нейтралізації цих загроз. На державному рівні повинні проводитися системні зміни, спрямовані на підвищення довіри українського суспільства до органів державної влади, що також є важливим мотиваційним чинником для державних службовців.

## **Заява**

### **Фінансування**

Це дослідження не було профінансовано жодною організацією та здійснювалося за рахунок автора.

### **Конфлікт інтересів**

Жодного.

### Етика

Матеріал, що подано в цій статті, відповідає всім пунктам і вимогам, що висунуті Комісією з етики редакторсько-видавничого відділу громадської організації «Науково-освітній центр «УСПШНИЙ».

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## Специфіка мотивації державних службовців в Україні й рекомендації щодо підвищення їхньої мотивації

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### Анотація

*Метою статті є висвітлення специфіки мотивації державних службовців в Україні й формулювання рекомендації для підвищення їхньої мотивації. Під час дослідження було використано методи аналізу, синтезу, узагальнення, порівняльний, описовий методи.*

*Для досягнення поставленої мети було проаналізовано українську нормативно-правову базу, пов'язану з державною службою, сучасні українські реалії, українські та закордонні статті, у яких було висвітлено тему «мотивація державних службовців», і запропоновано рекомендації для підвищення мотивації державних службовців.*

*Результати дослідження дають змогу констатувати недостатню матеріальну мотивацію українських державних службовців у сучасних реаліях воєнного стану й активізації різних видів криз, зокрема й економічної кризи. З огляду на це для уникнення кадрової кризи в державній службі треба приділяти увагу активізації трудової, статусної, стимулювальної мотивації. Керівник державної служби повинен створювати комфортні умови для роботи й саморозвитку державних службовців, дбати про здорову психологічну атмосферу в колективі, організувати щоденні медитативні практики, розроблені фахівцями й упроваджені за згодою колективу, забезпечувати демократичний стиль спілкування, підкреслюючи цінність кожного працівника, організувати систематичні опитування щодо з'ясування рівня мотивації державних службовців і вибудовувати для кожного траєкторію мотивації, відстежуючи появу загроз професійного вигорання й вносячи корективи для нейтралізації цих загроз. На державному рівні повинні проводитися системні зміни, спрямовані на підвищення довіри українського суспільства до органів державної влади, що також є важливим мотиваційним чинником для державних службовців.*

**Ключові слова:** державні службовці, мотивація, види мотивації, рекомендації.



**ВИМОГИ ДО ОФОРМЛЕННЯ СТАТЕЙ ДЛЯ ПУБЛІКАЦІЇ  
В НАУКОВОМУ ЖУРНАЛІ  
«СОЦІАЛЬНІ КОМУНІКАЦІЇ: ТЕОРІЯ І ПРАКТИКА»**

**Обсяг та форматування**

**<https://new.comteka.com.ua/index.php/journal/about/submissions>**

Повний обсяг статті разом з анотаціями англійською (обов'язково), українською (обов'язково) та мовою, якою написана стаття, додатками, таблицями, ілюстраціями, списком літератури має становити **26–80 тисяч знаків** (символів та пробілів).

Мінімальний обсяг тексту статті не повинен бути менше 8 сторінок (26 тисяч знаків із пробілами). Максимальний обсяг тексту статті не повинен перевищувати 60 сторінок (80 тисяч знаків із пробілами).

Обсяг рецензії на книгу має бути 5–10 тисяч знаків.

Файли необхідно називати прізвищем автора статті латиницею. Наприклад, Petrenko.doc. Якщо авторів кілька, то прізвищами перших двох авторів. Наприклад, Petrenko\_Sydorenko.doc.

Рукопис необхідно подавати у форматі, сумісному з Microsoft Word (можливі розширення файлів: .doc, .docx). Розмір сторінки А4; книжкова орієнтація; береги по 2 см.; шрифт Times New Roman; розмір шрифту 12; інтервал між рядками 1,0.

Назву статті треба набирати звичайним текстом; не допускається набір із використанням опції Caps Lock.

Необхідно розрізняти символи дефіс і тире (тире відокремлюється з обох боків пропусками й довше за дефіс).

Стиль тексту Звичайний (Normal). Використання інших стилів не допускається.

Схеми, графіки, діаграми (далі – ілюстрації), формули й таблиці нумеруються.

Ілюстрації таблиці не повинні перевищувати розміром зазначених вище розмірів сторінки (А4 мінімум по 2 см береги).

Таблиці формуються в редакторі таблиць (пункт меню «Таблиця»). Формат таблиць тільки книжковий.

Формули в статтях мають бути набрані за допомогою редактора Equation Editor.

Не рекомендується користуватись автоматичною нумерацією.

**Ілюстрації.** Формат файлів ілюстрацій: jpg. Роздільна здатність ілюстрацій: 300 dpi. Кожну ілюстрацію треба надсилати окремим файлом. Називати файл ілюстрації треба прізвищем автора статті латиницею. Якщо ілюстрацій кілька, то потрібно додавати в назві файлу після прізвища автора порядковий номер ілюстрації. Наприклад, Petrenko1.jpg; Petrenko2.jpg; Petrenko3.jpg.

Перед основним текстом статті потрібно вказати такі дані:

- прізвище, ім'я та по батькові автора/авторів, науковий ступінь, учене звання;
- електронна адреса, ORCID, Scopus Autor ID, Research ID, повна назва організації, у якій працює (навчається) автор, її адресу, поштовий індекс, назва країни;
- назву статті великими літерами;
- **анотацію (детальні вимоги – див. далі);**
- 3–5 ключових слів.

### **Вимоги до структури основного тексту статті** **<https://new.comteka.com.ua/index.php/journal/about/submissions>**

Основний текст статті повинен мати визначену структуру. Підрозділи статті, які наведено нижче, повинні бути виділені в тексті жирним шрифтом і розташовані на окремому рядку як підзаголовки.

**1. Вступ** (актуальність теми, огляд літератури й попередніх досліджень із цієї чи суміжної проблематики, мета статті). Обсяг – близько 3000 знаків.

**2. Методи дослідження** (не загальними фразами, а чітко розписати, які методи і як саме використовувалися для даного дослідження, тобто розкрити механізм проведення дослідження, яким чином було отримано його результати).

**3. Результати й обговорення** (навести основні результати дослідження).

**4. Висновки.**

**5. Подяки** (коротко висловити подяку університетові та дослідникам, які надали допомогу при підготовці публікації).

**6. Додатки й Таблиці** (якщо є Додатки й Таблиці, то вони обов'язково повинні мати заголовки й порядкові номери; примітки слід розміщувати безпосередньо під таблицями. У тексті статті обов'язково мають бути посилання на ці додатки чи таблиці).

**7. Список літератури.** Реквізити джерела для журнальних статей – автор, назва статті, назва журналу, номер журналу, рік видання, номери сторінок. Реквізити джерела для книжок – автор, назва книжки, місто видання, назва видавництва, рік видання, кількість сторінок. Приклади оформлення списку літератури дивіться далі.

### **Вимоги до анотації** **<https://new.comteka.com.ua/index.php/journal/about/submissions>**

**Анотації українською мовою та мовою, якою було написано статтю.**

**Обсяг анотації: 1800–2000 знаків, урахуваючи пробіли.**

Анотація має бути якісною, інформативною та лаконічною. Її мета – стисло відобразити основний зміст проведеного дослідження. **Уникайте повторення в анотації назви статті й загальних фраз.**

**Структуру анотацій описано далі.**

**Анотація англійською мовою (Annotation)**

**Обсяг анотації англійською: 1800–2000 знаків, урахуваючи артикли та пробіли.**

Анотація має бути написана **правильною англійською мовою** з урахуванням особливостей орфографії та граматики (британська або американська англійська, але не суміш обох). Неприпустимо подавати анотації, перекладені лише за допомогою комп'ютерних перекладачів.

**Структура анотації.** В анотації необхідно чітко вказати:

- **мету дослідження** (main **objective(s)** of the study);
- **методи (methodology)** – не загальними фразами, а чітко вказати, як саме було застосовано певні методи, тобто розкрити сам механізм проведеного дослідження, яким чином було отримано його результати (how the study was done);
- **головні результати й висновки дослідження (results/findings and conclusions)**, із яких має бути зрозумілою їх значимість (**significance**) для науки, суспільства, освіти тощо (здобутий новий цінний фактаж; виявлені нові взаємозв'язки та закономірності; підтверджені чи спростовані певні гіпотези тощо).

**Ключові слова (Keywords).**

Після анотації потрібно вказати 3–5 ключових слів, розділяючи їх крапкою з комою.

Добираючи ключові слова, урахуйте, що вони мають сприяти пошуку Вашої публікації в електронних каталогах та наукометричних базах. Рекомендуємо проаналізувати, які ключові слова зазвичай використовують у публікаціях за тематикою Вашого дослідження в ключових світових наукометричних базах, наприклад, ScienceDirect видавництва Elsevier (Scopus): <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/search>. Правильно підібрані ключові слова сприятимуть пошуку Вашої публікації колегами та підвищенню індексу її цитування.

### **Вимоги до оформлення списку літератури**

#### **Шановні автори!**

Звертаємо Вашу увагу, що до журналу «Соціальні комунікації: теорія та практика» приймаються для розгляду й подальшого double-blind (подвійного «сліпого») (анонімного) рецензування) тільки ті статті, що відповідають проблематиці журналу.

За умовами редакційної політики журналу «Соціальні комунікації: теорія та практика» автор/співавтори можуть опублікувати тільки одну статтю в поточному випуску.

#### **Умови подання й опублікування рукописів.**

Стаття подається однією з таких мов (українська, англійська, польська, сербська, чеська, французька, німецька, китайська) в онлайн-поданні – <https://new.comteka.com.ua/index.php/journal/about/submissions> або на електронну адресу – **akholod@ukr.net**.

Разом зі статтею подається окремим файлом підписана автором форма про ознайомлення з **Положенням про конфлікт інтересів** <https://comteka.com.ua/положення-про-конфлікт-інтересів/>.

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